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ABSTRACT
While the present work analyzes three distinct motifs – body, world, with – in the work of
Jean-Luc Nancy, the dissertation intends to investigate Nancy’s reading of Heidegger, with
particular focus on the question of Being-with. Given the nature of the reflection – opening
the question of otherness from within Heidegger – the research will also articulate a
dialogue between Nancy and Levinas. Through the examination of Nancy’s reading of
Heidegger, the dissertation will then endeavor to establish the original gesture of Nancy’s
contribution to philosophy, which will be identified in the concept of powers of existence.
Under the light of the analysis of the three concepts which structure the work, the
conclusions will define powers of existence as singular resistances of existence to the
mastering decision of philosophical work. This being the case philosophy will in turn
continuously loosen its categories and key words in the attempt to decide its course
according to what happens between us. The opening of a series of incommensurable
measures responds to the demand existence casts on philosophical work. The problem of
otherness is thus resolved as the work of powers of existence.
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The aim of the present work is neither that of tracing Nancy’s career, nor of 
introducing Nancy’s thought. Instead the analysis endeavors to follow Nancy’s reading of 
Heidegger in order to investigate to what extent the Heideggerian project motivates 
Nancy’s writing. The conditions for describing the originality of Nancy’s thought will 
emerge from the creative frictions between the two. 
This plan will be tracked in particular with regard to the notion of Being-with, which 
has been identified in the present work as the moment where Nancy’s appropriation of 
Heidegger becomes at once most distant and most productive.  
This same question that guides the research motivates the presence of a third 
interlocutor:  Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas has been one of the most attentive readers of 
Heidegger, engaging specifically the question of sociality. Finally dismissing the 
Heideggerian solution – because rooted in a philosophy of the world, where the Other is 
confronted simply as a moment in an otherwise individual and solitary trajectory – 
Levinas formulated the original command of otherness as epiphany of the face of the 
other human being. Jean-Luc Nancy never explicitly engages with the thought of 
Levinas, while at the same time one has the impression that his ‘return’ to Heidegger with 
regard to the theme of sociality and otherness works as a response and critique to the 
radically anti-Heideggerian position of Levinas.  
The dialogue between the Levinas and Nancy runs perhaps the risk of remaining 
sterile due to their conflicting readings of Being and Time. Nonetheless Nancy’s 
‘interpretation’ of Heidegger lets us envisage a possible reopening of the Levinasian 
question from within Heidegger himself. If Levinas shifts the interest from Being to the 
Other, Nancy’s reading of Heidegger situates the two on the same level. Instead of posing 
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an absolute otherness, Nancy’s conception of the co-essentiality of Being and Being-with 
opens the question of otherness at the heart of Being. Nancy seems to start at the point 
where Levinas finishes his work. 
 
Overall this research will thus attempt to read Nancy’s effort as directed to a 
disarticulation of Heidegger’s thinking of sociality (normally considered to be the 
weakest part of his thinking; Sartre, Levinas, Arendt all agree on this).  
Nancy’s reading though is almost never an historical or literal one; it is rather a 
reading that Heidegger himself suggests, one that aims at appropriating the underlying 
ground of existential analysis. Nancy explicitly states his engagement with Heidegger’s 
notion of finite being in his reworking of the idea of finite thinking, by trying to deliver 
finitude to its own openness, liberating it from a certain Heideggerian rhetoric. In a 
footnote to ‘A finite thinking’ Nancy writes ‘We don’t know finitude ‘in itself’ […] It is 
with this that we need to concern ourselves, and not the rhetoric of the modesty of 
thinking within which Heidegger remains trapped’1.  
Nancy starts precisely from a question that Heidegger has left unanswered, that of the 
body, to articulate finite existence at the crossing of materiality and thought. The question 
‘What a body can do?’, posed by Spinoza, allows Nancy to force Heideggerian thought to 
a territory of incommensurable measures. In Spinoza Nancy finds a model where the 
body is consigned neither to pure materiality nor to the simple extension of the mind, but 
precisely inhabits a space that is incommensurable to one or the other, opening both from 
within and making a clear distinction problematic. It is from this consideration of the 
                                                
1 Jean Luc Nancy, ‘A finite thinking’ in A finite thinking, Simon Sparks ed., trans. Edward Bullard, 
Jonathan Derbyshire and Simon Sparks (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), footnote 4, p.321  
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body that ensues the questioning of finite worldhood, which Nancy approaches in many 
works, but which is dealt with in a decisive manner in his volume on film. For Nancy 
cinema offers the possibility of reopening within the finitude of sense the infinity of its 
destination, namely the impossibility of grasping the sense of sense once and for all. By 
addressing the evidence of sense, cinema insists on the blind spot that the inscription of 
sense itself is. The world of finite sense opens in itself an infinite measure of sense.   
This touch of infinity on which finite sense rests, allows one to read the encounter 
between Nancy and Levinas at the moment where the latter invokes the notion of justice. 
Levinas advocates the intervention of the divine in the concept of justice. Levinas’ idea 
of justice springs from the breaking apart imposed by God on the face to face. In so doing 
Levinas seems to introduce a leap of faith, an impasse where the face to face is outclassed 
by the encounter with God. A number of commentators have argued that this moment 
impinges Levinas inasmuch as the distinction between the neutrality of the il y a and the 
intervention of the divine to guarantee justice remains uncertain. Nancy overcomes this 
difficulty by obliterating, in particular in the two volumes of the Deconstruction of 
Christianity, the clear distinction between secular and religious as well as that between 
finite and infinite. It is from this argument that a reconsideration of Heidegger becomes 
possible. Within the Heideggerian framework – existence considered as the disclosure of 
possibilities through the referentiality of sense in the world – the question of otherness 
becomes the question of the infinite reopening of the possibilities of finite existence. 
Finite existence in its three moments – body, world, with – is caught in the infinite as the 
continuous exposure of its significations to incommensurable appropriations.  
7
   
The point therefore will be to see from which concepts Nancy starts and how – namely 
thanks to what kind of ‘writing’ – he manages to articulate Heideggerian questions 
otherwise than Heidegger. This opens also the space to identify Nancy’s specific gesture. 
The research will then attempt to name Nancy’s original contribution to philosophy, that 
which allows his writings – whose format is mainly that of the short essay – to move 
from a complication of Heidegger to a more affirmative position.  
One has to retrace this decision in the space devoted to each single concept. This 
decision is not summoned at the end, but contained in the traces that punctuate the 
shattered movement of Nancy’s writing.     
 
Although one can identify a continuity of concerns and strategies, Nancy’s 
fragmentary style makes it difficult to systematize his thinking or to isolate one single 
concept. Each concept works on an incessant movement of presentation and withdrawal. 
What becomes apparent through these negotiations is the struggle by which 
argumentation seems always to lead thinking to moments of incommensurability which 
revitalize discourse without being resolved. Each concept therefore is articulated as 
intensification or an adjustment of the others.  
One should thus pay attention to the fact that Nancy’s writing responds to the same 
structure of plural sense and incommensurability that his work attempts to advance as its 
very conceptual agenda.  
For Nancy the problem of writing, the strategy of inscription, becomes co-essential 
with the demand of the creation of concepts. A distinction between philosophy as 
literature and philosophy as the naked re-appropriation of the question of Being is highly 
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problematic; one always has to do with the ‘essential indecision of the two’2. As Blanchot 
says then every philosopher is the ‘man of duplicitous word: there is what he says and 
what is important, interesting, original and able to prolong the interminability of 
discourse, but behind this, there is something that revokes his words’3.  
 
For the sake of the analysis and of coherent presentation this work will nevertheless be 
structured around three motives. However it is not only what the concepts do, but also 
how the concepts are orchestrated that characterizes Nancy’s gesture. Although the 
fragment is one of the preferred forms of Nancy’s writing, the fragment doesn’t simply 
dissect an original identity. The shattering precedes the unity; therefore each fragment 
collaborates with the other not in order to reconstitute a lost coherence. 
The risk of turning philosophy into literature is one Nancy is willing to take in the 
name of a possibility to save the argument from presenting concepts as the absolute. 
Fragments therefore do not only mark an insufficiency or establish a derivation of 
philosophy from literature, instead they respond to ‘the movement of meaning in the 
suspension of signification, which withdraws meaning in giving it, in order to give it as 
its gift’4. 
 
 
 
                                                
2 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Experience of Freedom, trans. Bridget McDonald (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 152 
3 Maurice Blanchot, ‘Le Discourse Philosophique’ in Maurice Blanchot: Récits critiques, eds. Cristophe 
Bident and Pierre Vilar (Tours: Éditions Farrago, 2003), 49 (translation mine). 
4 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Experience of Freedom, trans. Bridget McDonald (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 151 
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The following  concepts will be analyzed: 
- the body as the exposure of Dasein’s existence and what of Dasein’s existence is 
exposed; 
- the world as the opening of the question of sense understood in terms of what 
happens between us; 
- the with as the opening of the problem of otherness as incommensurable distance 
in the circulation of sense; 
 
Following Nancy one could move then from the characterization of the body to the 
definition of an ethical world, but also the opposite way: a world whose ethical stance lies 
in the impossibility of reducing the contact of bodies in separation (with) to a category.  
If the body is that which consistently keeps moving ‘towards the world’, the world 
being the very place where this transcendence becomes factical, the with is the hyphen 
that separates and maintains this transcendence. Such a manner of thinking permits to see 
the place of ethics in a perpetual form of displacement where the world is both what it is 
and also what is called by to separate itself from mere presence and givenness. The with 
is not then a simple device, but this very logic of unsettlement, a logic that prevents the 
becoming absolute of the ethical in a principle beyond the sense of the world. 
 
The work is organized in three chapters each devoted to one concept.  
The first chapter focuses on the question of the body in Nancy’s work Corpus5. The 
text doesn’t present a systematic treatment of the question of the body. Instead Nancy’s 
                                                
5 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A. Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008) 
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attempt to expose the intertwining of materiality and thought is elaborated according to a 
strategy of displacements achieved through a series of resolutions. Concepts like body, 
flesh, incarnation, are adopted momentarily and only strategically. The fragments are 
often organized or culminate with long lists, which occasionally lead to what Derrida has 
called aposiopesis6. 
Nancy’s discussion of the body is framed as an attempt to open Heidegger’s silence on 
the question of the body, taking this silence to be a praeteritio: the body receives its 
emphasis through silence. Nancy’s work will be read in the light of Spinoza’s Ethics, in 
particular there where the latter seems to offer a model to liberate the body. The work of 
Emmanuel Levinas is introduced towards the end of the chapter, since the notion of 
position developed in his early writings seems to provide a point of contact with Nancy’s 
attempt to link the question of the body with that of existence.         
 
The second chapter attempts a reading of the question of the world, mainly from 
Nancy’s volume The Creation of the World or Globalization7. Here Nancy embarks in a 
deconstruction of the onto-theological tradition that has presented the world in terms of a 
principle lying beyond itself. As the principle is often a divine one this deconstructive 
gesture cannot be completely separated from a deconstruction of Christianity. Following 
a reading of Heidegger’s notion of Being-in-the-world Nancy’s analysis understands the 
world as the site for the opening of sense as that which responds to the question ‘what 
happens between us’. ‘Us’ can be pronounced only insofar as it is pronounced within the 
                                                
6 Jacques Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Christiene Irizarry (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), 71 
7 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David Pettigrew 
(New York: SUNY Press, 2007)  
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limits of this world ‘here’. The sense of the world is always given, but only insofar as it 
given to ‘us’. Given to be given again. 
Heidegger’s attempt to extricate the question of the world from the subject – object 
relation and Heidegger’s own project of destruction are subject in Nancy’s text to a 
creative re-appropriation. This becomes more apparent when the question of a world 
without principle is read in the light of Heidegger’s examination of Leibniz’ principle of 
reason. 
In order to expose the logic of a world without principle, the chapter will investigate 
the relation cinematographic image and reality, as explored in Nancy’s The evidence of 
film8. In particular the work of American director John Cassavetes will be presented as an 
attempt to figure out a strategy of sociality based on distance. 
 
The third chapter will take its cue from Levinas’ notion of metaphysical desire and 
intends to question the notion of originary otherness. Levinas’ refusal of Heidegger’s 
Being-in-the-world constitutes the point of departure to develop the dialogue between 
Levinas, Heidegger and Nancy. The phenomenology of desire that occupies the central 
part of Totality and Infinity will be re-opened in a debate with Heidegger. The question of 
an originary otherness and Levinas’ relationship with the work of Martin Buber will be 
confronted with Nancy’s work on the incommensurable.  
Heidegger’s notion of Being-with, refused by Levinas because organized around an 
indifferent crowd or because grounded in individualism, provides Nancy with the 
possibility of understanding a co-essential plurality at the heart of singular existence.  
                                                
8 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Evidence of Film, trans. Christine Irizarry and Verena Conley (Brussels: Yves 
Gevaert Éditeur, 2001) 
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In this light therefore the with remains inappropriable, its logic is that of separation. 
Without being a thing, the with is that which commands a logic of relation based on the 
distinction of the terms that engage in the relation. The separation of the terms imposed 
by the with is that which allows the two terms to keep relating to each other.  
With therefore designates relation in terms of that which happens and withdraws 
between us. With is nothing, meaning that it is not some thing, but that which happens 
between things. As Jean-Luc Nancy puts it the law of the with is that of ‘the distinct that 
distinguishes itself in entering the relation […] coming to the other and separating itself 
from it’9.  
The fact that the with remains incommensurable guarantees the opening towards the 
other that Levinas was seeking to address.  
 
The problem of otherness will therefore be understood in terms of decision over 
singular existence. Existence is the work of otherness inasmuch as it always has to decide 
itself. This decision is always co-appearing along the with. 
The work of otherness at the heart of existence will be explored finally in the 
conclusive remarks where the attempt will be to understand Nancy’s 
incommensurabilities as the work of powers of existence. Those name on one side the 
primacy for Nancy of philosophy as demand towards the open and on the other the 
necessity of plunging philosophy into limit-thoughts and incommensurable distances.  
With regard to the first point for Nancy philosophy is mainly a problem of keeping 
open the exercise of questioning; the stress is therefore always on the possibility of 
                                                
9 Jean-Luc Nancy, L’ “il y a” du rapport sexuel, (Paris: Galilée, 2001), 22 (translation mine) 
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retaining in philosophy the primacy of the question. The work of philosophy is that of 
questioning acquired significations in the name of a reopening of sense, whose 
consequences cannot be completely calculated. Finite thinking must retain a completion 
in incompletion. 
On the second point the incommensurable is thought by Nancy in order to avoid 
binary structures and the reification of philosophical concepts. Nancy acknowledges that 
the work of philosophy is always an attempt to recover the ‘advance of existence’. In this 
act of recovering philosophy doesn’t represent existence, rather it interrupts it and works 
in and as this interruption. What this means is that philosophy must inhabit a space where 
reconciliation is impossible, but where the evidence of the real is exposed as that which 
philosophy has to decide upon without though extinguishing neither the real nor its own 
(in)decision. The opening of any question to the incommensurable is what prompts the 
most decisive transgression and allows philosophical discourse to proceed.  
The return to Heidegger in the conclusive section then explores another silence, this 
time on the question of love. In ‘Shattered Love’ Nancy reopens the possibility for a 
discourse of love from within the Heideggerian ontological constitution of Dasein, 
proposing that a logic of the broken heart would allow one to envisage a new opening of 
the notion of otherness in Heidegger’s thinking. The movement of love, which disrupts 
and at the same time widens the discourse, rather than determining the closure of the 
argument, should explode the enquiry towards a reconsideration of what still remains 
unthought. 
14
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‘You said soul…can you really still think about the soul’s reality
when the torture has shown you that your body is everything? Your
body has resisted, not your soul; and your mind, which is body, has
resisted. And very soon, body and mind…‘Mas tu y ello juntamente
en tierra en humo en polvo en sombra en nada’
Leonardo Sciascia1
                                                
1 Leonardo Sciascia, The Council of Egypt, trans. Adrienne Foulke (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1966),
183
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Introduction
Considerable attention has been devoted to the body in current reassessments of
phenomenology, metaphysics, film and literature. And yet the body resists
discourse by almost bouncing it back. To present it in a schematic fashion, one
could say that the discussion has mainly polarized around on one side discursive
bodies, bodies that are mostly constructed through socio-cultural practices and, on
the other, mere material bodies, bodies whose matter is all that matters. The body
resists. It resists as excess.
How is it possible, given these premises, to (re)open the question concerning the
body? In other words: how can one reopen the question of the body sewing
together the empirical reality of bodies and the relation they entertain with the
ideality of sense?
The present work proceeds by retaining the opening itself as original gesture, in
order to let the body appear in its excesses, to let it appear – as it were - as that
which exceeds all secure borders. Opening a space, an extension – a kind of plastic
language will be at work throughout the discussion and forms part of its strategy –
whose suture is unknown, or, better said, is a closure that falls outside of the realm
of knowledge.
The abovementioned opening simultaneously exceeds a symbolic, hysteric
reduction and its opposite, the purely materialist account, where the body is the
irreducible crust. This excess would place the body not in between the two, since
such an inscription would probably mean nothing more than translating the two
17
reductions into a third one, but beyond and elsewhere. Beyond means here that the
opening remains at work throughout, it means that one does not open it in view of
a closure, but that the gesture of opening is retained as the foundational movement.
Beyond is here taken to indicate the fact that the question of the body is always a
question of adjusting the limit of the excess the body is. What is at stake here is a
questioning of the body that has in view the Heideggerian analysis, although
Heidegger apparently does not have much to say on the body.
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1.1 - Heidegger: a review.
It has bee said everywhere that Heidegger does not speak about the body: ‘one
does not find ten lines concerning the problem of the body’2.
In Being and Time there is no reference to corporeality. Better said, the only
reference one finds is a dismissive statement. ‘‘Bodily nature’ hides a whole
problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here’3. Heidegger is not going
to talk about Dasein’s bodily nature. Nevertheless one should perhaps be
suspicious given that this passage appears in Section 23, at the point where
Heidegger takes up the question of de-severance (Ent-fernung) and directionality
(Ausrichtung), Dasein’s way of orienting itself in the world. How could he avoid
talking about the body? Perhaps this hasty dismissal should then be read as a
praeteritio, a figure that allows one to achieve emphasis by passing something by.
Perhaps Heidegger simply wasn’t interested in trying to liberate the question of the
body from the metaphysics of substance into which tradition had plunged it. And
yet, this very operation seems to be nevertheless performed. The passage from §23
gives the impression, as Levin says, to produce an interruption4 and also to leave a
blank there where the ek-statical opening of the world promises a
phenomenological investigation of the body.
                                                
2 Alphone de Waelhens “The Philosophy of the Ambiguous”, in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure
of Behavior, trans. Alden L.Fischer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), xix
3 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London:
Blackwell, 2006), 124
4 David Michael Levin, ‘The ontological dimension of embodiment’ in The Body, Donn Welton eds.
(London: Blackwell, 1999), 124
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De-severance is ‘a kind of Being which Dasein has with regard to its Being-in-
the-world’5. It is a constitutive state of Dasein’s Being, a state whose factical
modes go from the ‘extremely close’ to ‘absolute remoteness’. The only mention
of the body therefore appears when Heidegger sets off to explain what it means for
Dasein to spatialize. Dasein opens space, makes space for itself. Dasein’s spatiality
is linked with its Being-in-the-world; it is one of the ways through which
Heidegger specifies the nature of ‘in’ and the concept of world. Dasein’s spatiality
is not that of an object inside the world, Dasein is not in the world as present-at-
hand; rather its happening in a space has an ontological connection to the world.
Dasein’s spatiality ‘cannot signify anything like occurrence at a position in a
‘world-space’, nor it can signify Being-ready-to-hand at some place’6. Dasein’s
way of being in space is of a different nature: Dasein relates to things present at
hand by becoming familiar with them, by concerning itself with them. Through
this concernful dealing it gives things space and renders them accessible. Dasein
brings what it encounters within-the-world into its sphere of concern, namely it
brings things at a distance.
As Heidegger reminds us this is an existential characteristic of Dasein. Bringing
close accounts as well for what is cognitively discovered and not simply for
objects drawn near for immediate use. This does not mean taking a subjectivist
stance. Dasein does not change the nature of the entities it encounters; it rather
reveals them as that which always already matters. This ‘primordial spatiality’
precedes every measuring (whether scientific or everyday) because it is intended as
a way of relating, rather than serving as a device for quantitative calculations. This
                                                
5 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London:
Blackwell, 2006), 139
6 Ibid., 138
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is what Heidegger means with the example of the street, whose touch one feels at
every step, ‘it slides itself as it were along certain portions of one’s body’7, and at
the same time it is more remote than what one can encounter at a distance on that
street. Dis-stancing as bringing close does not mean drawing something nearer to
my body, encumbered by my body as it were; it means that one is bringing
something existentially at a distance, becoming concerned with it. The corporeal
involvement of Dasein appears here as existential: it discloses a world without
necessarily bringing this world here.
In the expression ‘existential character of one’s body’, one should hear the fact
that my body is involved in the world. This involvement entails the activity of
reaching as that of disclosing a region without performing any particular action.
Furthermore it involves the almost passive situation of being always stretched
between here and there. Perhaps one could say that in these passages Heidegger is
pointing to a structure that sees the body as never in one place, but always at each
time constituting a somewhere. This – it will be seen – is the starting point where
Jean-Luc Nancy takes up the Heideggerian silence over the body (one first
appearance of the unthought) and develops it into the relation between the body
and existence. This relation – that one could call ‘exposure’ – is structured around
the fact that Dasein moves between a ‘here’ in which it finds itself (without ever
simply being/resting there) and a ‘there’, which it ‘makes’ each time. The fact that
Dasein ex-ists and that its nature is ek-statical – always already played out in the
outside where it has transcended all beings, including itself – constitutes the central
question of the body. As François Raffoul puts it: ‘transcendence is the taking
                                                
7 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London:
Blackwell, 2006), 142
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place of any place’8. Therefore, despite the fact that in Being and Time  Heidegger
does not articulate any explicit argument with regard to the body, it is possible to
reopen the aforementioned question from a Heideggerian perspective, regardless or
even because of Heidegger’s silence.
The existential character of the body is disclosed moving from this section of
Being and Time. It is at this point that Heidegger attempts to liberate the body from
its metaphysical ‘history’: the body is not a substance, but a particular way of
existing in the world. The body is perhaps – this is precisely what Nancy seems to
say – a fundamental way of being of Dasein, exposing the throwness of Dasein and
also its involvement with the world (Being-in) and with others. As Heidegger puts
it: ‘Dasein is proximally never here but yonder; from this ‘yonder’ it comes back to
its ‘here’; and it comes back to its ‘here’ only in the way in which it interprets its
concernful Being-towards’9.
In Heidegger’s work the question of the body becomes the question of Dasein’s
leaping over and of its concernful being-in-the-world as dealing with and working.
Because Dasein is neither vorhanden nor zuhanden, neither present-at-hand nor
ready-at-hand10, one could say that it is not only factically that the body occupies a
crucial juncture in Heidegger’s thinking. The body is not only what is present-at-
hand for other Daseine. Existentially it is the ek- that displaces any place. The
taking place of any place happens existentially with the body. It is as a body that I
assume a distance and inhabit the world as the outside to which I’ve transcended.
                                                
8 François Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, trans. David Pettigrew, Gregory Recco (New York:
Humanities Books, 1999), 152
9 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London:
Blackwell, 2006), 142
10 Derrida reminds us of the problem of foundation between the two: ‘Is or is not Vorahndenheit
founded on Zuhandenheit?’. Jacques Derrida, “Heidegger’s Hand (Geschlecht II)” in Psyche.
Inventions of the Other, Volume II, trans. John Leavey and Elizabeth Rottenbergh (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2008), 44
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The body is in charge of possibilities as the horizon of ek-sistence. This could also
be put in the following way: something about the body is already explained by its
bare being-there, but this something comes to be articulated only once the body
exists as dis-stance from the world.
It has been said that Jean-Luc Nancy tries to reopen the question of the body
from a Heideggerian perspective, but it shouldn’t be surprising that one finds no
explicit reference to Heidegger in Nancy’s Corpus. The book in fact tries to make
its own space. Thus it often takes on trajectories that, while respectful of the
dictates of philosophical praxis, do not follow a specific model of philosophical
presentation. The risk of this discourse betraying completely the laws of
philosophical writing is always open, in particular when one stumbles upon
propositions that ‘can neither be derived nor refuted’ that therefore prompt and
never abandon the ‘syncopation’ of philosophical discourse. Corpus inhabits this
syncope by relying constantly on undecidable series11.
As it is frequently the case with Nancy, the way Heidegger is read allows for an
indirect appropriation where the proper name Martin Heidegger seldom appears,
while at the same time one can feel the German philosopher watching over the
curve of the argument. This kind of appropriation does not repeat Heidegger’s
discourse; rather, it attempts to open Heidegger to his own possibilities.
Despite the fact that the question of the body is again not addressed frontally,
the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic takes up the question of Dasein’s
neutrality. Heidegger makes clear that his choice of ‘Dasein’ over ‘man’ was made
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in the name of neutrality. Dasein’s neutrality allows investigating ‘the being for
which its own proper mode of being in a definite sense is not indifferent’ prior to
factual determinations; existence prior to its concretions. This peculiar neutrality,
however, should be taken not as indifference but as potency. Neutrality here stands
for openness to possibilities disclosed by Dasein in view of the realization of
factual humanity. As Heidegger puts it, ‘neutral Dasein is indeed the primal source
of intrinsic possibility that springs up in every existence and makes it possible’12.
This allows Heidegger to separate his existential analysis from worldviews and
philosophies of life. As neutral Dasein gets immediately dispersed. Its dispersion is
what exists. Dasein exists as its own dispersion. Seen in this light neutrality
translates an original situation: Dasein is originally neutral, its neutrality stands for
‘the not yet of factical dispersion’13. It is at this point, in the ontical order, that
Heidegger inscribes bodiliness: ‘as factical Dasein is in each case dispersed in a
body’14. One should immediately caution that Heidegger does not introduce
dispersion as a negative term, and that the lexicon deployed – splitting,
dissociation, disaccord, division – cannot be heard only in its negative resonances.
As for other concepts belonging to Dasein’s facticity – falling, throwness, They
and destruction, among others – the register suggested by the terminology cannot
be taken too literally. Dispersion, further defined as bestrewal [Streuung] and
dissemination [Zertstreuung], is first of all a descriptive term. It describes Dasein’s
relation with the ‘multiplication’ of possibilities, its standing against and disclosing
them. This multiplication is already present in Dasein’s neutrality and is realized in
its essence: existence. Heidegger says that embodiment is an organizing factor of
                                                
12 Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1984), 137
13 Ibid., 137
14 Ibid., 137
24
this dispersion. Dispersed in a body, Dasein then assumes its proper multiplication,
it occurs in the world as extension [Erstreckung]. As Derrida says: ‘Erstreckung
names a spacing that, ‘prior to’ the determination of space as extensio, comes to
extend or stretch out being-there, the there of being, between birth and death’15.
The extension Dasein assumes as factically dispersed in a body belongs to its
ontological character, to its existential structure, and decides of both Dasein’s
temporality and its spatiality. As dispersed Dasein is in between: both in a temporal
sense (extended between birth and death) and in a spatial one (‘here’, ‘there’ and
every other spatial meaning belong to this dispersion). The body as we said is at
this point ‘an organizing factor’ of this original dispersion. Heidegger again stops
here. Nothing further is mentioned with regard to how embodiment organizes the
aforementioned dispersion. For the sake of this argument and for the analysis to
come, what one could retain from these passages of The Metaphysical Foundations
is a ‘lexical swarm’, the scattering of dis-, ‘the series of “dissociation”,
“distraction”, “dissemination”, “division”, “dispersion”’16.
In the Zollikon Seminars hosted between 1959 and 1969 by Medard Boss in
Zurich, Heidegger will take up the question of the body explicitly. The first
emergence of the term is to be found within a discussion of the phenomenon of
making-present. Heidegger tries to clarify to an audience of non-philosophers the
philosophical presuppositions sciences take for granted when explaining
physiological-psychological processes.
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University Press, 2008), 20
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The phenomenon of making-present, Heidegger says, cannot be considered as
self-evident and known. Heidegger criticizes the sciences for such a blind attitude:
‘Science becomes blind to what it must presuppose and to what it wants to
explain’17. There is then something unsatisfactory in the way sciences approach
perception. Heidegger shows the impossibility of distinguishing between body and
mind, saying that a simple principle cannot be found; instead, one moves in a
circle. Contrary to what Nietzsche thought, the phenomenon of the body is not the
more distinct and comprehensible and this is why, Heidegger says, its treatment
has been passed by in Being and Time. This is also why Heidegger always seems
too sceptical with regard to providing a solution – his intention is more that of
opening a field of questions.
Phenomenologically the body is the most resistant of concepts18. If one works
by trying to reduce phenomena like sadness, blushing, grief, to simple somatic
manifestations, one ends up in the circle again, for measuring is not enough, and
still some kind of reduction, in the form of a set of references to other phenomena
at least, must be attempted. At this point Heidegger moves back to the question of
spatiality: how does the body relate to space? In a manner not different from Being
and Time, Heidegger says that ‘Dasein is not spatial because it is embodied. But its
bodiliness is possible only because Dasein is spatial in the sense of making
room’19. As a consequence of this, the body is not identical to any ‘being-here’ of
Dasein’s being in a particular place. The body is the most distant to us in space.
These passages serve Heidegger to say that although the body is a relation with my
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Northwestern University Press, 2001), 75
18 For an analysis of the relation between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty’s thought see: Kevin Aho,
Heidegger’s Neglect of the Body, (New York: SUNY Press, 2009).
19 Martin Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay (Evanston:
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here, this relation is not that of presence-at-hand or readiness-to-hand; Dasein’s
mode of presence is other. The human body is not a chair, therefore one cannot
properly say that the body is here in some place, ‘in each case the here is this
one’20. Rather the body always leaps forward and in so doing takes up space. The
fact that the body takes up space, rather than occupying a point in it, means that the
‘here’ of the body is never specified, because it is simply a ‘somewhere’: the body
discloses a somewhere, without ever identifying with a specific place. At each time
the body discloses a somewhere, this somewhere is opened, made by the body at
each time and impervious to being reduced to specific coordinates.
What one could conclude from these remarks is that Heidegger intends the
human body differently from a simply corporeal entity.
The body has to be linked more intimately with the question of Dasein, with
existence.
The limits of the body are not the limits of the body as a corporeal thing. They
extend beyond, and in this beyond one should understand existence. Thus the
question of the mineness of my body has nothing to do with the limit of my skin.
My body is not limited by or within my skin. Heidegger says that ‘the bodying
forth of the body is determined by the way of my being […] The limit of bodying
forth (the body is only as it is bodying forth: ‘body’) is the horizon of being within
which I sojourn’21.
Further on, Heidegger attempts to explain the body as organizing factor in the
following terms: ‘within philosophy we must characterize all comportment of the
human being as being-in-the-world, determined by bodying forth of the body’. The
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21 Ibid., 87
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body is an organizing factor in that it expresses Being-in-the-world. This
expression, which manifests itself as gesture – ‘one’s gathered bearing and
comportment’22, says Heidegger – shouldn’t be taken as an expression of
something interior – the body pushing outside what exerts a pressure from the
inside. The body is an interpretation of Being-in-the-world in the way of an
existential disclosure. As Levin says, this gesture could be heard perhaps in terms
of ‘a deep sense of inherence, belonging, rootedness, and grounding that normally
and for the most part remains deeply, darkly implicit, pre-reflective, unthematized,
unquestioned’23.
These few passages – from the almost total silence of Being and Time to the
explicit argumentation as a response to natural and medical sciences in the Zollikon
Seminars – do not exhaust the list. What emerges though is that there is a
possibility of reading the body in relation to Dasein’s existential disclosure of the
world. The path, however, remains in Heidegger’s work nothing more than a
prospect, whose articulation is always precarious. Nevertheless those references
provide a possibility to understand how Jean-Luc Nancy’s work tries to address the
question of the body within a Heideggerian perspective, while remaining silent
with regard to Heidegger’s silence.
Nancy endeavours to re-open the question of the body from within Heidegger,
which in a few words means to link the body most explicitly with the question of an
existence without essence.
                                                
22 Martin Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, Franz Mayr and Richard Askay trans. (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 2001), 90
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If it’s true that Being and Time ‘strives to understand meaning as a question that
precedes itself hermeneutically’24, then the work of Nancy on the body recalls that
of the subject in the hermeneutic circle: the sense of the body cannot be separated
from the body of sense.
Nancy will not treat Heidegger. He will not openly address the criticism that
Heidegger never talks about the body, but nevertheless his question, which finds
references elsewhere, namely in Spinoza, springs from a recess of Heideggerian
silence. Nancy takes up Heidegger’s praeteritio to re-mark what has been said only
by being passed by.
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1.2 - Situating the body
In the light of the work of Jean-Luc Nancy, it will be argued that the body is an
extension, but – one needs to make it clear in order not to fall into the discourse of
the body as pure extension or as tool - an extension of a particular kind, given its
relations with sense and existence. In considering the body as mere extension, one
ends up performing a discourse that minimizes the complexity of the relationship
that the body harbours with sense, the latter defined as that which, dis-identical to
itself, is irreducible to the assignment of significations. As Nancy puts it: ‘sense
isn’t a matter of something having or making sense. It is rather the fact that sense
grasps itself as sense’25. Regarding the second point, the body as tool, one could
largely agree with Michel Henry when he says that it is ‘just a fantasy of reflective
thought’26. Once the body’s relation with sense and existence is clarified the use of
the term extension will hopefully have escaped both aforesaid conceptions.
The angle at play within this research is then an existential one, which means
that it will posit the questions regarding the body mainly as emerging from and
concerning existential analysis. Following the path traced by Jean Luc Nancy, I
will then attempt to look at what the French philosopher calls an ontology of
bodies. The endeavour undertaken here with regard to the question of existence
will be to map out within the thinking of Jean-Luc Nancy the presence of Baruch
Spinoza.
                                                
25 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Elliptical Sense’ in A finite thinking, Simon Sparks ed., trans. Jonathan Derbyshire
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 92
26 Michel Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, trans. Girard Etzkorn, (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff Press, 1975), 61
30
One should be fully aware that such an enterprise is fraught with difficulties;
nonetheless a close reading of the work of the two thinkers will show that such a
trajectory is perhaps not impossible.
The first point is thus the acknowledgement that existence is disclosed at the
threshold of the relationship between sense and the body.
The difficulty about thinking the body is that ‘body’ can never be before me. I
am always already involved in the body I am thinking of. This is the prelude to put
in front of this first stage of the research. It amounts at saying that the body does
not refer to a beyond itself; if it has ever referred to such a thing, it does not do it
anymore. The body is that which makes sense, but at the same time, residing in the
passage sense-matter, it is resistant to signification, resistant to the play of
signifiers/signified.
As already anticipated, the present chapter will be largely occupied with a
reading of the body of work of Jean-Luc Nancy. It is in particular motivated by one
sentence: ‘The body is neither a ‘signifier’ nor a ‘signified’. It is exposing/exposed,
ausgedehnt, an extension of the breakthrough that existence is’27.
Following Nancy, I will argue that an analysis of the body in its relation to
existence, sense, and creation allows the body to emerge as excess resisting the
system of references. In this light the body weaves and disrupts the ground on
which this system of references is based.
It is not then a matter of translating the materiality of the body into a discursive
factor or of saying that materiality is itself a process28. The problem is to situate
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bodies beyond pure materiality. Bodies inhabit the passage, or ‘fracture’ as Nancy
wants it, that distances materiality and sense, that movement exceeding both in
circulating from one to the other. Although this program – a body that refuses the
dualism sense-matter in order to take position beyond the two and that plays a
pivotal role in the disclosure of existence and the world – might resonate with that
of phenomenology, there are nevertheless important differences between the two.
Michel Henry for example has posed the body as an ontological problem29, but his
investigations are still largely articulated within a Husserlian perspective (see for
instance the analysis of movement and the study of Maine de Biran). Working
within the framework laid down by Jean-Luc Nancy means to find oneself
sometimes even at odds with a phenomenological account. Furthermore,
differently from Merleau-Ponty and the approach linked with his work, the term
flesh (chaire) will never be used. While Henry in his latest works carefully lays
down the difference between flesh – ‘(that) which experiences itself and at the
same time senses what surrounds it’ – and body – ‘senseless to the universe’30, here
the word flesh will not impose itself. Instead of reducing the body to a mere outer
layer or a pure materiality, ‘a stone on the way’ as Henry says, one should think it
as the site that allows the spacing out of what is by inhabiting the passage sense-
matter. Adding the word flesh would mean to craft a notion that attempts to
surpass the body by claiming its insufficiency. In fact Henry says not just that
‘flesh and body are as opposed as to feel and not to feel’, but that ‘just our flesh
allows us to know […] something as «body»’31. In an interview with Roberto
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Esposito, which opens the Italian translation of Being Singular Plural, Nancy
claims to avoid the word flesh for it is too inscribed within the Christian and
phenomenological register. On the contrary, the word body retains some kind of
lightness. In addition: ‘(flesh) is a word of the in-itself and not of the outside of
itself’32. While Merleau-Ponty uses a register of intertwining (‘things […] are
incrusted into its flesh’33) that develops in his later writing into the notion of
chiasm34, here the register on which to insist is one of discontinuity: not an
inscription, but a writing out, a relation as limit that exceeds what it inscribes.
Finally there is in Nancy’s work a reflection on the lexicon of incarnation,
which breaks with the approach traced by Merleau-Ponty, since the Christian and
Christological foundation of the problem is taken into account as such35.
Incarnation is traced back to a broader questioning at the hearth of Christianity.
This project differs from that of Merleau-Ponty and also from that of Henry, who
conducts a similar analysis but focuses on the abovementioned distinction
flesh/body. Incarnation, according to Henry, would pertain to flesh and would not
at all entail the body:
it is a matter of flesh not of body and, if the difference between flesh and
body has appeared to us essential since the beginning, it is the flesh and not
the body that will lead to an understanding of Incarnation in the Christian
sense.36
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What both the constructive/social theory of the body and the phenomenological
approach seem to rely on is the presence of the body of God, that is to say an
external, eminent Cause or Discourse, a beyond, which is called to confer sense on
the body. On the contrary the attempt to understand the body in the absence of
Gods or as the place that the withdrawal of Gods has left open is usually set aside.
If there is no beyond, no body of God, then the question of the body can be put
alongside the obsession, peculiar to Western thought, for what is.
Questions will then be structured around the fact that the body is that which
exposes existence itself. These questions can be posited as demands concerning the
very fact that the body is and that it is always what is there (in thinking as in the
actuality of experience). What is left is the body as an obsession with the real.
Approaching the body in the light of an obsession with the real, without falling
into defining it as either discourse or matter, amounts to questioning the body’s
relation with an existence that cuts across its own essence.
The question is to address the body as body, out of the apparent tautology, in
excess of signification, as that which constantly exposes and is exposed to
existence. Nancy suggests thinking the body not as referring to clear and distinct
signifiers or fixed moments of meaning, but to existence’s coming to presence. To
put it differently, Nancy advocates a thinking of the body in terms of existence as
the sharing that creates the world as world. The body writes out this fact: the world
is its own existence. In reading Nancy and tracing his thought back to Spinoza, the
present discussion will try to avoid any teleological discourse on the body. What
34
the research stresses is rather the fact that the body should be read in its crucial
relation with the ‘happening’ of existence.
Spinoza will be brought into play not just because he is – as Deleuze so
eloquently envisaged – the liberator of the body, but because his thought on the
body – the body as extension participating in God; the mind as idea of the body –
is the site where one can trace Nancy’s reopening of Heidegger’s praeteritio.
Moving from the definition of the ‘body as a mode which expresses […] God […]
as the thing extended’37 and the mind as idea of the body, one can draw a trajectory
that culminates in Nancy’s thinking of the body as a place of existence.
Spinoza’s claim that ‘no-one has hitherto determined what a body can do’38
echoes the idea of the body as resilient to signification, of the body as excess, as
that which resides in the passage sense-matter. Furthermore, given the nature of the
Spinozian God, Nancy considered him to be the first thinker of the world. The
famous formulation ‘Deus sive natura’ bears a relation with the ways through
which Nancy addresses existence and the question of the world. Under this light a
look will be taken at the ways in which Nancy rereads the question of the creation
ex-nihilo and how this rereading finds in Spinoza an almost exact reference.
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1.3 - Banality of bodies
If as its name suggests, the Occident is a fall, then the
body is the ultimate weight, the extremity of the weight
sinking from this fall. The body is weight.
Jean-Luc Nancy39
To speak of the banality of the body would mean here that the word “body” itself
does not touch the ground anymore. It means that it is a floating concept, a
generalogy (a logos of the general, posited as generally as possible).
As Nancy puts it:
Capital, no doubt, also produces a banalizing generalization of the body and
of the neighbour. Photographic obsessions with crowds attest to this fact,
with their misery, their panics, with number as such, or with erotic obsessions
filtering in throughout…(this, too, is why the body has also become the most
insipid, the flattest, finally the most disconnected of themes and terms – in an
irreversible coma)43.
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Nancy goes on to indicate two versions of this banality, two shades of the same
phenomenon: ‘that of the model (the magazine register, a canon of streamlined,
velvety bodies) and that of the indiscriminate (no matter what body, ruined, wrecked,
deformed)’44.
This distinction sketches out the circumstances into which the question of the body
has fallen. On one side, the body matters when it can be subjected to a process of
beautification (cosmesis), what Stendhal once defined as la promesse de bonheur,
“the promise of happiness”45. On the other, a body is always called upon to signify or
stand in for something else. Any other body, which does not belong or subscribe to a
body of signs, which does not inscribe itself within a system of signification, falls into
the category of the whatever (n’importe que corps).
Along this same path the theme of proximity, the space of the one next to me, loses
its profundity. One’s relation with the fellow man becomes a question of a simple
summa of more than one body. Exposing the theme to its banality requires – I will
consistently come back on this – reopening again the Heideggerian horizon, in
particular at the juncture where a crossing is produced between the questions of
Being-with and the question of the world.
What happens once, as per Nancy, ‘the body is simply there, given, abandoned,
without presupposition, simply posited, weighted, weighty’46 and what if bodies were
‘first masses, masses offered without anything to articulate, without anything to
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37
discourse about, without anything to add to them’47? To the lightness and
inconsistency that the concept of the body has come to assume, it will be here
opposed a thinking that tries to give weight to this notion in an attempt to
acknowledge the nature of our bodies in terms of situations: local extensions exposing
existence and exposed to existence. It is worth adding at this point a brief remark on
Sartre’s use of the word situation. Sartre defines situation as
the contingency of freedom in the plenum of being of the world inasmuch as
this datum, which is there only in order not to constrain freedom, is revealed
to this freedom only as already illuminated by the end which freedom
chooses48.
The attempt here will not be to attach the notion of situation to that of freedom,
situation as that which allows for freedom. The aim is that of defining situation as
existence’s coming to presence and what of existence is present, playing on the
ambivalence of the Latin situ. In relation to the body this means questioning the pure
contingency of my place.
The urgency for an enquiry into what bodies are can be located on two limits,
which themselves form the edges of a polarized structure. This polarization is
determined on the one side by ‘starving bodies’ and on the other by bodies
excessively sated or nourished. It is here between these two poles that one should
situate the sense of the body, there where the sense of the word “body” has become
too light and too cruel, incommensurable. The former is the place where sense
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disappears from the body, the sign is in withdrawal, no longer present; it has left
space for a mere thinness, which presents itself like a shortage of existence. The latter
establishes a pole on which too much signification is concentrated. Sense disappears
in the wake of a body that dazzles.
It is in this cleft that the two banalities arise, in their spacing out which sees this
cruelty inflicted upon them: a cadaverous and gaunt body and a pleonastic one, each
incommensurable to the other in the lightness they have become.
What they have grown to be recalls precisely the Socrates of Aristophanes’
Clouds, the philosopher caught in pointless speculations, walking upon air and
descrying the sun: Socrates has become Σωκρατιδιον, sweet little Socrates.
One should then ask, as with Strepsiades, for a katabasi, for this body to come
down. It must be repeated here that the body is a matter of weight and thickness. Even
the body of the tightrope walker weighs, even a skeletal body has a volume; even the
lightness of bones left to vultures lets itself be weighed.
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1.4 – Impenetrable outline
On the 30th of October 1921, Franz Kafka wrote in his diary: ‘the impenetrable
outline of human bodies is horrible’49. This sentence provides a useful starting point to
separate the body from the two regimes of banality just mentioned. The passage
outlines the effort to give the body its dimension, a dimension that does not rest upon
a system of significations, but rather one into which signification has not yet entered.
The Kafkian outline sets the limit, that limit one has to question in order to let the
body expose sense and disclose the world. Rather than occupying a place, the body
occupies a limit. This is precisely what is horrible about it: the body, its outline, is
always the limit that discloses sense; it is always as limit that it makes sense. As
Nancy says: ‘a thought of limit is always a thought of excess’50. The outline then is
horrible because as limit it is always in excess. In excess of itself, always open and
about to reject itself – the limit where existence comes to presence. Finally it is also in
excess of signification and the symbolic order, since the outline of the body is the
limit where sense is articulated, and articulated as the confine of signification,
irreducible to it.
Nancy says that the general logic of the limit is such that ‘the limit unlimits the
passage to the limit’51. According to the excesses just mentioned, the body unlimits
itself, existence and sense. It unlimits itself as open; it unlimits existence’s coming to
presence; it unlimits sense as the denial of identity, as a resistance to signification.
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As bodily event, as passage disclosed by the body, sense makes the world
available, makes the world world: an entity with no principle, no end, no existence
other than a sense in excess of all sense. The sense the body exposes is ‘beyond the
appropriation of signifieds and the presentation of signifiers, in the very opening of
the abandonment of sense, as the opening of the world’52. This body itself, which is
always a situation of excess and a passage of excess (sense), goes beyond the play of
the symbolic-cultural order, it resists this reduction. It resists it as matter (the
thickness of its outline, almost a crust) and it resists it as the opening of sense (as the
horrifying power of its outline, the silhouette of excess). There is something about the
body that signification never grasps and this resides mainly in the fact that the body,
rather than signifying or being signified, is the element without which signification
couldn’t be opened. Meaning confronts the body always as its most riotous nescio
quid, horrible outline.
This is the first premise the present research understands as its area of
investigation: to think the body moving from this horrible outline. ‘The body is
neither’, Nancy says, ‘a ‘signifier’ nor ‘signified’. It’s rather exposing/exposed’53.
The nature of such an enquiry will subsequently lead to an analysis of the relation
between existence and the body. Here again a lexicon of projections and ridges will
be employed, revolving around notions of exposure and extension. The intention of
this first part is to arrive at a definition of the body as a situation. In order to do so the
research will work on the following statement: the body is existence as exposed and
the exposing of existence.
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The two analyses, of the body and of existence, will be shown from the beginning
to be intimately related to the point of their being almost inseparable. The trajectory
the research aims to draw moves from the works of Jean-Luc Nancy to the first two
books – with excursuses into the third and the fifth - of the Ethics by Baruch Spinoza.
Although this trajectory might seem unfounded, the attempt will be to underline the
fact that, given consistent differences and chronological gaps, the two thinkers
produce a similar approach to the relation between existence and the body. Moreover
the question of language must be taken in consideration: both seem to put forward the
question of the body as a question of extension. Nancy often draws on Spinoza when
giving his own reading of the question of the creation ex-nihilo understood not as the
Christian cosmology wanted it – with a creator creating from nothing – but instead as
a growing:
if creation is ex-nihilo, this does not signify that a creator operates «starting
from nothing»…this instead signifies two things: on the one hand, it signifies
that the ‘creator’ itself is the nihil; on the other hand, it signifies that this nihil
is not...«something from which» what is created would come, but the very
origin…of some thing in general and of everything54.
The enquiry into existence will then create the space for an analysis of the question
concerning the open nature of the body. At the end of the first part, the conclusion
would be that the body is the place of existence and therefore that ‘bodies aren’t some
kind of fullness or filled space (space is filled everywhere): they are open space’55.
The open nature of the body will be pursued along three lines: the body rejecting
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itself, its density; the body open as the exposing of existence, as existence’s presence;
the body exposed to other bodies, the world of bodies. Particular emphasis, in view of
further stages of the analysis to come, will be placed on the idea of the body open to
the contact of other bodies.
Through the analysis of the concept of position, as outlined by Emmanuel Levinas
in Existence and Existents, the research will attempt to sound out the space that a
body-open could make available. Attention will be devoted to the shift from the
notion of body-situation to that of position, which presents itself as the event from
which the subject arises. As Levinas says in the preface to the volume, Existence and
Existents is a preparatory work, which sets the ground for any further study Levinas
will undertake. While trying to evade the Heideggerian analysis of Being and in
particular the ecstatic character of Dasein, Levinas develops the notion of position as
a basis from which the subject posits itself. This interpretation of the body does not
treat the latter as substantive, but rather as an event arising in the rumbling of
impersonal Being, the there is. Position is never already within Being; instead it is a
rage, a movement, where the act of taking position opens up a space that wasn’t there
beforehand. The concept of position assumes a particular importance for the
development of the Levinasian system, since, on its basis, the philosopher will then
develop the idea of separation as that which is accomplished by the body in the living
from… both dependence upon and independence from the world. It is still within the
framework laid out by the notion of separation, which stage by stage (from need to
enjoyment) progresses towards the human condition, that it will be possible to speak
of the opening of the inner life, of the encounter and shock with what is other and
with the Other, an encounter always ruled by the equivocation of the body as
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dependent or independent. The examination of the two notions of position and living
from… in Levinas’ work will prove to be crucial for the development of the current
enquiry, in particular at the moment when this will depart from the question of one’s
own body in order to move towards the space of bodies, or, as Nancy puts it, the
world of bodies.
The open nature of the body will be the primary concept by which this movement
may be elucidated: from the analysis of one body to the analysis of the space created
by bodies in proximity. The study will open onto a second juncture, where –
introducing the aperture as expressed by Emmanuel Levinas and recalling the same
idea in Nancy’s thinking – it will turn towards questions that have to do with being
with Others and/or being for the Other.
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2 - Spinoza: the liberator of the body
At the very beginning of his remarkable Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Gilles
Deleuze comments that Spinoza’s thought has been of groundbreaking consequence,
insofar as it has provided philosophy with a new model: the body.
‘One seeks to acquire a knowledge of the powers of the body in order to discover,
in a parallel fashion, the powers of the mind’56. In EIII, p2, Spinoza writes that: ‘the
body cannot determine the mind to thought neither can the mind determine the body
to motion nor rest, nor to anything else, if there be anything else’57. He goes on to
reveal the motivation of his proposition: the mind is determined by the attribute of
thought, while the body’s determination is subjected to motion and rest only by
another body, that is to say, by God understood as an extended thing. Whatever then
arises in the body cannot come from the mind, but from God in the mode of
extension.
A first stop, followed by a diversion, is needed here to clarify the boundaries of the
expression ‘to come from’. It is true that Spinoza adopts the terms sequire and
effluere, but this shouldn’t induce readers to understand Spinoza as a Neo-Platonist.
As Deleuze emphasizes, the differences between an emanatist neoplatonic
understanding and the essentially immanentist theory of Spinoza are
incommensurable. However it is true that in Spinoza’s writings the abovementioned
terms result at times problematic. In the EP43 to Osten, for example, Spinoza goes as
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far as to say: ‘omnia necessario a Deo emanare’. Nevertheless there are consistent
clues that permit one to resist assimilating him to an emanationist logic. In particular
the line has to be drawn between him and Plotinus, who, with a view to providing an
anti-Christian tool, forged the theory of the emanation ex-deo. Spinoza situates
himself on precisely the opposite side, for his cause is an immanent one. As Deleuze
argues, if it is true that both an immanent and emanative cause can be said to produce
without leaving themselves, the emanative cause does not retain its effect. It is
precisely on this latter element that Plotinus developed the theory of degradation. To
this Spinoza replies with a cause that, instead of being remote, is everywhere equally
close. Spinoza’s God ‘produces things as he formally exists, or as he objectively
understands himself’58. I will come back to the notion of expression later on, but for
the time being it is important to note that in Spinoza expression is ‘freed from all
traces of emanation […] Far from emanating from an eminent Unity, the really
distinct attributes constitute the essence of absolutely single substance’59. One should
thus take seriously the remark by Jean-Luc Nancy that Spinoza is the first thinker of
the world.
According to the theory of parallelism, body and mind have to be considered as
one and the same thing precisely for this reason: neither of the two can limit the other.
The theoretical thesis known as parallelism60 assumes no primacy of the mind over
the body and vice versa. It is clear how this explicitly undermines the Cartesian idea,
which wanted the mind to act upon the body and the latter to act upon the mind. Such
a conception is entirely absent in Spinoza’s philosophical system. The work of mind
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and body is one and just one, but at the same time, since they depend on two different
attributes, they have to be understood as autonomous. Their relation – and this is what
it is addressed as parallelism – is established by the fact that the order of ideas
corresponds to the order of things. As in Spinoza there is no primacy of any attribute
over any other, mind and body share the same (im)perfection.
Spinoza adds a supplementary claim that allows us to understand why for Deleuze
he may be considered the liberator of the body. In the Note to the second proposition
of EIII, he argues: “For what the body can do, none has hitherto determined”61. The
body surpasses the knowledge that one has of it. Bodies are somehow free from the
understanding we have of them. Spinoza liberates the body not just from the legacy of
medieval philosophy, where after Plato the body was detachable from the elevation of
the mind and couldn’t achieve any perfection whatsoever (viventes scilicet in corpore
mortali, quod est quasi quidam carcer animae62, Thomas Aquinas says) –  but also
from Cartesian dualism. Deleuze will return to this point some years later in Cinema
2, silently quoting Spinoza and referring to this position as the philosophical reversal.
In the section of the study devoted to the cinema of bodies, a cinema that through the
body would build its alliance with thought, Deleuze still seems to be thinking with
Spinoza when he says that:
the body is no longer the obstacle that separates thought from itself, that
which it has to overcome to reach thinking. It is on the contrary that which it
plunges into or must plunge into, in order to reach the unthought, that is life
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[…] The categories of life are precisely the attitudes of the body, its postures
[…] To think is to learn what a non-thinking body is capable of63.
The mind cannot and should not act in order to dominate the body, for passions
arise in both and, most importantly, for what a body can do, none has hitherto
determined. One should thus not consider the mind to be the master of the body,
insofar as a significant number of bodily states – drunkenness and insomnia for
instance, but also effort and resistance – are unavailable to the mind.
It could be argued here that one is failing to take into account the 5th book of the
Ethics, the one devoted to ‘the method or way which leads to liberty’64. This volume
presents additional problems to parallelism. In EV, Spinoza argues that ‘we possess
the power of arranging and connecting the modifications of the body according to the
order of the intellect’.65 Many have taken this proposition as undermining parallelism
and in fact, when read in isolation, it does indeed seem to confirm this position.
However upon reading further one finds clues that seem to convey the opposite: a
persistence in determining the body as being parallel to the mind. The body is still an
irreplaceable intermediary on the way towards knowledge. If EV P10, the proposition
just quoted, could be read as saying that the mind acts upon the body in order to
subdue the body’s passions, one should nevertheless not forget that the liberation
from passions springs from a clear and distinct knowledge of oneself. This awareness
must necessarily include knowledge of the body allowing the latter to act.
Furthermore, if one stresses propositions 30 and 39, it is possible to find confirmation
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of such a reading, which aims at asserting that parallelism never fades out in the
Ethics. In EV 30, Spinoza says that ‘our mind in so far as it knows itself and the body
under the form of eternity, necessarily has a knowledge of God’66. One sees here that
the body is not excluded from the knowledge of God and of one’s being in God (the
subject matter of the third kind of knowledge, the one we must acquire in order to set
ourselves free from passions). In EV 39 Spinoza seems to dare even more. Therein he
pursues an old philosophical question, first debated by Aristotle and then by
Maimonides among others: whether or not the body can bring anything to the
perfection of the mind. Spinoza’s reply is affirmative. The body helps our mind to
experience during lifetime the liberation from passions, for ‘He who possesses a body
fit for many things possesses a mind of which the greater part is eternal’67.
Yet Spinoza is the liberator of the body in a further sense. He performs a liberation
of a quite different kind. Spinoza conceives of the body, as Deleuze puts it, as
composed of an infinite numbers of particles; it is the relation of motion and
rest, of speed and slowness between the particles that define a body.
Secondly a body affects other bodies68.
The body is here described as a set of relations; it is no longer depicted in terms of
form and function, or as substance.
As Deleuze says: ‘one never commences; one never has a tabula rasa, one slips in,
enters in the middle; one takes up or lays down rhythms. Also Spinoza provides the
body with a great deal of power, for its affective power is core to its definition’69.
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There is an additional idea here: ‘one never commences, one never has a tabula
rasa, one slips in, enters in the middle’. It is important to underline this point in order
to lay down a central premise: one never starts with the body, nor with it one ever
ends; one always finds oneself caught in its coming.
There is then a last element according to which Spinoza removes the body from its
traditional position: the body is a mode of God; God is also body, extended thing.
In EII D1, Spinoza says: ‘by body I understand a mode which expresses in a
certain and determinate manner the essence of God in so far as He is considered as the
thing extended’70. To the definition of God as thought, which was taken almost as
common sense at the time Spinoza was writing, he adds God as extension. From this
it follows that the body shares the same ontological status as the mind. It takes part in
God, it is in God.
From these introductory lines it is already apparent the degree of novelty Spinoza
brings to the understanding of the body.  As Deleuze says: ‘Every reader of Spinoza
knows that for him the bodies […] are not substances or subjects, but modes’71.
Therefore Spinoza allows for a definition of the human being that already opens a
path beyond subjectivity: ‘you will define a human being not as a subject, but by the
affects of which it is capable’72.
With Spinoza therefore one comes across a body that shares in the essence of God.
The body is an expression of God as extended thing; its powers are not fully graspable
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by the mind and its definition relies on relational properties: motion, rest and its
capacity to affect other bodies and to be in turn affected by them.
It is not by chance that the path of the elder man in Isaac Singer’s short story leads
to where it does. Dr. Nahum Fischelson, a Spinozian scholar, finds a sort of
redemption through his body while in the last stage of his life. His body comes to
liberate him from a state of abandonment; an abandonment that he pays, at an
intellectual level, in finding shut each and every door that would open onto a true
understanding of the Ethics. The revolution in his life is triggered through the
encounter with a woman ‘tall and lean and as black as a baker's shovel’73. Dr.
Fichelson, old, sick, and almost entirely devoid of strength, is all of a sudden and
quite unexpectedly led back before his physicality, his corporeality – indeed he very
nearly retrieves it – when the woman he has just married (with a wedding that,
involving as it does such a man, feeble and tired, is wonderfully described by Singer
as being without joy), Miss Dobbe, enters his room ‘wearing a silk nightgown,
slippers with pompoms, and with her hair hanging down over her shoulders’. Dr.
Fischelson’s first reaction is to start trembling, while Spinoza’s masterpiece plunges
from his hands. When she kisses him murmuring ‘Mazel Tov’, something miraculous
happens. ‘Powers long dormant awakened in him’74. Suddenly all the pain, the
pressures, the ailments and aches stopped, he was again a man in his youth75. After
this awakening of the body he seems for a single second to be able to grasp the
Spinozian system, he finally accepts the truth with which he is confronted. While he
watches the night sky in which a shower of meteors is shedding light, the narrating
voice comments:
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Yes, the divine substance was extended and had neither beginning, nor end; it
was absolute, indivisible, eternal, without duration, infinite in its attributes.
Its waves and bubbles danced in the universal cauldron, seething with
chance, following the unbroken chain of causes and effects, and he…with his
unavoidable faith was part of this76.
No one knows what a body can do.
Similar is the case of Anthime Armand Dubois, ‘unbeliever and freemason’, who
decides to visit Rome in order to consult a specialist for rheumatic complaints. This
sudden decision instigates the fury of his brother in law – Julius de Baraglioul - who
exclaims: ‘Is it your body you are going to treat in Rome? Pray heaven you may
realize when you get there that your soul is in far worse case’. Once in Rome the
freethinker is abruptly struck by a dream, following which he not only converts to
Catholicism - one of the orators during the ceremony of his conversion inevitably
recalls Paul of Tarsus - but finds himself cured of the sciatica from which he had
suffered for so long. This event, so unexpected given Anthime’s stubborn atheism,
surprises and gladdens Julius, compelling him to fight for Anthime in order to retain
all the mundane privileges once granted by the Lodge. However, when the novel is
about to arrive at its closing stage, the readers find Julius and Anthime engaged in a
final conversation. Julius has just informed Anthime that the pope he attempted to
visit was in fact a false pope. At this point Anthime stops the carriage in which they
are traveling and shouts: ‘I shall write to the Grand Master of the Order this very
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evening, and tomorrow I shall take up my scientific reviewing for the Depeché’.
Julius, surprised to see him limping again says: ‘What! You are lame?' ‘Yes, my
rheumatism came back a few days ago’77.
No one knows what a body can do.
Following the pathway marked by the nature of the Spinozian body, the
investigation in this first part will attempt to understand the body in light of the
question of its creation.
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3 - Touching the word
What is it that binds you more intimately to these
impenetrable, talking, eye blinking bodies than to any
other thing? Because you belong to the same species? The
impenetrable outline of human bodies is horrible.
Franz Kafka78
To claim that one does not know what a body can do might also mean that it will
not be possible to find its ‘truth’ in the realm of signification, in the symbolic order.
The intention here, then, is to pursue the opposite direction. Moving from EII, D1 and
the Note to EIII, P2, the intention will be to focus on the body as extension and on the
relational qualities that are yielded at its very origin. In conceiving of the body in
terms of its relation to the One Substance and in terms of the mutual affection it
performs on and receives from other bodies, the aim is to bring forward a discourse
that explores the truth of the body elsewhere than in the dialectic signifier/signified.
Following Spinoza, one can say that a body is in the world as relational extension,
well before it is in the world as subject of… The attempt to resist subscribing to the
idea of the body as signifier leads the analysis to further comments on the ways
bodies present themselves to us in language. I am here arguing that a body is
untranslatable, that one would necessarily fail in tracing its truth (that is, the moment
in which a body starts talking) in language(s). I will proceed by analyzing the words
we use to define the body, concluding that none of them actually let the body speak.
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The primary concern resides in the following circumstance: that a word for the body
is missing or that the word “body” fails to touch upon that to which it refers. A word,
in order to account for the body, should designate a physical extension or structure,
whose power relies on the ability to enter a complex set of relations; it should, as it
were, exist the body.
One understands that here it is all a question of “properness”, the same question
Jacques Derrida investigates in reading Aristotle’s Poetics and Rhetoric. The question
could be formulated in this way: when is a noun proper? Is the noun body proper?
Derrida argues that a noun is proper first of all when ‘it has but a single sense. Better
it is only in this case that it is properly a noun. Univocity is the essence’79.
Derrida suggests posing the question of properness along with the one of
polysemia. Derrida writes:
language is what it is, language, only insofar as it can then master and
analyze polysemia […] A nonmasterable dissemination is not even a
polysemia, it belongs to what is outside language […] Each time that
polysemia is irreducible, when no unity of meaning is even promised to it,
one is outside language80.
Another question arises at this point: is it possible that the word ‘body’ resides
exactly there, at the limit or even beyond the limit of language?  The question would
then be that of a polysemia only partially reducible to meaning, a polysemia that
resists being reduced completely, but that nevertheless makes itself be understood.
Polysemia would have here entered one single word, the word body, obliging it to
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always engage a dynamic game in and out, within and beyond univocity, thus at the
limit of meaning.
The Ancient Greek dictionary expresses the idea of a body with more than ten
words; it is a polisomatic dictionary. I presently recall the Ancient Greek dictionary
because it employs a different strategy to name the body than the one adopted by
modern languages and at the same time it directs a number of the ways we address the
body nowadays. What the Greek dictionary does not do is designate the body with a
single term; it does not provide a word for an organic unity, which would support the
individual in the multiplicity of his vital and mental functions. Univocity is excluded,
though one is not exactly outside meaning, never too far from it.
For the Greeks what exists is instead a corpus, a list, a catalogue without an index,
without a unity, precisely orphan of its object. A catalogue without an object is that
which creates its object through a continuous process of naming. It is a catalogue
without a table of contents, a catalogue comprised not of the totality of its terms taken
together, but of the declination of each one of them. It is a catalogue one would find
difficult to use as a reference, as one would make use of a dictionary.
The word that has survived in the philosophical tradition to designate one’s body is
σωµα. Modern languages still employ it in reference to a whole range of expressions
such as somatic, to somaticize, somatology, psychosomatic; even cells are designated
by the word soma (the soma of neurons for instance). In the Greek dictionary the
word σωµα originally indicates a corpse. It seems to designate the very opposite of a
body, an antibody as it were. Σωµα is what remains of an individual after his
incarnated life and physical vitality has left him. It is the body of bereavement and
waiting. Σωµα is an inert figure, it is immobility, stillness, absence of life, lack of
movement, lack of bodily functions; a symbol, an effigy, an imitation, an image
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(µιµεοµαι means to imitate, but also shadow, ghost). It is what remains of me, or
better still what remains of me after me has departed. It is then an exposition, an
object on display. The object of display and lamentation, cries, tears and screams. It is
the shadow of the beloved for the ones who are left celebrating him/her. It is the
minute before dust, before all disappears in the burial, ashes. Σωµα, rather than
indicating or standing for the word “body”, invokes the instant before invisibility, and
as such it thus accomplishes this invisibility’s initiation. It reminds us of Socrates’
statement in the Cratylus ‘there is a lot to say, it seems to me – and if one distorted
the name a little, there would be even more. Thus some say that the body is the grave
of the soul’81, which seems to have come directly from his ear: in soma (body)
resonates the word sema (grave).
Δεµασ indicates an individual’s stature, the whole individual as various pieces in
assemblage. It is employed in combination with ειδοσ  and ϕυη. The three of them
together account for the image of someone standing in front of us, the idea that one
gives when offering his body to another. Similarly Χρωσ  (from which the English
crust, the French croûte and the Italian crosta are descended) stands for the outside of
the individual, the hard outer layer, what is most likely to touch and be touched, the
place of contact, the place that links one’s body to the surface of another. These four
terms all indicate bodily properties or parts; they do so, however, without entailing
any idea of life. A body that lives, moves, escapes stillness, is immersed in the stream
of life is expressed with still different terms. Γυια and Μελεα  both communicate an
idea of movement, of a being possessing the quality of life, activity, strength and
ability to hold tools and make use of them. Suppleness, agility, flexibility, elasticity,
plasticity, even smoothness, grace, style. Γυια and Μελεα  are the two terms that
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more than any other articulate a wholeness, a physical entity that holds itself, that is
self-contained, that can bring itself from one place to another as a whole.
Σοµα, δεµασ, ειδοσ, πηυε, χηροσ, γυια, µελεα, καρα, προσοπον, ετορ, 
καρδια, πηρεν, πραπιδεσ, τηυµοσ, µενοσ, νουσ.
What keeps revealing and hiding itself under these many curtains is a human body.
The positive aspect of this dissemination resides in the fact that the Greeks were
reaching a productive compromise with regard to the idea of the body as in constant
change, immersed in a set of relations that it is not possible to simplify.
All the words the Greek dictionary employs account for a part of the body, or for
the body’s being in a particular state (thus somehow confirming the Deleuzian
account that by thinking the body with Spinoza one is driven to think it as a complex
set of relations). The variety of the Greek dictionary is still largely utilized, for
instance, in medicine (in every kind of medicine, also in psychiatry, the science
devoted to the body of the soul).  Surprisingly, this seems to be the one branch of
contemporary thought still to acknowledge that when we utter the word body we
don’t know what we are referring to (there is, for example, a body of cardiology,
which is not the same as the body of dermatology; the body of knowledge of
immunology then looks at the inside, while that of genetics looks at the invisible).
Surgery does not even treat the body as a whole, for the body of surgery is made in
turn of bodies: bodies of kidneys, hearts, legs – and these are removable, the whole is
never taken into consideration, purely partes extra partes. The Latin word corpus,
which then gives birth to the French corps, the Italian corpo and the Spanish cuerpo,
means simply “that which has a form”, leaving the question of the body in an
indisputable indeterminacy, for that which has a form does not tell us anything about
the changes this form may undergo and the relations in which this form can engage.
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The English word body (from the German root bodig) is itself a metonymy, originally
standing for chest. Looking at modern languages, it seems possible to draw the
following conclusion: while the Greek dictionary proceeded through dissemination,
always drawn into detours, and thus setting aside the possibility of having one word
which would without remainder account for the body, the strategy of modern
languages on the contrary seems to privilege a single component (the idea of form or
a part of this form), which then comes to account for the physical structure as a
whole. There is a sort of exuberance when one attempts to trace bodies in language, a
sort of enthusiasm of and for language, an enthusiasm that expresses itself in a love
for synopsis. Language persists in saying with a single word, keeps unravelling its
own imperfection in addressing the question of the body (or maybe here one is asking
of language too much, because this is exactly what language does, it continually
expresses and unravels a lack). The part goes beyond itself and names the whole. In
this case language, rather than allowing for an intervention to be made onto the body,
instead of opening up a series of paths, lifts up a curtain manifesting the in-
translatability of the body, maybe even the impossibility of talking about it. This is
the reason why a discussion concerned with the body should avoid starting from the
body in the midst of significance or from the body overwhelmed with signification. In
doing so, it seems one will eventually find oneself within that other body of
signification, translation, meaning, therapy, interpretation, giving up any attempt to
understand the body as that thick rim which makes sense in se, that which constitutes
the solution of sense by articulating it. If one wants to put it in a formula: ‘the body is
the solution of sense’. If absolution indicates the state of being free from..., depending
on nothing, solution would then be its opposite: that which opens up the opportunity
for a bondage, for to solve is always – even in its chemical meaning – to call for a
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fastening. This is the nature of the relation between body and sense. In order for sense
to make sense, a body must expose it, must solve it coming together with it.
An absolute sense (or sense absolutely, that is, a sense free from…) does not
properly exist, for it is not exposed to anything, it keeps coming back to itself;
absolute sense would be the identity of sense. Sense has to be solved. If sense has to
be exposed to become that which it is, it stops in front of the body, it stops because –
as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it – it is the body that exposes sense. When it comes to the
body one has to do with a ‘certain interruption of sense, and this interruption of sense
is body’82. If one looks at this relation from the other side one could also add that the
truth of bodies resides somewhere other than in absolute sense (that which would
make of the body a pure signifier). To treat the body as such would mean touching
merely upon the words we use for it and not on its thickness and volume. For the
word “body” is the word without word and without body, unable to utter itself, the un-
utterable. ‘Perhaps body is the word without employment par excellence. Perhaps, in
any language, it’s the word in excess. At the same time however this ‘in excess’ is
nothing’83.
The aim here is, then, precisely this: to touch upon the body itself, for to think it in
terms of the legacy signifier/signified would mean to run after its shadow all the while
neglecting the actual body by which this shadow is cast. It belongs to the innermost of
sense to be a fracture; it is always the crack and the body, which expose us to this
truth of sense.
At first glance the program outlined above may appear to simply register the fact
that sense, as the Incorporeal, needs flesh, needs an incarnation. What one should try
to say here is something different: not that sense requires embodiment, but the very
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fact that it needs a body is its end (in both senses of the word, as ending and as aim).
Jean-Luc Nancy puts it this way:
in no way is the body of sense the incarnation of the ideality of ‘sense’: on
the contrary, it is the end of such an ideality – and thus the end of sense as
well, since it no longer returns to itself or refers to itself (to an ideality
making sense of it) – suspending itself at a limit that makes its own most
proper ‘sense’ and exposes it as such.84
 The body is the end of sense in two ways: as ending, because sense ceases to
direct itself towards the purely Incorporeal, and aim because the body is that by and
through which sense begins. One must reach that point where signification comes to a
stop, where the body resists; we must always bear in mind that solid outline by which
Kafka was so terrified and disgusted, and bear in mind that sense comes with it, that
sense is exposed as this limit/outline.
A further misreading is also possible here: that of temporality. That sense begins
with the body shouldn’t be taken as an attempt to establish any kind of anteriority of
bodies with regard to the order of signification. The point that needs to be stressed is
instead their co-appearance. This is not at all to say the body may come at any time,
that it comes already loaded with signification, but rather that sense cannot come if
not at the limit of the body, on its border, with its border.
In principium erat verbum; but then verbo caro factum est, otherwise verbum
wouldn’t be able to express itself. It would remain caught up in the principium85.
Recalling the Christian logos at this point seems to lead the discussion back into the
                                                
84 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 23
85 In Latin the word principium (and its Greek equivalent αρχη, of the  εν αρχη τον ο λογοσ) stands
for both beginning and principle of something.
61
discourse of incarnation. In fact it is not a matter of incarnation at all, but of positing a
body with both verbum and principium, ‘not a body produced by the production and
reproduction of the spirit, but a body given, always already given, abandoned, and
withdrawn from all the plays of signs’86. If one repeats the action of turning this
relation upside down, one could then say: not a sense made available by its
incarnation in a body, but a sense given over, given over just to bodies; sense as a
bodily event, a passage that can’t be thought in abstraction from the body. Sense
becomes then the very possibility of bodies. There is no supposition here; the body
does not presuppose sense and vice-versa, the nature of this relation cuts short all
presupposition in favour of a co-appearance. As Nancy puts it:
this doesn’t mean that the body comes before sense, as its obscure prehistory or
preontological attestation. No, it gives it its place, absolutely. Neither before nor after,
the body’s place is the taking-place of sense, absolutely. The ab-solute is the detached,
the set-apart, the extended, the imparted. (We can say the finite sense).87
If sense therefore needs a body it is in order not to be the sense of itself, in order to
escape a return to itself. Speaking of the joy of the body Jean-Luc Nancy suggests:
‘this joy is its birth, its coming into presence, outside of sense, in the place of sense,
taking the place of sense, and making a place for sense’88. Thus, instead of incarnation
one should speak here of a making-place.
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Instead of a fragile version of a body floating in significations and language, one
must be able to set out a different program, one that will enable us to touch upon that
fear the body seems to provoke, the undetermined of the none has hitherto
determined. It is this solidity, this delimitation and this fear that one should address,
for these terms constitute the triad of a body extended, dense and open. This will in
turn require a program. “We always have to speak about the body ex-corpore”89.
Further on Nancy adds:
A discourse of the body or on the body is both touched by and touches upon
something that is not discourse at all. Which means quite simply that the
body’s discourse cannot produce a sense of the body, can’t give sense to the
body.90
What is thus demanded is to pursue the body through nails and hairs rather than by
questions of genders and identities, not because these are lacking in relevance, but
because bodies indicate their limit, that is their starting point. A limit is the place
where several opportunities remain open, and what is of interest here is the condition
of emergence of these possibilities. To say it better: that which allows for their
coming, that which makes consistent and dense their availability.
First of all one should go straight to the body. One should go there where bodies
make place for sense, contemplating at the same time what the body expels (its
outwards, or the body itself as outward and onset). To touch on the density, solidity,
terrible outline and open traits of the body, this is the program.
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What bodies do is precisely photography. By saying that the body is a
photographer - bodies perform a writing (γραφειν) of the light (φοσ) that sense is - I
mean that the body, prior to any assumption of subjectivity or inscription into
signification, articulates sense as disclosure of the world, as opening up of a set of
shared and meaningful relations. In Words of light Eduardo Cadava employs a similar
terminology, offering a reading of photography and history, which relies mainly on
Benjamin’s essay Theses on the philosophy of history. Cadava’s work associates the
act of writing the light with terms like mortification, reduction, disappearance, ruin,
decay; the entire work revolves around the conception that writing the light is a matter
of death and withdrawal. In the first pages of the book Cadava lays down an
association between the corpse and the image and one reads that ‘photography […]
speaks to us of mortification’ and that ‘the conjunction of death and the photographed
is in fact the very principle of photographic certitude’91. Although there is no space
here to do justice to Cadava’s work, nevertheless it is necessary to say that the kind of
photography the body performs situates itself at the opposite of Cadava’s discourse.
What is at stake here is that this writing of the light the body performs works in the
direction of an opening up, a disclosure. By saying that the body writes the light that
sense is I am here, following Nancy, defining sense as a bodily event, a bodily
passage. For Nancy sense is a movement, which never returns to itself, never goes
back to ideality. The body writes sense in this way, in disclosing sense as this
openness, as a dis-identity, which cuts off and exceeds ideality and signification.
What the body expresses is a writing of this limit, this closure into openness that
sense is. As Nancy puts it: ‘sense, as that which the world is, is only insofar as it
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never constitutes a ground […], rather exists as passage, as movement to or as
creation or birth’92.
The body writes the light by rendering sense as the limit - by weeding out any
possible ground where sense could be reduced to its identity - while at the same time
disclosing it as the ‘stuff’ of existence. In this constellation where sense is always the
sense of a limit – a passage, a being-to – bodies write light. Prior to being subjective
or to being inscribed into language and signification, the body opens up the world as
the writing of the limit from which sense can’t come back to ideality.
Thus one can see how distant this idea is from Cadava’s definition, for there is no
fixation here, no reduction to ashes. According to what has just been said, the body
would be the only photographer who never printed an image, who never developed
the film, for this writing of the light is the writing of a movement, a movement of
disclosure, which never rests upon itself. There is no withdrawal here. There is not
even mimesis, for there is no ground or identity on which mimesis can be achieved.
The outcome of this photographic act is never an image, but the dispersal of writing
itself.
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4 - Body’s origin: esse in se
What is at stake here is to look for the body making sense prior to any inscription
into signification. The questions of the body’s origin and of its existential status
therefore become more and more crucial.
It has already been underlined that in no way can one interpret Spinoza as being a
Neo-Platonist. In EI, P16 one reads: ‘From the necessity of the divine nature, infinite
numbers of things in infinite ways must follow’93. The relation between things and
God is derivative in kind, and the modality of this relation is one of necessity. Further
on, in EI, P17, Note, Spinoza says that the singularities one finds in the world ‘flow’
from God: ‘a summa Dei potentia sive infinita natura infinita infinitis modis hoc est
omnia necessario effluxisse’94. This relation of necessity – in which things follow on
[…ex natura… attributi Dei sequuntur…] from God in a constant flowing – contains
an idea of movement as well as one of dislocation. The latter is implied with the
notion of the divine extension: for EII, P2, individual things, this and that thing, are
modes which express the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner. God
therefore possesses an attribute, in this case extension, the conception of which is
involved in all individual things95. God then would have many places and would be
equally close to all of them. Is this not confirmed at the very beginning of the Ethics,
when Spinoza lays down the foundational principles of his system, and also in his
most evocative formula, which has somehow come to define Spinozism itself, Deus
sive Natura?
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66
In EI P15 one reads that ‘whatever is, is in God, and nothing can either be or be
conceived without God’96 [quicquid est, in Deo est], a proposition that develops out of
D3 and D5, so that modes can only be in the divine nature and only through it they
can be conceived. God would thus be the movement of dislocation, although this
dislocation, the outcome of the movement according to which things flow from God,
would not be separated from God himself. Again an echo of Nancy’s statement: ‘in
saying this [Deus sive Natura] Spinoza becomes the first thinker of the world’97. The
One Substance is the always-existing movement that – by flowing towards its own
outside – results in extension. This flowing does not make its way towards an Other,
as if the world would already be there, a tabula rasa upon which God forces his
powers, as if singularities would be a degradation of the One (this would be
essentially the doctrine of Plotinus). The outside towards which the One Substance
moves is an outside-to-itself; an outside that is comprised within. Acknowledging that
in Spinoza there is no separation between God and the world means articulating the
fact that the world expresses God while God expresses itself in the world.
God is immanent in the world, the creation is ex-nihilo, in the connotation Jean-
Luc Nancy gives it, as a creation where the nothing grows out of itself. According to
Nancy, the expression ex-nihilo, the world as coming from nothing ‘does not mean
fabricated with nothing by a particularly ingenious producer. It means instead that
[…] the nothing itself or rather nothing growing as something’98.
The creation ex-nihilo here is not understood as Christian onto-theology would
have it. Ex-nihilo for Nancy means ‘that it is the nihil that opens and that disposes
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itself as the space of all presence (or even as one will see, of all the presences)’99. This
is why Nancy defines Spinoza as the first thinker of the world: ‘Deus sive natura does
not simply say two names for one thing, rather that this very thing has its outside on
the inside’100. With Spinoza we move from ‘a creation as the result of an
accomplished divine action, to creation as activity and incessant actuality of this
world in its singularity’101.
In the world God feels himself eternal, that is to say, necessary. It is in this relation
of God with the world that the concept of expression may be developed furthest. It
should be remarked that the term expression is in Spinoza a technical one, a term he
inherited from a long philosophical tradition. Although this is not the site for an
extended analysis of the term, it is necessary at least to introduce it, in the light of the
work undertaken by Deleuze. As Deleuze says in Expressionism in Philosophy:
Expression is on the one hand an explication, an unfolding of what expresses
itself, the One manifesting himself in the Many (substance manifesting
himself in its attributes, and these attributes manifesting themselves in their
modes). Its multiple expression, on the other hand, involves Unity. The One
remains involved in what expresses it, imprinted in what unfolds it,
immanent in whatever manifests it102.
Deleuze proceeds to say that the notion of expression relies upon four concepts,
which also are derived from a long and lasting tradition. The four concepts respond to
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different steps of expression and are organized in a binomial structure: involution and
evolution, implication and explication. The idea of expression would then be the
synthesis of these four concepts. This synthesis takes the name of complicatio. To put
it succinctly: complicatio indicates that the attributes are points of view on the
Substance – not external but contained in the Substance itself, the latter then
comprising the infinity of its points of view within itself. As Deleuze says: ‘It is no
longer a matter of finite understanding, deducing properties separately…it is now the
object that expresses itself, the thing itself that explicates itself’103. A very important
point has been anticipated in view of the fact that the idea of expression serves as the
point from which one can begin to draw a line connecting the philosophy of Jean-Luc
Nancy to that of Spinoza. One could almost describe a trajectory here (if not a line of
descent), though in Nancy’s thinking the idea of an immanent God or Intellect is
radicalized and transforms into a world without principle. The idea of the Substance
having in itself all that is external to it comes back in Nancy’s idea of the coming to
presence of existence and of existence’s ‘sharing out’. In Corpus Nancy articulates a
precise reference to Spinoza’s atheism104 and in various works the Dutch philosopher
is brought into play as the paradigmatic figure exposing creation ex-nihilo.
One of the latest works by Nancy – The creation of the world - seems to be
devoted precisely to this idea: the thinking of the world on the basis of a
transcendental principle (a principle from which it would attain its sense) has come to
an end. This ‘exhaustion’ started manifesting itself in particular with Spinoza.
A close reading would reveal that a great part of Nancy’s reflection is devoted to
this analysis and that these themes are constantly present in his philosophy. The idea
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is that according to a tension present in our tradition, the world shows itself as that
which is ‘without a model, without reference, without a first step, without origin,
without even the possibility to say «without»’105. The world has come to coincide with
itself; this is what lies in the word mondialization. What in Spinoza was immanence
becomes with Nancy a coincidence, the coincidence of immanence. What the term
coincidence expresses is precisely the ‘becoming-world of the whole that was
formerly articulated and divided and expressed as the nature – world – God triad’106.
That is what allows Nancy to claim that ‘the world resolutely and absolutely distances
itself from any status as object in order to tend towards being itself the subject of its
own ‘worldhood’ – or ‘world-forming’ [mondialization]’107. The world has stopped to
be represented, to be the object of a representation, to become itself the subject of
sense. The possibility for a vision of the world has been extinguished; the world has
escaped a world of representations: in its wholeness and with all its weight it has now
entered this vision, it has become this vision, it has swollen it. It is with Spinoza and
from him that we can start tracing that auto-deconstructive drive in which Nancy sees
the inflowing of the world in thinking. The sense of the world, Nancy warns, is not
anywhere else than in the world itself, there is no outside to which we can refer to in
order to find the sense of the world. This sense resides precisely in the possibility of
this world, in the actuality of its taking place, the inescapable thinking that there is
this world. What is left is the experience of the world, its internal revolution and the
domestic movement from one end to another. We will come back to this point,
offering a closer reading of the ex-nihilo question as in Being Singular Plural.
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In Spinoza the passing away of a transcendental entity providing the sense of the
world (in terms of ground) is announced in the idea of God itself. In EI, P28 one
reads:
An individual thing, or a thing which is finite and which has a determinate
existence, cannot exist nor be determined to action unless it be determined to
existence and action by another cause which is also finite and has a
determinate existence; and again, this cause cannot exist nor be determined to
action unless by another cause which is also finite and determined to
existence and action, and so on ad infinitum108.
As one can see, the Spinozian God unambiguously negates the religious God.
Since the early stages of his philosophy, Spinoza, following the method of the
Collegiants109, challenged the idea of God as persona, a God able to lavish miracles,
an object of an unreasonable cult. In so doing Spinoza, a Jewish man of the XVII
century, was undermining the power of the Holy Texts and the idea of the Jewish
people as the ones selected by God.
In fact God in Spinoza is equated to nature; in the demonstration of P15 for
instance one can read:
there are those who imagine God to be like a man, composed of body and
soul and subject to passions; but it is clear enough from what has already
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been demonstrated how far off men who believe this are from the true
knowledge of God110.
As previously sketched out, unlike the God of religions, the Spinozian divinity is
not a God that responds to a principle of creation, for - in order to assume a principle
of creation - one should also imply a principle of exhaustion, since any creation has
an end in exhaustion. The God of the Ethics keeps auto-producing itself; it shares
itself out. This is how the world comes to presence – that is, it exists – in sharing out
its essence and therefore crossing this over before the latter can be posited as a
ground. Thus it derives that the Substance is never alien to the world since the world
is its expression, it is its outside without being unrelated to its inside. The truth of this
God is that it shares itself out. With the theory of modes Spinoza seems to claim that
the world is the ways of being of God, the attitudes and the postures of God, if one
can dare to use such terms. The world does not refer to a unity, a single wholeness;
rather world stands for a multiplicity of singularities (natura naturante), since the
attributes of God are infinite. Similarly in Nancy’s text: ‘a world is a multiplicity of
worlds and its unity is the mutual sharing and exposition of all its worlds – within this
world’111.
The fact that Spinoza employs two verbs such as sequire and effluire and the idea
of movement that they imply allows us to read Spinoza’s Substance alongside
Nancy’s idea of coming to presence. The One Substance, according to the
characteristics mentioned before and the principle of expression, recalls the idea of
existence as that which is always-engaged in coming, which informs much of Nancy’s
ontology. Such a thinking is crucial for our understanding of the origin of the body,
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for if one wants to answer the question: in which way is the body an extension, it is
necessary to ground any claim into body’s relation with existence as announced in the
introduction.
The kind of auto-production Spinoza talks about and the fact that everything
follows and flows112 from the One Substance allows us to read the Spinozian creation
in terms of an auto-production ex-nihilo. We have already mentioned that the term ex-
nihilo should not be intended here as referring to a Creator or Idea delivering the
world starting from nothing. In Nancy’s reading the question of the creation ex-nihilo
assumes different connotations from the ones established according to a Judeo-
Christian philosophical tradition. As he reads it ex-nihilo means that there is not a
nothing to start with, neither is there – as a cosmological mythology used to say113 -
rough material, uneven matter the Architect will work on, crafting the world out of it.
The nihilo is God himself and the ex is what is left in the sharing out of God.
if creation is ex-nihilo, this does not signify that a creator operates «starting
from nothing»…this instead signifies two things: on the one hand, it signifies
that the ‘creator’ itself is the nihil; on the other hand, it signifies that this nihil
is not...«something from which» what is created would come, but the very
origin…of some thing in general and of everything114.
As in Spinoza, here one has existence as, at the same time, some thing in general
and every thing (where every stands for each singularity). The nature of this coming
to presence - which is necessarily continuous - contained in the ex-nihilo is such that
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with it, Being shares out; that which exists is precisely the outcome of this sharing
out, or better said, the sharing out itself. Nancy says:
Creation takes place everywhere and always – but it is this unique event, or
advent, only on the condition of being each time what it is, or being what it is
only «at each time», each time appearing singularly…If ‘creation’ is indeed
this singular exposition of being, then its real name is existence115.
God then is all in the ex, in this movement, in this dislocation. The One Substance
– causa sui and per se concipi – ex-produces itself, and in this continuous production
it constitutes the immanent cause of the world.
What has been just mentioned can be put in still another way: if God is the
immanent cause of the world, which follows from him as its own dislocation, then
God never withdraws from the world, because this would mean that God can
withdraw from Himself. For Spinoza God is eternal (EI, P19), which means to say
that God is the there (without temporal affections), which has always and already
been there. Creation, if one can still call it by this name, is always occurring: ‘it is the
being-already-there of the already there that is of concern’116. Origin is thus every
time. Moving one step forward, one could then think Origin as the lack of a thing
called by this name, or better said as the multiplication, the unextinguishing echo of
this name. Origin is ongoing, it is contained in that «effluxisse», it is a movement. In
Nancy’s words: ‘Origin does not signify that from which the world come, but rather
the coming of each presence of the world, each time singular’117.
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Having worked out this parallel, one can now move back to the question of the
origin of the body and observe what room the notion of God as an extended thing has
made for it. In EII, D1 one reads: ‘by body I understand a mode which expresses in a
certain and determinate manner the existence of God in so far as He is considered as
the thing extended’118. The problem of origin and creation of the body asks to be
thought in terms of extension, that is to say in terms of that which makes room for
existence. In the second place it then demands a thought on the matter of access to the
origin. Making room for existence here means that the body is that which exposes the
coming to presence of existence. It is that which manifests the singular being as
shared out, for my body makes me here and you there. The expression indicates the
impossibility for me to speak at the same time and from the same place you are
speaking from [we would here need a detour on the question of making love for it is
in making love that the problem of the here and there manifests itself in all its
vividness, for the more I try to penetrate into one’s innermost being, both in its
physical and psychological connotations, the more that person remains there - keeps
occupying a space which I cannot fully access - without me being able to fill this gap.
For the time being we must set this discourse aside].
Making room for existence means that the body as extension or place – the body
thought here both with Nancy and Spinoza and with their lexicon – exposes the very
fact that existence is always in a coming of some sort and must be decided in the
open. Body is the dislocation of this coming, dislocation of existence’s coming. In
order for the coming to presence to persist in its name and to preserve the
meaningfulness of this name (without this name becoming just an echo, caught in a
meaningless bouncing back), it can’t be identical to itself, it has to be – always –
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encumbered in coming, for its very essence is in this movement. To exist means
exposing existence precisely to its to. (It is at this point that one could recall
Heidegger’s analysis of the ‘here’ and ‘yonder’, the impossibility of grasping the
body as ‘this particular place’).
The mode of the coming to presence thus can’t be identity; quite the opposite, it
has to be a movement against identity. If coming to presence has to keep coming –
otherwise it would be just presence, but presence of itself to itself, saturation - it needs
in each coming to move from itself, it needs to come at a distance from itself.
When Nancy makes use of the expression ‘world of bodies’ it is this constant
refusal of existence to come to itself that he has in mind. Existence performs in its
appearance a rejection of its own face, the refusal of its identity, a room with no
mirrors.
Dislocation is the dis-identity of the coming, the lack of evenness and saturation.
Coming comes always elsewhere; it is in this way that one can make sense of the
multiplicity of singularities. The world does not happen in one moment, it does not
suddenly burst out, but it is present every time this refusal comes to presence, thus
every time existence appears as dislocated. This is what bodies expose; the body
exposes this dis-identity. The body is the extension of this not-having identity (or the
necessary and eternal refusing identity) of the coming. But nowhere is the body
simply a figure, an illustration of existence’s dis-location – it is instead its very limit.
If existence is that which ‘pre-vents supposition itself, or that which overcomes it
by surprise […] the same thing completely different’119, then it is in this light that one
                                                
119 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey Librett (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1997),p.69-70
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can read Nancy’s words: ‘the body is the being of existence […] registering the fact
that existence has no essence, but only ex-ists’120.
This last thought connects the present discourse to the one that has been previously
anticipated: bodies are the limit where sense quits referring to that ideal it is and starts
making sense. Bodies do photography, but this photography is a mechanical writing,
something of the skills proper to the medieval amanuenses, who copy a manuscript,
crafting one letter after the other, while they are at the same time already caught in the
exegetical effort.
The body makes room for existence: along with each body, the whole is exposed,
but never recuperated as a system or determined as a closed totality. The body then
makes room for existence by exposing the logic of exposition: not identical and not
appropriable. One could attempt to summarize all this in three points:
- the body is that which makes room for existence, that is the body is existence
in action; not created, not produced, without supposition, simply placing itself
continuously outside, in the ‘other’.
- The body as the being present of existence. There is no anteriority of the body
to existence here because the coming of existence is also the coming into
existence121. It has been mentioned earlier on that bodies could also be
conceived in terms of access. This claim is grounded in the analysis worked out
in the previous paragraph: it has to be conceived in relation to the ongoing
characteristic of origin122. Given that the extension of the body, or better the
body as extended, is that which exposes existence – constant coming to
                                                
120 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008),  15
121 In a similar way as ‘the coming to the world is also the coming of the world’. Jean-Luc Nancy, The
Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey Librett (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1997), 159
122 Ongoing origin: the definition the dictionary gives of ongoing is: continuing to exist or develop, or
happening at the present moment. In apparent contrast with the definition of origin: the beginning or
start of something. It is the oxymoron which results by associating the two terms that explain how I am
posing the question of origin here.
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presence and dis-identity - bodies allow us to touch on the origin and to have
access to it. The body is that by which I can gain access to the «at each time»,
to the singular origin and to the plurality of origins. Body is my plastic locality
exposed to other localities; hence the access to the origin is realized in the fact
that I can conceive of myself as exposed to the multiplicity of existence and its
ongoing origin just through my body. My body is what spaces me from other
beings, thus allowing me to touch on that plurality constituting the continuous
arising of origins. Body is access in these terms: it is the extension of God – the
there of existence – and the existing presence of the ongoing origin.
- The presence of existence and existence presencing. To conclude: according to
what has been said thus far - that the body is extension of existence, extension
of the essence of existence as dislocation of its coming to presence - then one
can think the body as the ex, the presence of that outside which follows
(«sequitur») from existing.
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4.2 - ‘Bear in mind Dear Friend…’
At the very end of EP4 - a letter Spinoza addressed to Henry Oldenburg – one can
read the following: ‘bear in mind, Dear Friend, that men are not created, but born and
that their bodies already exist before birth, though under different forms’ 123.
In this passage Spinoza tried to reply to his friend’s objection to EI, P1 and EI, P3.
What is anticipated here is something that Spinoza will develop more extensively in
EII, Lemma VII, Note124, namely the continuity, indivisibility and indestructibility of
God as extended thing. Such a statement leads one to notice that, as to the mind we
can attribute a ‘certain eternity’, so one must do with the body. Bodies exist
independently from the individual subject; they are born and not created, which
means that with the singular body one is in the midst of the ex, which constitutes the
difference of God to himself. In its constant sharing out, the Substance dislocates
itself. This dislocation differentiates the Substance from itself. What Spinoza seems to
address is that the body is always already there in the substance and that birth is the
appearance of this dislocation.
The argument of the eternity of the body, this ‘certain eternity’ satisfied through
body’s eternal presence in the One, follows logically from two points:
1) the expressive implication of modes and substance; according to EI, P19: ‘God
is eternal or in other words, all His attributes are eternal […] eternity pertains
                                                
123 Baruch Spinoza, Letters to friend and foe, trans. Dagobert Runes (New York: Philosophical Library,
1969), 17
124 ‘The individual thus composed will, moreover, retain its nature whether it moves or be at rest, or
whether it move in this or that direction, provided that each part retain its own motion and
communicate it as before to the rest’ Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. James Gutmann (New York:
Hafner Press, 1949), 94
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to the nature of the substance. Therefore, each of the attributes must involve
eternity’125;
2) the idea of bodies and minds as having the same ontological status.
In addition if the body were to be thought as dying and being created anew each
time, this would mean that God as an extended thing would perish or be divided,
which is not possible. The body is then eternal, although it exists within the substance
in forms that might be different from the human body.
Oddly enough if one turns to Christian logic, it is possible to trace a similar
proposal; that is to say, there’s nothing before the body. Although this might appear in
sharp contrast with the εν αρκη ην ο λογοσ, it is exactly this incipit that allows for
such a statement. What demands to be asked here is: what is before the body? The
answer should be something of this kind: it is the angelic revelation that stands before
it, the angelic logic of Christian creation, that which has and is no-body. The coming
to presence of the Angel happens, however, under the features of a body, because any
presence is the presence of a body, even this presence of God. Body makes space for
the verbum. ‘In principium erat verbum’, εν αρκη ην ο λογοσ: what takes place
before the body actually claims body’s eternity as necessity. In this principium is
already contained the idea that verbum caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, they co-
appear, their coming is simultaneous. The word has to caro se facere. This body that
the verbum becomes is nothing else than the sharing out of logos itself, what makes
the logos come to presence. Everything that comes without a body is just principium,
not even verbum, for verbum needs a body to become that which it is. In principium
erat verbum, verbum caro facto est = the verbum, in order to become what it is, to
                                                
125 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. James Gutmann (New York: Hafner Press, 1949), 59
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make sense, has to come on the edge of a body, otherwise it remains principium, that
is to say the beginning of sense and its ideal principle (Goethe’s Faust, struggling with
the logocentric diktat and the mediation of signs to which he saw himself
subordinated, retranslated the question as: ‘in the beginning was the deed’126).
What this biblical detour attempted to express is that once one poses the verbum
one is at the same time posing the body, and necessarily so. Principium – as Jean-Luc
Nancy points out – indicates that which has always already been there (it is the
religious equivalent of the metaphysical nihilo) the incipit that already also implies an
excipit. Verbum = corpus = incipit. They all come together, at the same time in the
same place, or they don’t come at all, or there’s no way out of the inertia of the
principium. Either there is just an incipit without the body of the text or there is an
incipit with an excipit. It is not by chance that Christianity starts with a body. It starts
with it and from it twice and in two ways:
a) there is no Christianity, there is no verbum of Christianity, without the body of
Christ, without God becoming flesh; this body of Christ makes room for the
existence of the Christian God;
b) moreover there is no Christianity without this body of Christ being extended
until the end of every possible extension; until he starts rising and engages in
an anabasi, becoming untouchable, becoming again the body of logos, the
body of God, God as extended; quo tangere non vis.
                                                
126 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, trans. Bayard Taylor (London: Euphorion Books, 1949), 59.
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5 - Idea of the body
Yet the expression of her face is one of sad contrition and
her wilting body conveys nothing other than her
sorrowing soul, which we cannot ignore even if it is
concealed by tempting flesh, for this woman could be
completely naked, had the artist so chosen to portray her,
and she would still be deserving of our respect and
veneration
        Jose Saramago127
In EII, P13 one reads: ‘The mind is the idea of the body’128. The mind is the idea of
an extended thing actually existing. The suggestion is here to read this statement next
to a posthumous fragment by Freud on which Jean-Luc Nancy has extensively
commented: “Psyche is shared out, she knows nothing about it”. The proposal can be
justified looking at how both Spinoza’s proposition and Freud’s fragment draw a
trajectory of incommensurability. They both point at a thinking of the mind as
extended. One is here facing incommensurability. In a text on Descartes, Nancy says
‘there is no measure one can attend to here. It is the incommensurable that makes
possible the quasi permixtio of the union and that makes of this an incommensurable
thought’129. How to think this incommensurable community in extension of thought
and body?
                                                
127 Jose Saramago, The gospel according to Jesus Christ, trans. Giovanni Pontiero (London: Harper
Collins Publishers, 1993), 2
128 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. James Gutmann (New York: Hafner Press, 1949), 89
129 Jean-Luc Nancy, Ego Sum (Paris: Flammarion, 1979) 161 (translation mine)
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Nancy thinks this incommensurability in terms of holes. He employs a metonymy,
‘the incommensuable extension of thought, is the opening of the mouth. The mouth
that opens itself and forms ‘ego’, this mouth is the locus of the union as far as the
union opens itself up and stretches itself’130.
Nancy thinks the mouth for everything else, as accounting for the whole body. He
suggests that what is to be thought, in order to make sense of Psyche’s extension, is
the mouth, ‘psyche’s body, the being-extended and outside-itself of presence-to-the
world’131. One should then think the mouth, but starting from it one must also pay
attention to other entrances, ways in and ways out. In order to think this extension of
Psyche, it is necessary to think a mouth before orality, doing things other than
speaking, spacing out thought, thus reconciling the incommensurability. The mouth
assumes this importance because it is the place where the ‘I’ is thrown. The mouth
creates space, making available the condition of extension, including that of thought.
Psyche’s extension is an idea tenaciously resisting perception and common sense. It is
easy to conceive body as extended, it is a different question, a harder and more
demanding one, to think the extension of psyche or the mind as the idea of the body.
How to think this being outside and stretched out of Psyche? How to make it
bearable?
Spinoza wrote that the mind is not an Other to the body, it is not that which is in
opposition to the body, for the very reason that mind and body are united (EII, P13,
Note). While thinking the body one then shouldn’t presume that there is a soul on the
other side, which is overdetermined or which overdetermines. What ‘Psyche ist
ausgedehnt…’ and EII, P13 point to is the outside of the body, the idea of the mind as
the body outside itself.
                                                
130 Jean-Luc Nancy, Ego Sum (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), 161 (translation mine)
131 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard Rand (Fordham University Press, New York, 2008), 21
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Nancy suggests that once one proffers a discourse on the body one is in fact
already implicated in a discourse about the mind. One should then reason keeping in
mind the parallelism introduced at the beginning of this discussion. On one hand,
what is demanded is not to think body and mind as exactly the same thing, while on
the other, one should resist giving in to a dualistic vision. What is at stake is to think
with Spinoza, at the very heart of his P13, at the very heart of parallelism: the mind as
the idea of the body or Psyche being stretched out. In other terms: one is here asked to
conceive the mind as the difference of the body to itself; that which accompanies the
journey of the body from itself to itself. One should notice a similar thinking in the
Stoics and in the Christian philosopher Tertullian, for whom the soul is a corporeal
substance [consitus spiritus corpus est]. This idea has at different times agitated
Western thinking and has performed with Descartes’ second meditation (certainty as
the verbalization of the ‘Ego Sum’ – ‘Ego sum, ego existo; quoties a me profertur, vel
mente concipitur – necessario esse verum’) a deconstructive interruption. As Nancy
says: ‘the setting up and inauguration of the Subject have provoked the collapse of its
substance […] the collapse of the substance belongs to the setting up of the
Subject’132.
Nancy suggests thinking the unity of the articulation, which means to understand
the extension of the mind and its relation to the body in terms of movement, of a
common e-motion.
What Spinoza says in the propositions following P13 is fundamentally that the
mind is the experience of the body. That is how I would make sense of EII, P39, P22,
P19. If one reads these propositions in this light they will resonate with the last words
of Freud’s fragment ‘…weiss nichts davon’. In addressing the question of
                                                
132 Jean-Luc Nancy, Ego Sum (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), 33, (translation mine)
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experience, it should be made clear that the word – from the latin experiri - always
holds to an idea of movement towards the outside.
As long as sense is all that is available to us, then bodies make sense – in the
double and ambivalent sense of the expression. This is why to talk about bodies is a
matter of touching on that which is not discourse at all. If one argues – with Nancy –
that the world is the exposed of human being and that human being is that which
exposes the world, then sense requires a body in order to gain such a name. As Nancy
points out, if we are to rebuild ontology the only one available would be one
concerning the body. Bodies do photography, they write the light in making space for
sense, but sense needs to stop on the edge of this writing, it has to squeeze itself into
this writing the body is133.
Sense finds in the body a second skin, while at the same time the body invests itself in
sense. It is not the skin of an incarnation, but the skin as the surface that makes space,
that exposes sense, that takes the place of sense.
In EII P13 we read that the mind does not know anything else but the body, ‘the
object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body […] and nothing else’134. If
the body is the extended thing informing the very and only idea of the human mind,
then the mind makes sense of itself by ways of the affections of the body. Body is the
extension of the mind on which the mind bases its knowledge of itself. What a mind is
capable of is what a body is capable of. This last discussion inscribes the present
                                                
133 One could here use the metaphor Michelangelo employs in a sonnet to his lover Tommaso
Cavalieri: Cosi’ volesse al mie signor mie fato/ Vestir suo viva di mie morta spoglia/ Che come serpe al
sasso si discoglia/ Pur per morte potria cangiar mie stato/ O fussi sol la mia l’irsuta pelle/ Che del suo
pel contesta, fa tal gonna/ Che con ventura stringe si bel seno,/ Ch’i’ l’are’ pure il giorno; o le
pianelle/ Che fanno a quel di lor basa e colonna,/ ch’i’ pur ne porterei duo nevi almeno. ‘Would that
my destiny wished the same for me as regards my lord: that I might clothe his living skin with my dead
skin, so that, as a serpent sloughs on a stone, I might through death change my condition. Oh might my
skin alone be the hairy skin that, woven from its own skin, makes the gown whose good fortune it is to
bind so lovely a breast, so that I should have it at least in daytime; or might I be the slippers which
make themselves a base and support for him, that I might at the very last carry him for two winters’.
Michelangelo Bonarroti, The Poems, trans. Christopher Ryan, (London: J.M.Dent, 1996), 90
134 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. James Gutmann (New York: Hafner Press, 1949), 89
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argument once more there where the body escapes the dialectic signifier/signified.
The body does not stand for anything else. Instead the body is sense in itself, as such,
as extension, as dense, solid and open. Nancy says that the body is there where sense
comes to presence, sense in se and per se.
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5.2 - Body and the wound
In 1601 Caravaggio started painting The Incredulity of Saint Thomas (Doubting
Thomas) showing Christ as he forces the apostle to penetrate his rib, wounded after
the crucifixion, with a finger. The body is that fracture of existence one needs to test
in all its cruelty. Always open, always already wounded: this is the condition of the
body135.
Following the path traced by Jean-Luc Nancy, the question of the open nature of
the body can be thought of in three ways. When Nancy writes that the body is ‘what is
neither shit nor soul’136, he is not just provoking. Rather, he is advancing a consistent
argument. One could summarize it as follows: the body constitutes its form in an
inception where it is what it expels. Soul and faeces are what the body is and what the
body is not; they constitute the difference of the body to itself, ‘in and of itself a body
is also its consumption, its degradation’137. In this way the body is always open,
always ready to think its form and its manner in terms of its own rejection and
expulsion. As Nancy remarks, the open body or the body-as-open is never a void, a
blank page; it is an open calling for a double action or double movement: going inside
to recover that which then, through its entrances, will be forced outside.
The openness of the body, its breach, revolves around this double movement. In
order to configure itself as appropriation, the first movement demands the second.
                                                
135 Mentioning the question of the wound inevitably brings fore the question on the surroundings of the
wound. If there is a wound there should be a totality, originally intact and then injured. Although this is
a theme we don’t intend to approach here, due to the space the question would need, we are lured to
attempt a first answer: there is no totality, for the wound itself, as it is, opened, a displacement, is the
place of the coming to presence, the only way we can conceive of this kind of wound, of Being as
wound, is if we take the wound itself as the totality, but the totality always opened to be wounded. The
wound as totality is a wound without a surrounding body, but body itself, a body of a particular nature,
always opened.
136 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 127
137 Ibid., 105
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This appropriation will then make possible the ex-scription, the being in the world,
dislocation of the coming to presence. Similarly to the wound of Christ, which
overwhelms Thomas, the body, as the dis-identity of the coming to presence, cannot
withdraw from its openness. ‘A world of bodies in which bodies, identically,
decompose the world. Identically: dis-location, dis-localization’138, the body has to
keep extending and dislocating itself. The dislocation, which is its creation, its mode,
its art, keeps opening the body, and new origins keep arising. The body is also
ignorance, for it is incapable of closing itself. This ignorance is not a lack, though. As
Nancy points out ‘the body does not belong to the domain in which ‘knowledge’ or
‘non-knowledge’ are at stake’139. The ignorance of the body lies somewhere else; it
stands alone, as Artaud would say. The body cannot contain – it is not in its
knowledge – its origins, its ends and its beginnings, as it cannot contain its immersion
and emotion towards other bodies. Soul and excrement constitute the difference of the
body to itself and show how this constant movement is needed for the body to
maintain its density.
The body is open in at least two other ways. It has been mentioned already that for
Nancy bodies are not a full space, they are rather open space, the opening of space.
One can take this to mean that bodies are what make room for existence, thus they
constitute the taking place, the taking the place of. Here one finds the second way in
which the body is open: in that it creates the conditions for space and then,
maintaining itself as this dislocation, persists (without its persistence ever perduring
in the same) in making room for existence. It does so continuously and not once and
                                                
138 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 105
139 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Corpus’ in The Birth to Presence, trans. Claudette Sartiliot (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1993), 200
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for all. It is always the dislocation of the coming to presence, it is always open for
presence to come. When the body turns back it sees no origin or creator, no Idea or
Archon; this possibility is no longer given to it. What the body finds is its own being
open and its coming as the always open, the extended open, the wound without cure,
without tissues to close it. Open would thus mean the presence of the always and
forever there, terms that in turn indicate an open as permanent access to the origin, for
this origin is ongoing, always possible, always arising.
This second way for the body to be open is a being open as access, as that which
creates the possibility for access, what continuously makes access available. A body
is the continuous being outside of existence, it is that which never stops coming to
presence and always makes space for an outside. So the ontology of the body would
be in this fracture or spacing140. Extension = fracture, wound that keeps bleeding
existence. This second manner of the body open is the body as condition. One would
then say: the opening of existence and existence as the open.
There is then also a third way – which still has to do with the relation between
body and coming to presence – inducing us to treat the body as openness. Body is an
extension, it is what exposes being, but my individual body is also local, it is the local
extension that makes me-here and you-there.  It is worth recalling that Spinoza
focused his attention on the relational value of the body. As Deleuze points out, in
Spinoza the body is not defined as a subject but on the basis of kinetic and dynamic
properties. When Spinoza says ‘we do not know what a body can do’ and ‘the human
mind does not know the human body itself…except through ideas of modifications by
                                                
140 ‘In fact the body is partes extra partes, it is discrete, for it is spacing of being, that is to say spacing
from itself. Self spacing’. Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne
O’Bryan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 84
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which the body is affected’141 [EII, P19], he proves to be investing a great deal of
attention in the presence of the body to other bodies. It seems as if  he is here
concentrating the powers of bodies on some kind of being-with. Nancy as well often
makes use of the list, to the point of risking apoiopesis as Derrida says142. Mentioning
one body leads one to mention not only its partes, but a great number of other bodies;
one comes to place oneself in the midst of the system of relations and exposures the
body is made of, relations which extend toward a beyond. The word itself opens up –
like the Aleph that in its three centimetres contains the ‘populous sea, dawn and dusk,
the multitudes of the Americas and London as a broken labyrinth’143 - and all the
possibilities of a universe are pulled out:
Hoc est enim: this world-here, stretched out here, with its chlorophyll, its
solar galaxy, its metamorphic rocks, its protons, it deoxyribonucleic helix, its
Avogadro number, its continental drift […] Cleopatra’s nose, the number of
petals on a daisy144.
One can’t employ the word body without necessarily letting the space free for this
burst, since every time we use it everything the body is exposed to comes about as an
eruption. Nancy puts it in an almost poetic way:
a body is an image offered to other bodies, a whole corpus of images
stretched from body to body, local colors and shadows, fragments, grains,
areolas, lunules, nails, hairs, tendons, skulls, ribs, pelvises, stomachs,
                                                
141 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, trans. James Gutmann (New York: Hafner Press, 1949), 99
142 Jacques Derrida, On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy, trans. Chritstine Irizarry (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2005), 71
143 Jorge Luis Borges, Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (London: Penguin, 1998), 283
144 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 33
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meatuses, foams, tears, teeth, droolings, slits, blocks, tongues, sweat, liquors,
veins, pains, and joys, and me, and you145.
The body is always exposed to and always exposes an alium as well as an aliud.
The definition Nancy proposes of our world as the World of Bodies seems to indicate
this: that our body is always offered –thus open – to the other. To those other bodies
which it shares the coming to presence with. If Nancy says that body has to be
intended as bodies, otherwise it does not make sense, this means that there is an
opening of the body towards the other. However this other is not more foreign than
my body. ‘There’s not, on one side, an original singularity and on the other, a simple
being there of things, more or less given for our use’146. Or again: ‘they [bodies] are
not isolated nor mixed together. They are among themselves, as origins’. My body, is
always my outside, an outside I offer to the other. I will never perceive my body as
such, as mine; what I will perceive are others as bodies.
Body is open to other bodies, and this word other should include both alium and
aliud, both other human bodies and all the other bodies of whatever nature.
Because all the aliud have the same access to the ongoing origin, I will always already
be there with them. If my body is an opening, it is then all a question of access, of
acknowledging that my local density is always handed over to the other, for, every
time a body rises up, this inception immediately brings fore all the other inceptions.
My relation to these others is not such that I can stop sharing with them; on the
contrary, it is such that having access to them also assures me access to myself.
                                                
145 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 121
146 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 17-18
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Three ways of the body-open:
- open as rejecting itself; as incontinence of its own density, of itself as origin;
- open as the taking place of existence; constantly moving with the coming to
presence of existence; constantly placing itself in existing;
- open as body=bodies; open in the sharing of an ongoing origin, open for its
being local extends to all the other localities
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6.1 - An interesting situation. Welcoming Levinas
Calling for the body as an aperture147, for openness as the necessary truth of the
body, draws the trajectory for the second part of our analysis. I have so far dealt with
the body in terms of extension, locality. It is now time to introduce the notion of
position as outlined by Emmanuel Levinas in Existence and Existents148. In this
volume, in which Levinas starts deploying the elements which will later on come to
constitute the core of his philosophy, the task undertaken revolves around the attempt
to describe the relation between the there is, the impersonal being, and existents. In
Levinas’ words ‘the distinction between that which exists and its existence itself’149.
What Levinas is looking for is the way in which ‘a being, a subject, an existent, arises
in impersonal Being’150. The notion Levinas develops to introduce the aforementioned
question is that of position. This idea contains in nuce most of Levinas’ mature
philosophical concerns and will retain its whole strength up to Totality and Infinity.
Under the light of this research, the notion of position proves to be useful when linked
with the notion of situation I have attempted to describe thus far. The body is a
situation: it is both a situ – a taking place, existence taking place - but it also finds
itself in situ - it is then existence as situated. The body is the situation of existence,
existence in the act of situating itself, it is the happening or the event of existence
finding a situ and the condition existence bears as place. In this way the body is the
arising of existence and the fact that existence will always arise and situate itself. If
one wants to put this double meaning of situation with Nancy’s words, one should
                                                
147 The term aperture recalls a technical terminology used in photography, aperture would be a narrow
opening that allows light into a camera. According to what we say before – that bodies do photography
– this term sounds particularly proper.
148 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 2003)
149 Ibid., 1
150 Ibid., 3
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quote him saying: ‘being takes place, but its place spaces it out. In every instance of
its occurrence, being is an area, and its reality gives itself in areality. It is thus that
being is a body’151.
When expanding the question of Being to a different scale, Nancy tries to reply to
the questions what is a world? What does ‘world’ mean? Nancy’s argument is that ‘a
world is the common place of a totality of places: of presences and dispositions for
possible events’152. Here one sees how the lexicon that was earlier on structured
around terms like exscription and extension is lending itself more and more to a
spatial connotation, so as to allow us to introduce the duality situation - position. This
is because henceforth the aim is to open up the enquiry into the realm of the possible
space released by the aperture of the body to the space of bodies, the world of bodies.
From now on, this will be the central question: what the world of bodies is and what
the characteristic of such a shared space is. Space here would take up the local tone of
something spacious rather than spatial, a roomy space, whose coordinates haven’t
been posited as yet.
                                                
151 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey Librett (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1997), 35.
152 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David
Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 42
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6.2 - Levinas’ Position
The question of position is called on to respond to the definition of the body as
situation, in the double meaning of actuality of a space and happening of that space.
It is necessary now to clarify what role the notion of position plays here and what
is crucial about it. In reading Existence and Existents one should always keep in mind
that Levinas has been trained mainly in phenomenology – having been a pupil of
Husserl – and that in this volume, written while the author was a prisoner of war
(which means that it does not take into account almost any volume published between
1940 and 1945), is an attempt to overcome the Heideggerian analysis of the existents,
while still remaining attached to the conclusions of Being and Time.
Levinas introduces the notion of position to express how a subject can arise from
the ‘rumbling of the there is’. He is here trying to answer the question ‘what does the
advent of a subject consist in?153 His argument moves from an analysis of states such
as fatigue, insomnia, sleeping and the detachment that sleeping produces from the
there is. The position in which the subject arises is a position before any
understanding, even before any world; it is the very essence of any existent to have a
position, to hold himself: ‘the here we are starting with […] is the very fact that
consciousness is an origin, that it starts from itself’154. The body, in order to become a
subject, to develop the awareness of being a situation and an open one, needs this
notion of position. Moreover one needs to conceive of position as a base, as a
localization that allows the existent to put itself together. The event of this position is
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the very opportunity a body possesses to become a subject, to realize its position and
the opportunity of opening spaces.
One further clarification is required. From the aforementioned remarks it seems I
am incurring a plain contradiction: according to what I have been saying, it looks as if
the body would be entered into an already existing space, but this would contradict
the notion of the body as situation, bearing the connotations of existence taking place
and existence as place. This claim would undermine all that has been said before, in
addition to rendering the notion of situation completely useless, If the body would just
enter a space that is already there and from which it would then arise as subject, it
wouldn’t make sense to talk about the body as ‘existence situated’ and ‘the evidence
of existence as something looking for situation’.
The body is itself that which makes the situating of existence possible: by creating
the condition of space, it is the body that creates the spaciousity of existence.
To make this point clear one could show how this happens in cinema, employing
the analysis Gilles Deleuze undertakes in his Cinema 2. As in the concept of position
the conditions for space are created by the body, so in what Deleuze calls the cinema
of bodies do bodies create the space for the camera. If in classical cinema the body
was an obstacle on the road to thought, in modern cinema (at least for some directors;
the work of John Cassavetes will serve here and in the following remarks as
guideline) the body acts as a tool, ‘it is through the body that cinema can reveal what
remains of past experience’155. What is important for us to consider is the possibility
for bodies to construct the plot. In some cases the plot is even undone in favour of the
attitudes and the gestures of the body. The characters themselves are reduced to their
movements, gesture by gesture.
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Those directors who employ this procedures inevitably let bodies arrange the
spatial coordinates, articulate camera movements and lights; the space is composed
according to the presence of bodies, so is the camera framing, ‘all the components of
the image come together on the body’156. Each body will be accorded the faculty of
giving space, of shading light and of orienting the camera. The image is calibrated
through the presence of the body. One could say that for this kind of cinema the body
unravels the film, bodies begin to play the image, they articulate every part of it, they
bang into the camera, forcing the camera to move according to their movements. As
position designs the spatial coordinates in which the subject arises, so bodies in
cinema decide what will be inside or outside of the picture and at which tempo the
film will flow.
The presence of existence is the body, but the body is also that which existence –
in its always dis-identical coming – presents of itself, what has here been called
situation. Position then cannot be conceived simply as a location, a point in space,
because before any body no spatial possibilities are given. As already said, the body
makes place for existence, it is God (the Spinozian God) as the extended thing.
Levinas is well aware of this when he assumes that the
body is nowise a thing…because its being belongs to the order of the
events…it is not posited; it is a position. It is not situated in a space given
beforehand; it is the irruption in anonymous being of localization itself.157
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To reinforce once more the idea that the taking position is the foundational idea of
an analysis of the body in the world, one should follow Levinas in saying that
a subject does not exist before the event of its position. The act of taking
position does not unfold in some dimension from which it could take its
origin; it arises at the very point at which it acts. Its action does not consist in
willing, but in being158.
Position is then an awakening of the body-as-situation, the moment where
situation starts becoming preoccupied with itself. If the body as situation is all/entirely
in its relation with Being, then the movement towards position concerns a relation of
the body with itself.
The idea of position will come back in later writings of Levinas, again to support
the same thinking. In Totality and Infinity – within the chapter devoted to Enjoyment
and Nourishment - readers are told that ‘the body is the elevation, but also the whole
weight of position’159. The question of the taking position as the very advent of
consciousness is restated few lines later when Levinas says that the essence of a body
is to ‘accomplish my position on the earth […] to give me a vision’160. The position is
for Levinas the very moment where the subject can state its beginning, a beginning
that is intrinsically linked with the positioning itself:
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to posit oneself corporeally is to touch an earth, but to do so in such a way
that the touching finds itself already conditioned by the position, the foot
settles into a real which this very action outlines or constitutes161.
With this analysis I have introduced Levinas into the discourse led so far by Nancy
and Spinoza162. Although at first Nancy and Levinas seem to move from similar
points of view (at least they both devote attention to a close reading of Heidegger,
whose thinking Levinas introduced for the first time to the French speaking world),
the more this enquiry will engage with the space of the bodies the more one will see
that there is an incommensurability between the two ways of thinking this space. I
will let these differences emerge and feed our questioning, since it will be from this
incommensurability that I will attempt to develop further investigations.
Nevertheless most of the conclusions Levinas draws in Existence and Existents
provide a useful framework, which is not at all contradictory with what I have been
developing so far in reconstructing a collection of traces from Kafka, Nancy and
Spinoza. In the preceding lines I have tried to sketch out a possible movement from
the body as exposing existence to the body as subject, and we’ve found in the notions
of situation and position the way to articulate this progression. Our trajectory has led
us from the origin of the body to the event of a subject, or in Levinas’ words: ‘the
advent of consciousness’163. It was necessary to emphasize this movement, for the
idea of openness, the body as open, as an open position, is that which makes available
a discussion on the space of bodies.
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As I mentioned earlier Nancy highlights three ways in which a body is open. The
one I will take most into consideration here is the third way, where he states that body
is always bodies, because I will always perceive it as present with others, as sharing
their same origin. It is the question of this sharing out that is decisive, because this
sharing out between bodies constitutes the very condition of a shared space; it sets
down the coordinates for a world of bodies. What Levinas wanted to state in
introducing the question of position is that it is possible to begin a thinking on sense
and consciousness only if one acknowledges the crucial role played by the taking
position of a body in the coming of Being, in the rumbling of the there is. The body
stands up, something emerges out of its ignorance. But Levinas sets another program
for the body. In Totality and Infinity he further develops the question of Being and
beings, assuming a radical perspective, unknown to Existence and Existents. We here
encounter the question of the body framed by the broader aim Levinas has set for his
research: the possibility for Beings to overcome totality, the same, the ontological
enclosure. The core question of Totality and Infinity was already announced in ‘Is
Ontology fundamental?’ – an essay Levinas published well before he started his first
major work – as: ‘How is this simultaneity of a position in totality and a reserve or
separation with regard to it achieved?’164. Levinas introduces the concept of
separation, for his interest is to show the wrench operated by western ontological
tradition. Levinas’ program aims to revise this way of thinking by opposing to
Totality the idea of Infinity. Infinity in Levinasian terms is realized in the opportunity
for ipseity to contain in itself what is not of itself, the welcoming of the other and the
Other, gentleness and the face165. The point of arrival of this philosophy, at least of
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Totality and Infinity – as the discourse will become even more radical in ‘Otherwise
than Being’ – is that ‘to think the infinite, the transcendent, the stranger is not to think
an object’166, it is to do more or better than that. The idea of the body plays in this
philosophical system a crucial role.
For Levinas it is crucial to resolve the question of Infinity in terms of resistance to
totality, of overcoming of it, the very possibility of thinking a way out of the Same
[same and totality are correlative terms for ‘totality’ and ‘infinity’, and we’ll see how
in Levinas’ work many terms actually perform the same philosophical action: face,
for instance, while playing a role in itself, is also a synonym for infinity, when it is
defined as the way the other presents himself exceeding the idea of the other in me].
Infinity then comes to be defined as ‘the desirable, that which arouses desire, that
which is approachable by a thought that at each instant thinks more than it thinks…
the measure through the very impossibility of measure’167. For the idea of Infinity to
be possible one has to understand what separation is, for the latter agitates the former.
Levinas establishes in the creation ex-nihilo the first time that the possibility for
separation arises. This notion has been discussed already with regard to Nancy and
Spinoza, but Levinas’ interest in this idea lies elsewhere. On one hand Nancy stresses
the fact that the body is the created par excellence and created always refer to a
creation ex-nihilo – ‘if the world is the growth of/from nothing – an expression of
formidable ambiguity – it is because it only depends on itself, while this ‘self’ is
given from nowhere but from itself’168.  On the other, Levinas sees in this movement
where the nihil comes to presence and where what is important is the cresco, the
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possibility for the first detachment from Totality. The ex-nihilo is also the moment
where Levinas introduces for the first time that equivocation169 which delivers us to
the question of the body:
the creation ex-nihilo expresses a multiplicity not united into a totality; the
creature is an existence which indeed does depend on an other, but not as part
that is separated from it. Creation leaves to the creature a trace of dependence
on an other, but not as a part separated from it. Creation ex nihilo breaks with
system, posits a being outside of every system…Creation leaves to the
creature a trace of dependence, but it is an unparalleled dependence: the
dependent being draws from this exceptional dependence, from this
relationship, its very independence, its exteriority to the system170.
In the ex-nihilo Levinas sees the flash where the novelty of the ‘I’ is introduced,
the first instant where the light of separation is foreseen. The foregoing quotation also
sets  the ground for the dependence - independence equivocation that constitutes for
Levinas the very secret of the plurality of existence. It is in fact in the possibility of
separation, of every existent disposing of its own time, that Levinas makes sense of
plurality. Here there is inevitably an echo of what Nancy affirms: ‘The unique God,
whose unicity is the correlate of the creating act, cannot precede its creation any more
that it can subsist above it or apart from it in some way. It merges with it’171. Although
the two thinkers reach different conclusions, for both of them what is at stake is
nevertheless the autonomy of existents/singularities. Levinas places the creation ex-
                                                
169 Levinas makes use of this term when referring to the body throughout Totality and Infinity
170 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 2005), 104
171 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David
Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 70
102
nihilo at the beginning of his analysis on separation because: ‘the idea of creation ex-
nihilo expresses a multiplicity not united into a totality’172.
Separation, warns Levinas, cannot and should not be regarded just in terms of
negativity. It has to be the outcome of a positive movement, a movement where the ‘I’
and the ‘I can’ grow (crescunt173).
The movement Levinas has in mind is a movement towards the inside, for
separation can only happen as ipseity. Separation is a movement whose finishing line
is inner life, for ‘inner life is the unique way for the real to exist as a plurality’174. This
separation however cannot rest on an opposition; to say this would betray the entire
construction of this philosophy. If the intention is to breach the there is up to the point
where a violation might occur, then separation has to come not from an opposition,
but from a positive movement of reconciliation. Resisting Totality, the heading or
slogan under which one could thematize Levinas’ work, cannot be resolved in an
opposing to the totality of the same, of another kind of totality, that of the I
completely shut, isolated into its own inner life, an island. The way in which one
should conceive of separation is rather as the possibility for the I to identify itself.
Separation is made necessary by Infinity in the process of overcoming its own idea;
hence a mere correlation is not enough. Separation is instead the way in which we
come to be freed from that site in which we are. Here one sees the crucial role the
question of position assumes and how it has developed from the earlier stages of
Existence and Existent. Separation, then, is produced when the ‘I’ starts loving life,
starts that process by which it begins to love what it lives from, to become
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preoccupied with itself. Levinas alerts that this existent preoccupied with itself is not
the same as Dasein‘s care for Being. There is something more dear than my own
being, ‘thinking, eating…distinct from my substance but constituting it, these contents
make up the worth of my life’175. It is not as in Heidegger’s thinking, where Dasein
always cares for its existence, for it is always there to comprehend Being, because for
Levinas the ‘love of life does not love Being but loves the happiness of being’176.
Separation thus constitutes itself first in creation ex-nihilo, as pure trace of the
intertwining dependence – independence; secondly in the closure of egoism, and
finally in the living from… The notion of living from... is crucial for the way in which
Levinas frames the question of the body.
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6.3 - Living from…
The notion of living from… articulates another step towards separation, psychism
and the inner life. Through the living from... ‘each existent comes to have its own
time’177, separation appears to be resolved in a deep-seated way. When an existent has
come to recognize itself in ipseity, it then turns towards life, towards its dependence
on the other. Living from…is the basis of enjoyment: there we recognize that our
dependence on the other, on the world, characterizes also the contents of our lives. In
Vittorio De Sica’s movie ‘Miracolo a Milano’ the paupers leaving in huts happily
praise their poverty by singing ‘Ci basta una capanna per vivere e dormir, ci basta un
po’ di terra per vivere e dormir’178 [all we need is a shack to live and sleep in, all we
need is a bit of ground to live and sleep in].
Living from… bears this dual meaning; it is poverty and dependence, πενια, but
also the very exercise of existence, the fact that there is a life to live from,
ενθυσιασµοσ, dwelling with God. To this effect Levinas writes: ‘what I do and what
I am is at the same time that from which I live’179. Need is the need of enjoyment, it is
that which makes enjoyment possible.
In this construction the body plays a central role, for it is the body that bears more
than any other the weight of this ambiguity, it is the body that concentrates in itself
πενια and ενθυσιασµοσ. The body is the very articulation of this equivocation, of
this game between dependence and independence, which in the end life is made of.
The chance for the human being to leave the realm of nature is all in the body, body
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as the mode making possible the movement from need to enjoyment, from life as self-
sufficiency and nutrition to life as happiness, love of life. “My body is not only a way
for the subject to be reduced to slavery, to depend on what is not of itself, but is also a
way of possessing and of working…of overcoming the alterity of what I have to live
from”180. Without the body I wouldn’t be able to realize this distance from the world,
which assures my movement from need to enjoyment of the content of life. The here
of the body, situation that becomes a position (situation upwards), exercises itself in
this double performance between dependence and independence, need and happiness.
Separation is thus possible just to the body, the possibility of evading totality is given
to it and in particular to the body as position, ‘raised upwards’. Through the body a
separation towards Desire is realized. I grasp, I labour, I allow myself to exercise life,
I gain time – ‘to be a body is to have time in the midst of the facts’181. My inner life is
possible just as body, since the body closes the way to totality while it remains open
to the other. Here again one has to come back to the question of position, as presented
in Existence and Existents. In that first study Levinas worked out the notion of
position moving from the body as an event and not a substantive. Position was not a
site in being – not already posited in a pre-existent space, but making space– but the
arising of human being as subject in the rumbling of the there is. In Totality and
Infinity the argumentation becomes even more radical, for the body becomes almost
irreducible to thought; it even appears as the very contestation of consciousness.
Similarly to Nancy, where sense starts making sense by coming at the edge of the
body, in Levinas’ text the body is ‘a permanent contestation of the prerogative
attributed to consciousness of ‘giving meaning’ to each thing’182. Levinas also
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approaches the problem of consciousness in a way recalling the Freudian ‘psyche ist
ausgedehnt’, in particular when he says that ‘consciousness…is a disincarnation, a
postponement of the body’183. The very question of the body – its truth as it were –
must be traced in the taking position and in the equivocation this taking position
implies.
The taking position is being in the earth in a way that it is conditioned by this very
being. The action of positing, although it creates its conditions – its space – is at the
same time settled by the position one assumes. The body is this taking position that
makes available the future, a future that nevertheless has already been announced.
Bodies inhabit the element but are the only accessible mean in order to raise upwards,
to forget this inhabitation.
Thus the question of position here turns out to be more problematic, because if the
body is what makes it possible for me to be here and to exercise being, to make
present Being, it is also at the same time what bounds me to this here. ‘To be a body
is to be master of oneself and on the other hand to be encumbered by one’s body’184.
The body is this participation of health and sickness, and in this way it comes to be
the how of separation, ‘the ‘somewhere’ of the separated being as separate. I will
come back to this ambivalence in the next paragraph, although shortly, for this
argument will be covered more extensively in the second part of the analysis.
At this point all of a lexicon has been reviewed, a lexicon and a register which –
given the differences and the different aims – draws Nancy and Levinas nigh. It has
been shown that for both the question of the ex-nihilo is relevant, but that what is
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most important is that they have in common a particular lexicon. On one hand, a
lexicon of places: position, somewhere, standing, dwelling, inhabitation, immanence,
localization…On the other side there is a lexicon of weight: the body for both of them
is the foot that weights on land, the trace of the weight, the very heaviness of Being
here and there. If Nancy says that the body is a weight, Levinas answers that the body
endures “the whole weight of position”185.
In a short while, however, my aim will be reversed, I will need to make them far
from one another and to seek questions and answers in this distance.
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7 - In between bodies
Having established a group of notions on the body, it is necessary to move to the
opening that the body allows for. I have mentioned the three ways in which the
openness of the body is articulated by Nancy, and I will now examine how this
opening is structured in Levinas’ thinking. It is by means of this opening that it is
possible to proceed in the analysis and make sense of a world of bodies. The attempt
is to move the focus from the body as standing alone to a body exposed to any other
body. The spaces where bodies keep each other company.
In order to introduce the topic that will be central in the second part of this
analysis, it seems crucial to first move a step backward. I previously talked about the
opening as the true nature of the body, as that which makes the body what it is. I have
even listed a series of possible directions this notion can take. Now it is time to go
back to that idea and develop the direction that will prove to be the most fertile. In
reading Corpus, I summarized that the body could be open, an aperture, as rejecting
itself, as that which can’t contain its own density, what Kafka calls the ‘horrible
outline’. The body can’t contain its own creation, which is, as I have already insisted
a creation without creator. The apertures as rejection that Nancy enumerates – playing
on the sounds of the French words cent, sense and sang186 – all highlight this necessity
for bodies to pull out something of themselves. This same discourse informs the idea
of the mind as difference of the body to itself.
The body is then open in a second fashion: as the exposure of existence, constantly
open to the coming to presence of existence, thus open as constituting the space for
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existence. Recalling Nancy once more: ‘the world of bodies is the nonimpenetrable
world, a world that is not initially subject to the compactness of space; rather, it is a
world where bodies initially articulate space’187. This quotation introduces us to the
third way in which a body can be open, the one that will lead us to the second
argument of this research. Bodies do not just articulate space, making available the
conditions for space, arising in a position which wasn’t posited before; as Levinas
makes clear, bodies also articulate a space for contact. Bodies are open to the contact
of all other bodies. It is not just a matter of a body articulating its own space and
extending to the space of other bodies. The point here is to show how the aperture that
a body is articulates a space for contact, communion, sharing and otherness. How the
singular bodies necessarily make available the proximity to other bodies and how this
space of company becomes the declension of their locality and the necessity of their
presence. There wouldn’t be any discourse on the space of the body if this space
wasn’t a space where there is always spare room, an open space that declines itself
and slopes down every time towards spaces which come to him from the outside. It is
essential to see how the body creating an outside of itself, being itself an outside,
necessarily opens the conditions for a more general outside. This space of extended
existence is not configured as a possibility the body can avoid, a responsibility it can
decline; quite the contrary, it is the space without which it would not exist. What it is
indispensable to think here is that the two steps just delineated, the body as making
available itself through the conditions for its own space and the body as articulating
the space of contact, company, the space of bodies, do not occur as consequential -
first a body that constitutes itself as a closed locality and then one that opens up to
share this inner place. On the contrary, what is a stake here and what I propose to shed
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light on is the co-presence of these two possibilities at the very point where a body
exposes existence. When a body exposes its own existence it is already exposing to
the whole of existence. One can’t take the coming to presence of the body as a point
of closure, after which existence arrests its coming just to move to another singular
creation. Quite the contrary, one must think that the arising of a body as extension of
existence is also the way existence articulates itself as space of contact, as a world of
bodies. The body contains both its space and the space for contact, its presence is
always a co-presence. It is present to itself as much and as long as it is present to other
bodies. In this way, after having said that the body is a situation arising in a position,
one could say that the body is a separation, for in the body there are, already at the
moment of its onset, two dimensions of space.
The body is existence extended but also extends itself towards the plurality of
existence. Separation indicates that the body is that space which contradicts itself by
also exposing to any other possible space, and in so doing making them possible. To
say that – to say that the body is a separation – additionally leads one to allege that
this is what the expression to be in the world – to be alive, present, born, here and
there – means: to be able to express through one’s own locality the eternal
(necessary) possibility for a space of other localities. There’s no choice: being in the
world means being offered to a space of co-presence. As Nancy says:
The opening is neither the foundation nor the origin. Nor is the opening any
longer a sort of receptacle or an extension prior to things of the world. The
opening of the world is what opens along such things and among them, that
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which separates them in their profuse singularity and which relates them to
each other in their coexistence188.
One must therefore acknowledge that it is from the body that one can question the
idea of the space of the other(s). The following steps will revolve around the question
on how to make sense:
how to do justice, not only to the whole of existence, but to all existences,
taken together but distinctly and in a discontinuous way, not as the totality of
their differences, and differends – precisely not that – but as these differences
together, coexisting or co-appearing, held together as multiple […] and held
by a co- that is not a principle, or that is a principle or archi-principle of
spacing in the principle itself189.
From this space of the single body, from its trait of separation – where in the
opening of one’s locality this body is also thrown190 towards constituting the space
which is not its own, but its outside - derives the possibility of an analysis beyond the
single body, or the single situation/position.
A discourse on the space of the other needs to arise from this analysis of the body
as a place for existence, a place that makes possible not only its own expression of
existence, but existence’s expression. A body is never alone with itself, it is never
known as a single body,
                                                
188 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David
Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 70
189 Ibid., 61
190 It is interesting to note how the latin verbs jectare [to throw] is a derivation of the verb jacere [to
lie]. The same root expresses the movement towards a position and the act of assuming a certain
position. [also in Italian, gettare and giacere and in French jeter and gésir].
112
Bodies are first and always other – just as others are first and always bodies. I
will never know myself as a body right there where ‘corpus ego’ is an
unqualified certainty. By contrast, I’ll always know others as bodies191.
In Levinas’ thinking, where the ideas of separation and constitution of the inner
life, psychism, play a central role in the arising of the subject out of totality and the
same – action that is delivered to the body, in the taking position of the living from…
- the idea of an opening is equally relevant. Although the first step towards separation
is played in the realm of closeness, for the separated being arises in egoism, ignorant
of the Other, in coming to be preoccupied with itself, this closeness reveals itself as
ambiguous. It is in this ambiguity that the separated being, the body that has taken
position, which lives in the dependence/independence from the world, can produce an
encounter with heteronomy. Levinas says that ‘in the separated being the door to the
outside must hence be at the same time open and closed’192. Closed because the inner
life necessary to infinity must remain real in order to keep itself out of the dialectic of
the same, but simultaneously open, for within this interiority ‘there must be produced
a heteronomy that incites to another destiny than this animal complacency in
oneself’193.
Thus, once the separated has come to love life, it has to open itself in order to rise
from the animal condition, it has to let itself be shocked by heteronomy, his body
trembling due to the proximity of another body. This shock, Levinas warns – and this
will be a ruling concern for the development of our discussion – is not the shock of
                                                
191 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 31
192 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 2003), 148
193 Ibid., 149
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the Other negating me, of the ‘non-I’ negating the ‘I’, it is the Other who comes
directly from gentleness.
On this former structure Levinas will then configure another opening, even more
decisive, that resides in the possibility of a movement whose target is the beyond
essence. The questioning of openness Levinas approaches at the end of his second
major work takes this shape:
How can the openness upon the other than being be conceived without the
openness as such forthwith signifying an assembling into a conjuncture, into
a unity of essence? Can openness have another sense than that of the
accessibility of entities through open doors or windows? Can openness have
another signification that that of disclosure?194.
Attempting here, where I have not even introduced the argument of this dense
volume, where we have barely skimmed over, glanced through the complex
philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, to unravel these questions would be to proceed
without knowing the direction. I will come back to this key idea, and consistently so,
later on in the research.
It is on this basis that the second stage of this research, which will be devoted to
questions of proximity, proximities of bodies, will be approached. The next question
will be: how to shed light on the space of bodies? How to shed light on the question
of the body always expressing the world of bodies, always having this possibility as
its inner nature, for this means being in the world and also the existence of the world?
                                                
194 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsuburgh:
Duquesne University Press, 1998), 178-179
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What is the place of the other, what kind of space is allocated to the other in the
world?
It seems the matter will move to an ethical dimension, but what for the time being
one needs to keep in mind is that we must approach the abovementioned questions
from what this analysis has been able to underline: any possibility for a sharing, must
be – to put it in the words of Jean-Luc Nancy:
The with understood in terms of existence, must therefore be elaborated as a
quite particular space – the word space being understood here both in the
literal sense, since the existents are also bodies, extended beings, and in a
figurative sense, which would answer the question: ‘What takes place
between us?’195 .
What is the space opened between eight billion bodies?
                                                
195 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Being-with of the Being-there’, in Rethinking Facticity, trans. François
Raffoul and David Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2008), 119
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Conclusions
The task of this first chapter has been to determine the angle of the present
discussion. This takes its cue from Heidegger’s silence on the body. By way of the
work of Jean-Luc Nancy this silence is intended as a praeteritio, a passing by that
emphasizes its object without touching upon it. From within Heidegger’s praeteritio
Nancy reopens the question of the body.
It has been said that one should look at weighing the body, working in that
incommensurability between a skeletal and a pleonastic body; thus thinking its
thickness and the horrible outline Kafka was terrified by.
The idea that the body is what existence exposes and the exposure of existence has
been expressed through the work of Nancy and Spinoza. Spinoza’s idea of the body as
God as an extended thing has been read under the light of Nancy’s writing on the
question of coming to presence, the ongoing origin and the role that the body plays in
this structure. The conclusion I reached has been that the body exposes existence and
marks the rim of sense. In doing so it remains constantly open. This openness has
been seen as the very truth of the body. It is in fact this opening that makes space for
existence and also makes available the space of other bodies.
One could say that the existence of the body is therefore the body of existence. The
crossing of the praxis of existing happens through the materiality of our world. In the
reading Nancy offers of it, materiality is not a property of matter, but the resistance of
sense to Ideality, to a non-actual referent. The praxis of existing is already the
distance and circulation of materiality. Existence transcends this materiality not
towards pure spirit or pure soul. This means that materiality itself is always already
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sensible, predisposed to and predisposing sense, and that sense is cut across by its
own actuality.
At the same time the existence of the body is nothing but a force of appearance
between a here and a there, a ‘here’ and a ‘there’ of sense, a ‘here’ constituted by
body’s evidence and a ‘there’ constituted by the fact that this evidence is nothing if
not stretched, filtered through, suspended, abandoned to a ‘there’. The evidence of a
body is nothing if not the movement of sense in space and time. It is therefore a force
of sense inasmuch as it is a force of spacing. The body spaces itself out and spaces
sense out. Sense circulates through bodies and on bodies: this is Nancy’s ‘absolute
realism’196. The existence of a body is therefore preserved as long as the work of
existence is preserved. One could say that as body existence is already decided,
already in action, cutting across the substratum of its essences.
The existence of a body is a free force which does not disappear even when
the body is destroyed and which does not disappear as such except when the
relation of this existence to an other and destructive existence is itself
destroyed as a relation of existences, becoming a relation of essences197.
Existence of the body indicates also that the body itself is not a whole, it is not
self-same but always already crossed by existence, and unable to recover itself as a
property. The property of the body is not to be found in some determination of matter,
but in its implication in the praxis of existing. This praxis sends the body to the open,
remits it to the open and brings the open into the body. And again the open does not
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become itself a substance, but precisely the fact that the body negotiates its existence
against substance. The body guarantees that existence comes to have no essence, no
interiority into which it can withdraw. This means that at the same time the body itself
has no guarantee, it remains completely delivered over.
The body is what existence exposes (of itself): existence exposes through the body
the logic of a putting at stake of interiority; from this existence receives its name. This
does not mean that existence recalls or gathers its interiority and puts it outside, but
rather that existence decides only and always in favour of the outside and is only
decided when it is left outside. Through the body existence exposes the fact of
subsisting only in the restlessness of a going to that, despite its obviousness, cannot be
made into a property. That the body is what existence exposes means that existence
offers its evidence precisely by remaining outside the field of vision that it creates.
The body is the exposure of existence: existence touches on its sense only in
detaching from itself ‘the sense of existence’. In spacing sense, therefore, bodies place
it at a distance, there where a final completion would have to always be negotiated
again. Sense is thus never the ideality of recurring significations or the ultimate sense,
but an entangled circulation that bodies expose precisely in excess of conceptual
formulations. The exposure of existence means the remaining in circulation of
existence, despite the closure brought upon it by discourse. Bodies name the actuality
of existence, bringing the fact of existing to its bareness, to an exuberant and mute
absence of mediation that conceptual formulations can write out without making less
bare and resistant.
What appears from this double signification is that the body pronounces about
existence the latter’s being nothing: everything that is not a thing.
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The body therefore lets itself be articulated only in a multiplicity of figures. A
body is a corpus. This corpus though is not one that can be completely dismembered;
rather, its parts keep articulating themselves in proximity with one another.
As Emmanuel Levinas says, articulating about the body means talking about an
advent. The notion of position – which in a way determines a body preoccupied with
itself – determines still the space for a growth, a space not yet saturated, but
constantly in the making, offered to others.
The next stage of the research will try to develop the questions: what happens
between eight billion bodies?
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BETWEEN US
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It depends on us, so it is said
  Martin Heidegger1
                                                
1 Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
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Introduction
The question: ‘what happens between eight billion bodies?’ can also be formulated
in a different way: ‘what happens between us?’
The distance between the two expressions is apparently minimal, but by looking at
them more closely, one finds that in fact the second makes visible something that the
first leaves out of sight.
It is not the same thing to ask what happens between eight billion bodies – without
having defined any attribute with regard to the way those bodies share a between – and
to ask what happens between us. It is precisely the ‘us’ that draws the line here, as it is
not established, by any means, that the ‘us’ follows naturally, organically as it were,
from the mere juxtaposition of a number of bodies. The pronoun ‘us’ contains
something that goes well beyond any space filled with bodies. It contains that which
lies beyond any simple proximity, even the closest one. The ‘us’ is a leap, a movement
forward with respect to the simple exposition of bodies. At the same time it
pronounces what is most proper to them: that bodies are ‘us’, in this odd grammatical
fashion, or that we are as bodies. As a matter of fact the two aforementioned
propositions do not articulate any valuable statement on ‘us’; the latter rests, therefore,
on an unresolved inertia. ‘Us’ is never a given, it is never posed in something, it is
never presupposed, unless one situates oneself within a perfectly immanent
community, a community by definition destined to constantly restate its natural
intimacy.
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What is to be articulated here is the way in which bodies find themselves in
between one another, or – to put it differently – what is found between them. ‘Us’ lays
in between bodies; not just as the space between one body and another, but most
properly as that between, the articulation of one body with regard to all others. The
task will then consist of looking not solely for the space opened by my locality, as it
was the case in the previous stage of this analysis, but in the exposition of one locality
to ‘the other’. The ‘between’ is intended here precisely as this space bodies articulate,
but whose determination goes beyond their pure juxtaposition. It is this
indetermination that allows ‘us’ to speak.
There is one more point that requires clarification. The questions ask: what happens
between eight billion bodies or what happens between us. That which ‘happens’,
rather than addressing the firm and clear visibility of an actuality, holds the quality of
a coming to, of an open possibility, of an ongoing movement towards presence. If one
pushes the reading to the limit of the word it is not incorrect to list, along with other
connotations, those of ‘spontaneity’ and ‘accident’, of an unexpected emergence. To
put it in other terms, what happens between us could possibly not happen at all.
Everything that can happen, that has this possibility as its very essence, always
embeds also its very opposite. It is then worth questioning what ‘to happen’ means,
investigating the nature of this happening when related to the space between us.
Before moving on to analyze the philosophical traditions that have to do, in one
way or another and under different headings, with us, or with the way in which
something happens between us, the task will be to investigate the conditions of this
space.
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The main thesis this second stage of the research moves from, is that the conditions
of this space do not just provide a background for the emergence of the question ‘what
happens between us’, but draw the path of a possible investigation. In other words, the
where of this happening is also its how and suggests the order of the exposition. The
analysis here presented, for reasons that will become clear as the reading of the two
main questions proceeds, intends the space of the ‘us’ as bearing also a physical
dimension. This space is identified as the world. The analysis of this concept, through
Jean-Luc Nancy’s work and its references to the Heidegger’s idea of ‘Being-in-the-
world’, and the closure of the onto-theological horizon, will occupy most of the
following discourse.
Nancy’s argument that the world rests on a lack of principle or essence – the world
of bodies – will constitute the point of departure on which to situate the happening of
‘us’. With regard to the impossibility for the world to represent its own premise,
Nancy speaks at times of the end of the world. However this end
cannot mean that we are confronted merely with the end of a certain ‘conception’
of the world, and that we would have to go off in search of another one or to
restore another one. It means that there is no longer any assignable signification
of world or that the world is subtracting itself from the entire regime of
signification available to us2.
                                                
2 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey Librett (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press,
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A world without reason, a world that has escaped any ground, is a world where
what remains are bodies and their exposure to one another, as in Deleuze’s cinema of
bodies. What remains, once characters and plots have been stripped away, are forces
supported only by the belief in this world here, a world whose sense corresponds to its
confines. Among the filmmakers whose gesture can be exposed according to such
logic Deleuze mentions American director John Cassavetes.
Cinema here will work as our model. The method will follow one rule: that the
philosophical approach to a filmmaker cannot be taken simply as the possibility to
unravel a convergence between concept and image. The task cannot only be that of
treating a film as a philosophical example or that of using a concept as a
comprehensive approach to a particular cinematographic work. It is a matter of
investigating how both philosophy and cinema creatively confront a problem, in this
case the problem of our being-together in its relation with the question of the sense of
the world. It is therefore not a matter of providing an entrance into Nancy’s
philosophy or of describing Cassavetes’ cinema but of how cinema reopens the sense
of what happens between us. Moving between philosophy and cinema one is always
asked to look for their internal alliance and their creative possibilities. It will be thus a
matter of exposing the cinematographic idea as it happens in the image and not to
impose ideas from the outside.
Along with Deleuze’s argument, one can read modern cinema as reestablishing our
belief in this actual world, the articulation of the world’s here with regard to all its
there. Understood thusly, cinema establishes the very modern fact that we do not
believe in another world anymore. As Deleuze puts it: ‘what is certain is that believing
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is no longer believing in another world, or in a transformed world’3. In the account
provided by Revault D’Allones – who elaborates on Deleuze’s work – ‘starting with
World War II […] a number of directors have decided to turn their cameras to the
world itself, “as it is”, “raw”’4.
As the world happens and happens between us, so cinema essentially ‘contributes
to free a motion, which is that of a presence in the process of making itself present’5.
There is here the same relation the ‘us’ entertains with the world, for cinema, to quote
Nancy once more, ‘shares the intensity of a look upon a world of which it is itself part
and parcel’6. Cinema does not represent the world, it does not mirror it, reality is not
simply registered in its immediacy. In cinema experience is not reduced and
incorporated. Instead the impossibility of capturing it under the regime of truth
liberates once more the sharing of experience’s evidence as undecidability. Cinema
allows Nancy to express the intrinsic differential structure that the world is. This
structure is not a category of the world - neither disposition nor organizing principle –
it is the world itself. It is the constant creation of finite sense, infinitely relating to an
out of itself, which makes for the evidence of the world. The ‘real’ at stake in cinema,
what Nancy calls the ‘evidence of film’, exposes this logic: sense isn’t the set of
significations sent and received, sealed on themselves, but the sending and receiving
as they infringe acquired significations and release a tension that opens the immanence
of the world. In this in this view that Jean-Luc Nancy’s engagement with film
                                                
3 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2. The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Rober Galeta (London:
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4 Fabrice Revault d’Allonnes, Pour le cinéma "moderne": Du lien de l'art au monde, (Liege: Yellow Now, ,
1994), 9 (translation mine).
5 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Evidence of Film, trans. Christine Irizarry and Verena Conley (Brussels: Yves
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6 Ibid., 16
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responds also to a wider reconsideration of the question of the image where the
concepts of absence and presence are played in a sort of reversal: what comes to
presence is the force liberated by an absence and presenting is nothing other than the
drawing out of absence, which constantly occupies what is presented. The discussion
of cinema therefore attempts at responding to a double demand: the status of the
cinematrographic image – what cinema is, cinema’s ontology – and how cinema
exposes finite worldhood by making the world evident. Cinema allows entrance into
an ontological moment, where the world – delivered to us – is separated from its
character of mere given and its sense now requires our attention. Cinema’s relevance
for Nancy’s ontology resides in the possibility of presenting the unseen, not as the
extraordinary, rather as defeat of ultimate significations, sense’s constant withdrawing
from its own horizon, deferral of its arrival. The notion of evidence should thus be
understood within this ontology of finite sense, where the world is always presented as
the absolute novelty of sense, in absence of an ultimate disclosure. Cinema does not
mimic the world, it gives presence to it, but this giving presence again should be
understood under the mode of absence: ‘the image gives a presence that it
lacks—since it has no other presence than the unreal one of its thin, filmlike
surface—and it gives it to something that, being absent, cannot receive it’7. The
something that cannot receive this presence is precisely sense, which is only in the
existence of the image, ‘sense exists, or rather it is the movement and flight of
existing’8.
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The philosophical mirror, as it were, of the world of bodies would then be the
cinema of bodies, a cinema that undoes the character and the plot in order to follow
and reduce both to bodily attitudes. In the cinema of bodies, as Deleuze conceives of
it, the space is also reduced to bodies’ articulations, ‘in order to get to attitudes as to
categories which put time into the body, as well as thought into life’9.
After having outlined Deleuze’s discussion of Cassavetes and his cinema of bodies,
this argument will move towards a more detailed analysis of Cassavetes. The endeavor
will be to establish the reason of this strategy – why it lies at the heart of Cassavetes’
construal of the moving image. The present analysis will revolve around the thesis that
Cassavetes’ way of making films rests on the attempt to get to ‘us’, to drag people
behind the camera.
Cassavetes was intimately interested in making films about people, and Deleuze
himself seems to be fully aware of this when he says:
This is what Cassavetes was already saying in Shadows and then Faces; what
constitutes part of the film is interesting oneself in people rather than in the film,
in the human problems more than in the problems of the mise en scene; so that
people do not pass over to the side of the camera without the camera having
passed to the side of the people10.
Although Deleuze’s analysis of the work of Cassavetes is detailed and generous, I
will attempt to highlight one more strategy Cassavetes developed and move from this
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towards a philosophical discussion of his work. The second strategy relates to
Cassavetes’ use of close-ups. The question asked will be how, in particular in a film
like Faces, close-ups take on a contrapuntal structure. By way of the contrapuntal use
of the close-up, Cassavetes is able to elaborate a model of distance, as opposed to a
panoramic one.
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1 - What happens between us
What is the space opened between eight billion bodies?
What happens between us?
As mentioned in the introduction, the second question exposes a set of quandaries
on the nature of this happening, but in particular on the status of ‘us’ and on its
measure.
If the first chapter has been almost entirely devoted to the analysis of the body and
its radical openness, here the gesture will extend beyond the local position of the body
to reach bodies in relation with one another. It is here a matter of relation, because one
is moving from an analysis of the status (from stare - to lay, to rest) towards a
dynamic investigation, the investigation of a passage.
As I have already mentioned it is from the space opened by eight billion bodies that
I will move, starting from the thickness of this opening to investigate what happens
between us, retaining entirely the previous analysis so that the space of the one next to
me will not lose its meaningfulness and become a simple summa of more than one
body. The aim here is to be able to say something about ‘us’, about the space where
‘us’ takes place, the space where we are essentially with ‘us’. It is by way of the
connotation of being-with that one is impelled to consider so carefully the question of
the space where the ‘us’ takes place.
Following Nancy the problem of understanding the space of the ‘us’ reveals itself
in all its urgency:
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The with understood in terms of existence, must therefore be elaborated as a
quite particular space – the word space being understood here both in the literal
sense, since the existents are also bodies, extended beings, and in a figurative
sense, which would answer the question: ‘What takes place between us?’11.
A discourse on the space of this relation (if one wants also the space of the other)
needs to arise from the analysis of the body as a place for existence, in the double
connotation already described for the notion of situation. A body is never alone with
itself, it is never known as a single body, ‘bodies are first and always others, just as
others are first and always bodies. I’ll never know my body, never know myself as a
body […] An other is a body because only a body is an other’12.
Already in the first chapter the question of space as intimately linked to that of the
body was of crucial importance. This space, opened to a plastic lexicon, a register of
plasticity, was needed in order for the excesses of the body to appear, so that the latter
would not fall either into the symbolic, hysteric reduction or into its opposite, the
purely materialist one, where the body forms just an irreducible crust. This last
definition is what Heidegger in the Zollikon Seminars refers to as the mere
corporeality of a thing.
The kind of space thus described, the space of this language, was announced as one
whose suture is unknown, or, better said, as an opening that is not anymore in the
realm of knowledge. However this openness should not be dismissed as vagueness. As
                                                
11 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Being-with of the Being-there’, in Rethinking Facticity, trans. François Raffoul
and David Pettigrew, (New York: SUNY Press, 2008), 119
12 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 31
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Nancy says, ‘tightly woven and narrowly articulated, it constitutes the structure of
sense qua sense of the world’13.
Further than opening the space for a new lexicon, one finds a more substantial
attention to the question of space. One of the main issues the previous reading of the
work of Jean-Luc Nancy was concerned with was the fact that bodies are open-space.
The open nature of the body was pursued along three lines: the body rejecting itself;
the body open as the exposure of existence; the body exposed to other bodies, the
world of bodies.
One could even say that the first chapter in its entirety had an implicit centre
constituted by the question of space. Even when the discourse turned to the work of
Emmanuel Levinas and its notion of position, the focus was on bodies’ way to
articulate space. There it was said that position is never already within Being; instead
it is a rage, a movement, the opening up of a space that wasn’t there beforehand. The
lengthy analysis devoted to this concept was in fact pointing to the same direction as
the reading of Jean-Luc Nancy: bodies spacing each other out do articulate space.
Levinas assumes that the ‘body is nowise a thing […] because its being belongs to
the order of the events […] it is not posited; it is a position. It is not situated in a space
given beforehand; it is the irruption in anonymous being of localization itself’.14
Levinas attempts to refute what he calls the concreteness and usability of Heidegger’s
world through the question of the body. In other words, he tries to formulate a concept
                                                
13 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey Librett (Minneapolis: Minnesota University
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14 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
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that would precede the instrumentality of Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world. From this
search for an ‘otherwise than the world’ will spring the third part of this analysis.
The problem of the body also returns in Levinas’ following analyses. In Totality
and Infinity – ‘the body is the elevation, but also the whole weight of position’15 –
Levinas claims that the essence of a body is to accomplish my position. Subjectivity
begins with this taking position beyond mere living as making use of, beyond as it
were the ‘rumbling of the there is’. The notion of position also allows Levinas to
distance his thinking from the geographical-political connotation of Heidegger’s
thought. In later writing Levinas will express all of his concern towards Heidegger’s
reasoning on the place of Germany and on the primacy of certain topography.
In Otherwise than Being the body becomes a necessary element in the construction
of the ethical relation: ‘the body is not only an image or figure here; it is the distinctive
in oneself of the non-contraction of ipseity and its break-up’16. It is a decisive
recurrence to oneself in name of the other.
Levinas is clear in saying that:
in contradistinction to the philosophers of existence we will not find the relation
with the existent respected in its being […] on being in the world, the care and
doing […] Doing, labor, already implies the relation with the transcendent17.
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From this conception of the world, as fundamentally linked to the relation with the
transcendent, follows a series of consequences, which will lead the research to its third
and last part and will make possible the emergence of a path or even a whole
philosophical tradition.
Two notions will be retained here from the analysis that has occupied the first stage
of the research:
- the body as what spaces me from other beings; thus the question of access and
origins from which  the question of relations between us will also spring;
- the world of bodies – that is to say, ‘a world that is not initially subject to the
compactness of space […] rather, it is a world, where bodies initially articulate
space’18.
2 - The world of bodies
The world of bodies bears no relation to a beyond or an outside of itself, for it is
that which has escaped every representation. It is not surprising, given that the
question of what happens between us is formulated in a text devoted to the analysis of
Heideggerian ethics and the question of Being-with, that the conclusions Nancy
reaches echo the Heideggerian argument of the world.
In order to get to what the world is, or to the apparently simple fact that the world
is, Nancy draws largely on Heidegger’s Being and Time. Despite the fact that this
                                                
18 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus, trans. Richard A.Rand (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 27.
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volume is never mentioned, it constitutes an inevitable background throughout
Nancy’s The creation of the world and Globalization.
Nancy moves from the same point already envisaged by Heidegger when the
German philosopher says that ‘the concept of the world or the phenomenon thus
designated, is what has hitherto not yet been recognized in philosophy’19. Nancy is
then looking to investigate philosophically the question that there is a world. Within
this concern, what one needs to be attentive to is ‘the diction of word world’20. Nancy
is looking to establish the notion of the world as a relational totality from which one
cannot escape. By saying that one can’t escape from this world, I am not proposing to
give to the world some kind of Pascalian connotation, as if the world were a sort of
cachot. Rather, what the expression hints at is the fact that what is at stake is at stake
in the world and nowhere else (not beyond it). The preliminary gesture required in
order to pose the question of the world beyond the tradition that wants its principle
somewhere beyond it is to elude the subject - object model. As long as one places the
thinking of the world on such a model, one necessarily understands the world as an
ob-jectum, illuminated by the gaze of a subject.
The world, Nancy says, is a fact, our fact. Namely, any reference to a principle
conferring sense has now left space for the immanent experience of the world. As one
                                                
19 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1982), 165.
20 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David
Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 47.
The French original uses the word diction, which the word determination I believe does not do justice to.
Diction refers both to the choice of words and to the way words are pronounced.
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can see, what resonates here is the idea of being-in-the-world as a particular kind of
absorption, absorption in a set of references, from which there is no way out.
What one should look into is therefore:
the very movement of the occidental history of sense as the movement of an
ontotheology in principle involved with its own deconstruction, the end of which,
in all senses is precisely “this world here”, this world that is to such an extent
“here” that it is definitively beyond all gods and all signifying or signified
instances of sense21.
The very attempt Nancy engages in revolves entirely around the possibility to reach
an (open) conclusion on what the sense of the world is. That the sense of the world is
to be found in the world itself and absolutely in what is immanent about it (although
for this immanence Nancy uses the expression transimmanence, to mean that sense
belongs to the structure of the world, but precisely as the ex-position of this
structure22) could be said to rely on Heidegger’s discussion of significance as ‘that on
the basis of which the world is disclosed as such’23. According to Dreyfus’
commentary this suggests that ‘the world and Dasein are ultimately so intertwined that
one cannot separate the world from Daseining’24. Understood in this way, the world is
subtracted from the subject - object structure.
                                                
21 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey Librett, (Minneapolis: Minnesota University
Press, 1997), 25
22 Ibid., 55
23  Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne, (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2000), 28.
24 Hubert Dreyfus, Being in the world. A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time. Division I,
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 98.
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Nancy seems keen to retain most of the Heideggerian argument, despite the fact
that he does not explore the modes of our everyday dealings with the world. In this
way he avoids entering the discussion of how we encounter things in the world,
ultimately limiting himself to define this relation in terms of exposition. ‘Man is the
exposing of the world’ – he says – ‘and the world is the exposed of man’25.
Moreover Nancy finds in Heidegger’s work – in his critique of Descartes’ use of
the concept of substantia for example, whereby the substantia is not defined and thus
makes it impossible for philosophy to pronounce any statement with regard to what
the world is and to the being of this world – an understanding of the world as being
‘world’ only for the ones inhabiting it.
Since the structure of the world, its worldliness and significance, are thoroughly
connected with Dasein’s being-in-the-world, by way of a double transcendental
movement of disclosure and discovery, the world cannot be read in reference to a
substratum that does not participate in it. Heidegger writes that ‘the world is therefore
something ‘wherein’ Dasein as an entity already was, and if in any manner it explicitly
comes away from anything, it can never do more than come back to the world’26. This
seems to contain one of the main points Nancy wants to advance: there is no way out
of the world; the only way out still resides within the world.
The possibility to represent the world’s premise is replaced by the facticity of the
world, by the fact that the world is here as ‘our fact’. Such a proposition calls for a
                                                
25  Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne, (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2000), 28
26 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (London:  Blackwell,
2006), 106-107
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double reading. If it’s true that the world is our fact, it is also true that the world is our
fact and nobody else’s – this ‘negative’ connotation should not be overlooked or
passed by. For this reason, in Being and Time Heidegger argues that because of its
structure the world could not be understood by a rational entity, who does not inhabit
our world. Nancy, following Heidegger, articulates on this point a wider argument,
emphasizing the idea of dwelling as the moment where a definition of the world
becomes possible. As it has been pointed out earlier, Nancy conceives of the world as
something into which one is absorbed, otherwise the world is not such anymore. If one
can give a detailed description of the world, if the latter offers itself as an object of
representation, one is already looking at something else. The only way to access the
world is to access it as the ‘wherein’ one inhabits; ‘the world is such just for those who
inhabit it’.
Nancy then proceeds by specifying what inhabiting means and how any form of
inhabiting must be the taking place of the possibility of a world to be. In my inhabiting
I hold myself to the world, I take place in the world, where the ‘in’ does not address
just ‘insideness’ as ‘being contained’ or ‘resting inside’. ‘In’ addresses in fact
something quite different: the ‘in’ of ‘this taking place in’ sustains my most proper
happening.
For Nancy the taking place as happening provides the world with a structure, or
better with an ex-perience, while at the same time what takes place, takes place by
way of that world. This taking place then not only recalls the double structure whereby
Dasein is always already in the world – at the same time as it reveals the world’s
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significance by a double ‘attitude’ of disclosing and discovering – but seems to follow
a number of passages that can be found in Heidegger. For instance when he says:
the world as already unveiled in advance is such that we do not in fact
specifically occupy ourselves with it, or apprehend it, but instead it is so self-
evident, so much a matter of course, that we are completely oblivious to it27.
Heidegger specifies the nature of the in of the Being-in-the-world by saying that we
should not think the in as the insideness of an object into a container. The ‘in’ is thus
not a spatial representation whose expression renders Dasein as contained into the
world; rather, it stands for Dasein’s concern towards the world, a concern Dasein is
invested with, prior to its disclosure of the world:
Being-in […] designates the kind of Being which an entity has when it is ‘in’
another one, as the water is ‘in’ the glass, or the garment is ‘in’ the cupboard […]
Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein’s Being; it is an existentiale […]
So one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing
(such as a human body) ‘in’ an entity which is present-at-hand28.
Heidegger draws his analysis of Being-in from the etymology of ‘in’, which he
finds in the Latin terms habitare, diligere, colere: to dwell, chose and cultivate. These
terms, rather than specifying a container and a contained, bear a direct relation with
                                                
27 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1982), 165
28 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (London:  Blackwell,
2006), 79
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being-familiar-with and being-connected-with. Heidegger explicitly links the
expression ‘having a world’ with the connotation of habitare that Being-in refers to:
‘In its very possibility this ‘having’ is founded upon the existential state of Being-
in.’29.
In a similar fashion, Nancy links ‘taking place’ with the Greek terms êthos and
ethos, echoed by the Latin habitus and habitare, both related to habere, a ‘having –
Nancy says – with a sense of being: it is a manner of being there and of standing in
it’30. It is by way of Heidegger then that Nancy seems to reach the conclusion, based
on the abovementioned etymological resonances, that the world ‘is an ethos, a habitus
and an inhabiting’31, our fact.
This is what allows Nancy in the end to attribute to the world its own proper mode,
its way of standing and occupying a place. ‘A world is an ethos, a habitus and an
inhabiting: it is what holds to itself and in itself, following to its proper mode. It is a
network of the self-reference of this stance. In this way it resembles a subject’32.
This last sentence creates a problem (a problem that confirms the kinship between
Nancy’s thought and Heidegger’s, for the German philosopher asked himself the very
same question)33. If the world resembles a subject then one would need to make sense
of it through the model of subjectivity. As a consequence of this one would need to
presuppose something, to look for something prior to the subject itself and to seek
therefore the substance of this subjectivity. Here, as one can see all too easily, one
                                                
29 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (London:  Blackwell,
2006), 84
30 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David
Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 42
31 Ibid., 42
32 Ibid., 43
33 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1982), 167
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runs the risk of falling again into some kind of Cartesianism, at least the one
Heidegger moves against, whereby an undefined substance comes to define the world.
Against this argument Heidegger will say that ‘the world comes not afterwards, but
beforehand, in the strict sense of the word’34. Also one should keep in mind that the
analysis Nancy devotes to the world aims at defining it beyond a subject - object
relation and beyond any presupposition according to which the sense of the world
would have to be found beyond the world itself. If the world can be called subjective,
this is not because it can be placed somewhere within the subject - object relation, but
because the world presupposes itself outside any premise. The only possibility left
open to the world-as-subject is its own revolution, the fact of turning on itself, from
one end to the other. Nancy says: ‘the world does not presuppose itself: it is only
coextensive to its extension as world, to the spacing of its places between which its
resonances reverberates’35. Thus, following a Heideggerian path, Nancy manages to
resolve the question of the world in terms of experience, a particular kind of
experience taking place as the revolution of the world on itself.
The word experience has again to be understood according to the logic just
exposed:
there is no experience of sense if ‘experience’ is supposed to imply the
appropriation of a signification – but that there is nothing other than experience
                                                
34 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1982), 165
35 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David
Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 43
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of sense if ‘experience’ says that sense precedes all appropriation or succeeds on
and exceeds it36.
The sense of the world lies on the immanent experience the world makes of itself.
As Nancy puts it, experience then consists in the circulation of sense infinitely
reopening the available significations. Experience here is the given of sense delivering
itself back to exposure. Hence the experience of the world would be in this case the
apprehending of the world as an inhabiting, a self-standing that never presupposes
itself. The world grinds on itself and this grinding is its experience. The world is thus
this habitus, this taking place as dwelling that grinds on itself.
The points one needs to retain are mainly two:
- the world is such just for the ones who inhabit it;
- the world does not depend; rather it ex-ists itself.
How does the world appear for the first time as escaping the subject- object
relationship? How does the world appear as that which is available just to those who
inhabit it without depending on any substance?
Nancy is here exposing once more the argument of the end of metaphysics – the
closure of the onto-theological and onto-teleological horizon. More specifically his
gesture attempts a re-reading of the Heideggerian compound expression being-in-the-
world.
                                                
36 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey Librett (Minneapolis: Minnesota University
Press, 1997), 11
142
Nancy shares with Heidegger a point of departure: both attempt to think the world
as that which has never been thought before in its being as such. The philosophical
urgency Nancy moves from revolves around the need to think the world not as an
object, but as a habitus, ‘what holds to itself and in itself’. The question to which one
tries to respond, the very question the philosophical tradition has left open, is
formulated as follows:
What has remained unresolved is the grasping of a concrete world that would be
the world of the proper freedom and singularity of each and of all without claim
to a world beyond-the-world37.
                                                
37 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David
Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 38
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3 - The World is without a why. Deconstruction of the World.
Let the world be without name for a time. Let things listen to
what they are. In silence, in their own time and their own way.
Jean-Luc Godard38
One needs here to take a step backwards and reread the passage that has led us this
far. The present discussion started out from this:
The with understood in terms of existence, must therefore be elaborated as a
quite particular space – the word space being understood here both in the literal
sense, since the existents are also bodies, extended beings, and in a figurative
sense, which would answer the question” ‘What takes place between us?”39.
Nancy is here using a vocabulary that draws on Heidegger’s Being-with. At times it
seems as if the entirety of Nancy’s effort were devoted to reopening the problem of
Being-with as in sections 26-27 of Heidegger’s Being and Time. Given the question
investigated here, a passage resonates with particular relevance: ‘the world is always
the one that I share with others’40.
                                                
38 Nouvelle Vague, prod. by Alain Sarde, dir. by Jean-Luc Godard, 90 min.,Mercury Film Group, 1990
39 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Being-with of the Being-there’, in Rethinking Facticity, trans. François Raffoul
and David Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2008), 119
40 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London:  Blackwell,
2006), 155
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Most of the questions this second part of the research sets at its horizon derive from
and are triggered by an attempt advanced by a group of philosophers after Heidegger’s
work. The debate formed around this question has tried to reconsider – according to
different trajectories and taking in some cases opposite paths – Being-with as the
possibility to open the question of subjectivity outside individuality.
What is important at this point is to analyze the space from which Being-with
emerges and begins to work. The first challenge so far has been to connote this space
as the world. The second is to recognize what the diction of world is able to tell us,
this diction that a long tradition has hidden away.
The with of Being-with discloses the question of the world in all its urgency. If the
with in its existential determination articulates itself as a space – both the physical
space of a coming-to-presence and the space as relational set – then such a space, that
has been here denoted as the world, collaborates to define the with itself. This is to say
that the with and the world are intimate, so intimately bound up that the first
emergence of the with can be read from within the question of the world. If the world
is our fact, then it is a fact that has first of all to do with ‘us’.
The investigation of the notion of the world, of the world as a space, is nevertheless
invested with the character of necessity. At this stage with indicates first of all a
common space. It is thus necessary to question the nature of such a space.
For Jean-Luc Nancy the question of the with moves, or better revolves around, the
question of a space, a space that – one will have to wait for this to come into sight –
sometimes is also structured as a thin line running between Heidegger’s destination,
the destining of a people, and a pure juxtaposition of impersonal bodies.
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The deconstructive gesture Nancy performs – in order to understand how the world
appears as our fact – lets emerge the conditions for the abovementioned determination
of the world. In other terms Nancy seems to take up Heidegger’s question ‘How does
the deity enter into philosophy?’
Nancy formulates a similar demand, but according to an almost reverse articulation:
‘How does God abandon the world?’ What happens to the world once God’s presence
stops signaling the sense of the world from its rearguard beyond the world itself? The
nature of that place that was once divine and grounded in the highest cause assumes
different traits: ‘if the god no longer offers himself, if he no longer even conceals his
presence in his divine being, he leaves only bare places, where no presence withdraws
or comes’41.
Both Nancy and Heidegger elaborate on the development of the Western tradition
as the search for a ground. This engagement with the idea of a foundation draws the
trajectory for the institution of divine places, of the world itself as a divine place,
intending with this expression that the world becomes a place caused by a Supreme
Being. The argument cannot be completely separated from a deconstruction of
Christianity and of monotheism, at least insofar as a discussion of the God of
philosophy makes evident that monotheism is not simply the reduction of the Greek-
Roman pantheon to one single divinity, but the positing of the divine as an existent
being holding real qualities. The question therefore is not just that of a singularity
                                                
41 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor et al. (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1991), 111
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replacing plurality, but that of the place of the divine in the real. One could say that
monotheism accounts for Being itself.
With the question ‘How does the deity enter into philosophy’ – asked in the context
of a debate with Hegel – Heidegger aims at penetrating the nature of the onto-
theological constitution of metaphysics, which is to say the posing of grounds that –
within the Western tradition – has allowed and dominated the thinking of the Being of
beings. Drawing in particular on his What is Metaphysics Heidegger inquires on the
nature of the God of philosophy, the metaphysical concept of God as causa sui. ‘How
does the deity enter into philosophy?’
Heidegger’s task is to deal with the nature of the question itself. What is in question
in the onto-theological? What are the terms of the belonging together of ontology and
theology?
Heidegger makes clear in this context that ontology and theology cannot be thought
of as two distinct disciplines coming together in a second stage. What must be
considered is indeed the nature of the unity according to which they belong together,
which means looking for ‘beings as such in the universal and primal at one with
beings as such in the highest and ultimate’42.
The aforementioned unity has established itself as our way of thinking the
difference between Being and beings. Philosophy has represented this difference to
itself in onto-theological terms. The difference just mentioned, however, is what one
encounters at any time – therefore it cannot be said to be simply a contribution of
                                                
42 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2002), 62
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representational thinking. This means that on one side Being can only be thought of as
the Being of beings and on the other that beings can only be reached according to the
ways in which they account for Being. Being constitutes itself as that which transits
the arrival of beings, the difference becoming as a result ‘the perdurance of
overwhelming and arrival’43. It is in this way that Being is posed as ground. In turn,
and still by virtue of the difference, beings as such – as a totality, a whole – account
for the ground. The difference is then thought in terms of Being as that which grounds
because it allows beings’ presence and in terms of beings as that which account for
Being because they present Being’s active nature. Being as grounding becomes
something that is, something that appears as presence and therefore needs ‘accounting
for through a being, that is causation, and indeed causation by the highest cause’44.
This configuration is clearly expressed by Leibniz in The 24 Theses of Metaphysics, a
text Heidegger recalls both in Identity and Difference and The end of philosophy.
According to Leibniz: ‘ratio est in natura’; ‘ratio debet esse in aliquo Ente Reali’;
‘Est scilicet Ens illud ultima ratio Rerum, et uno vocabulo solet appellari DEUS’45.
The totality of Beings must be thought in terms of a ground that justifies its existence.
This ground must be identified in the realm of ‘reality’. It must be conceived as a real
cause that grounds the actuality of existing things. This real cause must in turn be
necessary, which means not grounded in anything else. This necessary being that
grounds the existent goes under the name of God.
                                                
43 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2002), 65
44 Ibid., 72
45 ‘There is a ground in nature’ – ‘This ground ought to be in some real being or cause’ – ‘That being is the
ultimate ground of things and is usually designated by the one word GOD’. Martin Heidegger, The end of
philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 49-50.
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These passages from Leibniz highlight the specific movement prompted by onto-
theology: once the transformation of Being into real ground has occurred, then the
ground is identified with God, a real being providing the first cause. Therefore we
think onto-theologically because we always think beings both as belonging to a
common ground and as a whole granted by the highest being, whose existence is
necessary (per se concipi is the formula used by Spinoza). Beings belong to a common
ground that makes their presence possible, while this common ground at the same time
belongs to beings according to the existence of a supremely original matter that exists
necessarily.
Heidegger therefore concludes that the ‘deity enters into philosophy through the
perdurance of which we think at first as the approach to the active nature of the
difference between Being and beings’46.
This is the framework on which Nancy too starts his work. Nancy’s attempts seem
to respond to this urgency opened by Heidegger across a number of texts in terms of
‘destruction of ontology’, what John Stambaugh in the introduction to The end of
Philosophy defines as ‘the unbuilding (de-struere) of the layers covering up the
original nature of Being, the layers which metaphysical thinking has con-structed’47.
Although Nancy’s argument does not refer explicitly to the Heideggerian notion of
‘appropriation’, it nevertheless finds its point of departure in the breach operated by
                                                
46 Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2002), 71
47 Joan Stambaugh ‘Introduction’, in Martin Heidegger, The End of philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), ix
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Heidegger at the heart of our tradition. The following remarks attempt to take this
‘provenance’ into account.
To grasp how the deconstruction announced by Nancy in fact participates in the
construction of the world of the onto-theological tradition, one should start by reading
the very beginning of a text named Urbi et Orbi:
‘it is no longer possible to identify either a city that would be ‘The City’ – as
Rome was for so long – or an orb that would provide the contour of a world
extended around this city […] it is no longer possible to identify either the city or
the orb of the world in general’48.
‘Urbi et orbi’ is the expression used in papal addresses to Rome and the world, or to
Rome as the world. To name the world ‘Rome’ meant to imagine the world as
inscribed within a particular topography, in that case that of the city of Rome and the
walls – Murus Servii Tullii, Murus Aurelianii, the walls protecting the Civitas Leonina
– that were separating the city from the surrounding countryside.
‘Urbi et orbi’ makes the world the subject - object of a metaphor, of a
representation. The world has today escaped this possibility, the possibility of a being
represented or subjected. The possibility of this break away from its representations –
from the ones held true by the tradition – is already at play within the tradition itself.
This is precisely the juncture Nancy tries to bring about by attempting a
                                                
48 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David
Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 33
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deconstruction of the world. The deconstruction of the onto-theological tradition – our
tradition, the tradition of the Western world that comes to make the entire world – can
once again not be completely separated from a deconstruction of Christianity:
The opening of the world in the world is the result of a destitution or a
deconstruction of Christianity, which goes back or which advances in it all the
way to the extremity at which nihilism breaks up the presence and the value of
God, breaks up the sense of salvation as an escape from the world49.
The more one progresses with the imaging of the world – the more one forges
pictures of it from satellites – the less the world resembles a topos. When the Pope was
pronouncing his blessing it was clear to everyone that he was thinking the world as a
particular image of God: the order God had wanted for his creatures. The Pope could
say ‘urbi et orbi’ just because his audience would have immediately understood the
world as the subject of…. This formula was made available moving from the
consideration that the world was the subject of the making of God and of the making
of God itself, God’s praxis.
The same use of the word orbe allows one to imagine that the Pope had in mind a
particular shape for the world: not just an image as idea, but also an image as shape.
The rim surrounding the world and providing it with a sense, theological or historical-
teleological, filling the word with the consistency of a world, does not include the
world anymore.
                                                
49 Jean-Luc Nancy, Dis-Enclosure. The Deconstruction of Christianity, trans. Bettina Bergo, Gabriel
Malenfant and Michael Smith (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 78
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Nouvelle Vague postscript
In the intimacy of his flat, his figure softly lightened, a man is typing passages of a novel
on his typewriter. We recognize the noise of fingers tinkering with the keys. A voice-over
narrates the events of a life that is becoming literary creation. The following frame introduces
a woman wearing a green skirt and stiletto high heels shoes. The camera follows her steps,
while she is seemingly walking towards no specific destination. Her legs are the only thing we
see, while the voice of the man comments: Les jambes des femmes sont des compas qui
arpentent le globe terrestre en tous sens, lui donnant son équilibre et son harmonie50.
                                                
50 ‘Women's legs are like compass points, circling the globe and giving it its balance and harmony’. The
Man who loved Women, prod. and dir. by François Truffaut, 120 min., Film du Carrosse, 1977
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How could one therefore address the world nowadays51, provided that the
metonymy – Rome – has ceased to work? It has ceased to work not just because there
is no city around which the world is wrapped, but also because the meaning of the
word world should be readdressed today in a fashion that excludes any appropriation
and also any illustration (as the world as a sphere or orbe, would suggest). One would
rather have to address the world as a matter of fact. To say that one is left with the
world means that the world ‘is such only for those who inhabit it’52, a world without
principle.
That the world is ‘without principle’ should be read as inhabiting two poles of any
reasoning on the world. This double meaning articulates the opening and the open end
of a possible deconstruction of the world. One could say that ‘the world is without
principle’ presents itself also in another form, it can be spoken out under another
fashion that says: ‘the world is without reason’. Once translated in such a way, this
new formation posits the following: that there is no reason to engage in a discussion
that holds the world as its centre, for – the world being an ens creatum, the very here
below, placed at the bottom of the hierarchical vertical structure—its very reason, the
point of departure as it were for reasoning, would necessarily (and thus eternally) lie
beyond the world itself.
                                                
51 Among the many interpretations not contemplated because of lack of space and time, it’s worth recalling
here two main traits or directions that will remain out of the frame, although it would be definitely worth
considering them elsewhere. One has to do with Heidegger’s statement that ‘the world is always spiritual’
and the analysis Derrida devotes to this in ‘Of Spirit’ and the other with Wittgenstein claim that ‘the sense
of the world must lie outside the world’.
52 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Creation of the World or Globalization, trans. François Raffoul and David
Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 42
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This reason thus rests on the specification provided by an ens perfectissimum,
which itself requires no specification in order to be what it is. Hence, every time one
sets oneself out to speak about the world, one needs to define the subject – or creator –
of the world.
On the other hand ‘the world is without reason’ means something that might sound
just like the exact opposite. It means that the world is in itself in no need, it is
determined in a self-standing, which requires no further specification and no further
representation. According to this articulation the world would finally be able to
confront its own freedom: revolution. This is the world-subject (although one should,
it has been mentioned already, always be careful when it comes to the term subject).
What needs to be highlighted is how the world, from being that which needs to be
rescued from the abyss, becomes itself the [α-byss], that which is without a ground.
The abovementioned movement is such that one might find in the end that the
figure of the subject of the world has been replaced by the world-subject. As Nancy
says, after Heidegger, a long and lasting tradition has covered up the question of the
world by replacing it with something better, its creator or with a substance accounting
for the phenomenon world. In this scenario the world can’t account for itself, because
its sense is deposited beyond its ‘thereness’.
The world, augmented by an ideal world, which lays above (υπερ), or via a
προτον κινουν ακινετον that moves it, has never been enough. Nevertheless one can
see how even the most radically transcendent, the most vertical tradition, assigning the
creation, order and destination of the world to a distant God beyond the world, does
not fail to bring fore the question of the existence of the world.
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It should not surprise anyone to find within this same tradition a constant
questioning of the world and of our being-in-the-world. One could say, as Nancy
outlines, that the metaphysical tradition has in fact brought fore the question of the
world and of its immanence with such insistence that the question never really
deserted philosophical thinking. In a formula one could say that the more one attempts
to explain the world as the outcome of God’s praxis – God’s very productivity - the
closer one draws God to the world. This being the case the only possibility for God to
remain a Supreme Being would be for God to be completely alien to the world, so
Supreme that no account of the world can, even accidentally, even by an odd
trajectory, touch on him. God could be saved and thus save his divinity only as that
which is farthest from the world. As long as God is at a distance, but still within
concern, as Heidegger would say, still within the worldly horizon, then it is somehow
fated to follow the destiny of the world until its own withdrawal within the world
itself. The Supreme Being, which used to be the distance of the ‘from a distance’,
privileged point of view on the world53, has departed that position, closing the gap
from the world, until no distance is left, not even a diaphragm, and the world and God
become so bound up that one does not need to reference any supremacy or any
beyond. Nancy puts it like this:
The God of onto-theology was progressively stripped of the divine attributes of
an independent existence and only retained those of the existence of the world
                                                
53 Among others, one particular figure in Christian mysticism provide very vivid images of the ones getting
close to God and thus grasping the world. St Teresa of Avila wrote about S.Pedro de Alcantara that by
means of an insuperable devotion he had put the world at his feet. A large iconography was to develop
from this, showing the Saint with the globe at his feet.
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considered in its immanence, that is to say, also in the undecidable amphibology
of an existence as necessary as it is contingent54.
The places of the divine are now empty and have left space for what in Nancy’s
terms can be called the spacing out of sense. In commenting Heidegger’s famous
statement that ‘Only a God can save us now’ (even more remarkable considering those
were Heidegger’s last words), Nancy reminds us that ‘every god is the ‘last one’,
which is to say that every god dissipates and dissolves the very essence of the
divine’55.  The necessity of God leaves in this way space for the necessity of the re-
affirmation of the sense of the world against (in front of) any given sense.
A world where God has left its place vacant is a world that stretches itself out:
divine places, without gods, with no god, are spread around everywhere around
us, open and offered to our coming, to our going or to our presence […]
ourselves, alone, out to meet that which we are not, and which the gods for their
part have never been56.
Thus it is within this tradition that one should seek the crumbling away of the
otherness of God and the becoming apparent of a world without principle/reason. If
it’s true, as Levinas also underlines, that ‘the God of philosophers, from Aristotle to
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Leibniz, by way of the God of the scholastics, is a God adequate to reason, a
comprehended god who could not trouble the autonomy of consciousness’57, then this
deconstruction participates in the very construction of onto-theology itself.
The deconstructive gesture emerges as the search for a movement within that which
rids itself of any principle and could be formalized, with Nancy, as follows: ‘If it [the
world] is necessary without being the effect of a superior reason (or will) what is that
necessity?’58
The trajectory Spinoza follows in treating the question of the world and his notion
of Divinity have already been examined in the first chapter. Spinoza’s notion of
divinity consistently departs from the Christian onto-theological tradition. Spinoza
solves the problem of the relation between the immaterial God and the material world
by abolishing the immateriality of God. What is more, Spinoza places at the centre of
his system the denial of final causes and the necessitarianism, which drastically
excludes the possibility of the creation of the world as an act of pure will. Spinoza
says, in the appendix to the first volume of the Ethics that God ‘acts from the necessity
alone of his nature […]’ adding that ‘things have been predetermined by Him, not
indeed from freedom of will, or from absolute good pleasure, but from His absolute
nature’59. What has just been said stands in overt contrast with Aquinas’ conclusions
that God works not by necessity, but by His intellect and will. Spinoza goes as far as
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to say that ‘Nature has no end set before it, and […] all final causes are nothing but
human fictions’60.
Even before Spinoza, another philosopher working within the onto-theological
tradition had already reached similar positions. He was, similarly to Spinoza, to be
heavily attacked because of his ideas and finally burned alive by the Inquisition.
Giordano Bruno’s philosophy seems to have significantly influenced the metaphysical
thinkers that followed him, although he had claimed to be interested purely in natural
philosophy – physics – leaving further speculations to theologians. In fact Bruno’s
philosophy extends well beyond a mere cosmological interest. Moving from Nicholas
of Cusa’s ideas, Bruno argues for the immanency of God in ways that will echo both
in Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura and in Leibniz’ idea of an intellect organizing the world
as the ‘best of all possible worlds’. Establishing a link between the material and the
immaterial infinity of the universe, Bruno claims that God would be in need of the
world as much as the world is in need of Divinity. Furthermore the relation between
multiplicity and unity is worked out in a way that allows Bruno to say that the unity of
the universe lies within it and not beyond or above the universe itself, thus denying the
existence of two distinct worlds. Divinity is then all in all and everywhere, not
localizable beyond the world and not in a particular place. What is interesting for the
current research is the conclusion Bruno reaches with regard to the fact that God
cannot be placed in an ‘elsewhere’, given the coincidence in God of spirituality and
matter. The possibility for naming an elsewhere is thus foreclosed. Bruno defined his
thinking as a new beginning, both for the cosmological and for the ethical implications
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that this could have, starting for instance with the question of the Christology as
mediation between the ens perfectissimum and the ens creatum. Dialogue Fifth of
Cause, principle and Unity, starts with one of the interlocutors, Teofilo, saying:
The universe is, therefore, one, infinite and immobile. I say that the absolute
possibility is one, that the act is one; the form, or soul, is one, the matter or body
is one, the thing is one, being is one […] it possesses no outside to which it might
be subject and by which it might be affected61.
A few lines further down, the same character concludes that: ‘the universe
comprises all being in a totality; for nothing that exists is outside or beyond infinite
being, as the latter has no outside or beyond’62, something that will profoundly
resonate in the philosophies of Spinoza, Malebranche and Leibniz.   
The latter, in particular commenting on God as Supreme Wisdom, will define God
as existing everywhere as a centre, having everything present to itself immediately.
Leibniz’ God works as the Reason of the universe. Although this Sufficient Reason
is immanently present in the organization of the universe, it is not however to be found
within things themselves. Even if Leibniz thus retains the supremacy of God and
claims that things, lacking any perfection, do receive a sort of perfection from Him –
through the idea of each monad as ‘a perpetual living mirror of the universe’63 – the
thought of a God less and less divine reaches with him an articulated stage. God
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calculates and the world comes to be (‘Cum Deus calculat fit mundus’), but
calculation may have nothing to do with creation.
In particular when he says: ‘there is a certain urgency towards existence in possible
things […]’64, he seems to imply that the world might just as well happen out of its
own necessity, without any principle prompting it to change from possibility to
actuality. It is perhaps with Leibniz that the idea of a world without principle emerges
most clearly.
In the language employed by Nancy this would also mean that the world has no
ground beyond its own taking place, our way of in-habiting it. The absence of
principle is the absence of the world’s premise. As Nancy puts it:
If the world essentially is not the representation of a universe, nor that of a here
below, but the excess – beyond any representation of an ethos or of a habitus – of
a stance by which the world stands by itself, configures itself, and exposes itself
in itself, relates to itself without referring to any given principle or to any
determined end, then one must address the principle of such an absence of
principle directly65.
It is crucial here to make sense of this ‘without principle’ that Nancy talks about,
because it is this lack of principle that makes possible the world as a taking place of
the us.
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It is not a new idea to say that the world is without reason […] We know quite
well that it is found within Angelus Silesius (“the rose grows without reason”),
but one does not always notice how it works within all the great formulations of
the most classical rationalism66.
By quoting Silesius, Nancy is here just partially disguising a reference to
Heidegger’s The Principle of Reason. Lending an ear to the lack of reason(s) with
regard to the world means approaching once more, from a different angle, the question
of the sense of the world. This operation also lets the various Heideggerian filiations
of a thought on the world emerge more clearly.
More than three hundred years ago Leibniz wrote: nihil est sine ratione, speaking
out for the first time in the history of Western thinking the principle of reason, which
had, Heidegger says, slept within the inner structure of philosophical thought. This is,
Leibniz repeats in the Principles of Nature and Grace, the most important issue, the
very question of philosophy.
Within modernity, Heidegger says, one finds the unconditional demand for
sufficient reasons, perfect cognition as the stretching out of complete rationality.
Heidegger opens the series of lectures on Leibniz by saying: ‘what the principle
says is illuminating. When something is illuminating we understand it without further
ado’67.
And yet the principle can be read according to two tonalities. The first one reads the
principle as ‘nothing is without reason’ and addresses exactly the demand for the
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completeness of a foundation. The principle of reason becomes in the rationalist
tradition that which decrees the existence of a being, of what may or may not count as
an object of cognition. Therefore, if heard in this way, the principle is a statement
about cognition as that which transforms the world into an object. The principle
expresses the essence of being human as an ‘I that relates to the world such that it
renders this world to itself in the form of connections correctly established between its
representations’68.
Heidegger tries though to also lend an ear to a second tonality, where the principle
is read as ‘nothing is without reason’. Here it is the word ‘is’ that becomes decisive.
The principle of reason can in this way be read as a statement on beings and in
particular on the Being of beings. However it is thanks to this second tonality that
names Being that the first one becomes true in the first place. As Heidegger points out:
‘as the fundamental principle of rendering sufficient reasons, the principle of reason is
thereby true only because a word of being speaks in it that says: being and
ground/reason: the same’69.
If understood in this way, then the principle of reason speaks of the belonging-
together of being and reason/ground. Being and ground/reason: the same.
The word ratio, though, does not explicitly speak of Being. The belonging together
of Being and grounding must therefore be read within the tradition of Western
thinking (the Geschick of Being, Being’s destining) there where ratio translates the
Greek logos.
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Thought from within the Geschick of Being, the belonging together must then be
heard in its Greek formulation: το αυτο (ειναι) τε και λογοσ70.
It is in the word logos that the belonging-together emerges more clearly. Logos
names being because it names what lies present as the ground for everything that lies-
present.
In Heidegger’s words:
Logos names this belonging-together of being and ground. It names them insofar
as it, in one breath, says: ‘allowing to lie present as allowing to arise’, ‘emerging-
on-its-own’ […] and ‘allowing to lie present as presenting’, laying a bed of soil,
“grounds”71.
Logos names being in terms of an allowing to arise. Named this way, according to
the word logos, being is the ground from which everything arises. This also means
though that Being – as that which grounds – remains itself groundless; every
foundation would degrade being to a being. Being is then that which cannot be
appropriately founded and thus remains immeasurable. Heidegger calls it the abyss.
Being is abyss insofar as being is ground. The leap into which, Heidegger claims, our
thinking has stepped with the principle of reason consists in this reconfiguration of the
un-needy nature of Being. Being as the a-byss is then the limit of our thinking; that
from whence something commences emerging as what it is. The principle of reason
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thus stakes on us a demand: to consider the lack of any principle as the only possible
principle.
Therefore the second tonality establishes for the first time the possibility to think
Being not according to beings (in particular to an ultimate being, causa sui), but qua
Being: Being as that which cannot be accounted for by another being, not even the
highest ultimate cause.
It is at this point that Heidegger introduces a leap: if Being is ground, then it means
that Being is not grounded, it is an abyss. Being as abyss therefore does not repose on
something present; instead, what Being reposes on is the ‘play’. This play is what
cannot be properly thought, since our manner of thinking does not allow us to think it.
The play cannot be thought thoroughly because our way of thinking provokes us to
think it again in terms of ground. If we try we end up reducing it to something present,
‘we take the play as something that is’72.
The play is instead determined as the dynamic of freedom and necessity and is not
to be understood in terms of an object for cognition or representation. This play is
without a why. It is the active nature of the play itself – its playing – that shrivels away
the ‘because’. This play is ‘the world that worlds and temporalizes, in that, as
κοσµοσ, it brings the jointure of being to a glowing sparkle’73. The play is αιων, 
according to Heraclitus’ Fragment 52, ever-being (αει − ον), non-appropriable and
non-finishable. The mystery ‘in which humans are engaged throughout their life, that
play in which their essence is at stake’74.
                                                
72 Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1996), 112
73 Ibid., 113
74 Ibid., 113
164
This play is the world without principle. It is κοσµοσ not as the fulfillment of
complete rationality, but as the singular circulation of sparkles. The juncture of the
world without principle is the rendering of the abyss onto  us, the continuous rendering
of essence by the singular crossing of existence. ‘Us’ in a world without principle
indicates precisely this: the tuning in with the crossing of essences opened onto an
abyss. A world that plays is a world that constantly puts the essence of the human at
stake – thus bringing the sense of the human forward always in sparkles of sense,
before or in excess of an ultimate meaning. This is the world as the field of existence.
Within the formulation of the Principle of Reason by Leibniz – Nihil est sine
ratione – found at the heart of the rationalist tradition of metaphysics as the claim for
an all-encompassing Rational Ground, Heidegger reads the belonging-together of
ground and being, and the abyssal character of Being itself, which is now not
accounted for by an ultimate cause (God). Being reposes instead on a play as the
engagement of essence in the work of undecided existence: the world not as a
rendered reason, but as the venture of existence. Being as abyss unconceals being as
play, where essence is continuously put at stake. This play is the work of the world, its
becoming κοσµοσ beyond any pre-established order. It depends on us, ‘whether and
how we, hearing the movements of this play, play along and accommodate ourselves
to the play’75. This play is excess, the world is in excess of itself; its essence is
continuously submitted to existence.
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What is a world that worlds then? It is a world that has itself as world, which means
here that it has itself as the space of its own principle, or better that its space is
constituted as the lack of any principle, as the consistent space where any reference to
a beyond falls inside the a-byss, falls inside itself. This is precisely the mystery which
Nancy too evokes: ‘the absolute mystery of spacing itself, according to which there is
a “world,” from that dis-enclosure that is preceded by no enclosure of Being’76. The
world has no principle outside its space.
What seems to change, in a decisive manner from Leibniz to Heidegger and Nancy
is the eminent character of the world. In Leibniz, beyond the principle of reason lies a
God that at least is calculating. In On the ultimate origination of the universe, for
instance, Leibniz writes: ‘the reasons for the world are concealed in some entity
outside the world, which is different from the chain or series of things, the aggregate
of which constitutes the world’77.
In Heidegger’s text one finds another decisive leap, triggered by the definition of
the principle of reason as that which shows the play of ‘the world that worlds’ (the
world as the rendition of the abyss onto ‘us’). In Leibniz the world is still placed
within a chain of causality. Leibniz still employs the scholastic term eminenter, which
stands for a movement through which a cause is more perfect than the effect it
produces. When instead cause and effect are of the same nature, we would say that the
effect is contained formaliter (formally) in the cause. The world, as cause of itself, as
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its own revolution, is the cause that contains – formaliter – its effect. To put it in a
different language: ‘the world […] is a fact without reason or end, and it is our fact’78.
[That the world plays could also mean that it produces a sound, but this sound is the
product of its revolution, of the two ends of this same world extending one toward the
other and touching each other. One has here lost the harmonia celestis, the music of
the stars – we can’t hear it anymore, but what we can lend an ear to is the music of the
revolution of the world on itself (revolution = return to the point from where a
movement has started)].
A world that springs from the principle of reason, without a why, growing in excess
of the demand of foundations, this is the world of bodies. A world that is configured
differently from the world as cosmos – the world the God creator and cause had
delivered – but also differently from the world as earth explored and mastered by a
conqueror. The latter would in fact be the world of a complete rationality or at least of
the possibility of a completion operated by reason, by representations permeated by
reason. The world is not the property – ‘re-presented and presented to the faculty of
representation’79 – that finds its unity in the mastering subject.
The world without principle therefore also requires a disengagement from a
“‘conquest of space’ conceived if not in terms of kosmotheoria, at least in terms of
kosmopoiesis, mastery and possession of the universe and thus mastery and possession
of its reproduction by and for the subject ‘man’”80.
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This world is the world of the density, of the space between bodies; its truth, its
very articulation being that of the spacing out of bodies, of their incommensurable
distance. This density releases the question of the world as a question of singular
sharing: ‘sharing singularity means to configure a world, a quantity of possible worlds
in the world. This configuration allows the singularities to expose themselves’ 81.
The world as the exposition of singularities, necessity of their being-with.
The with or the question springing from the Heideggerian Mitsein has to be
analyzed as moving from a space, a space articulated by bodies, by extended beings.
The world is the space just described as that which can no longer be addressed, that
which no longer has an address. It is in this fashion that the world can be the space that
belongs to the ones who inhabit it. One must pay attention to the fact that no other
space would be able to resist this formulation. The only space where one can articulate
a discussion on ‘us’, on me with you, rather than simply me and you, is this world that
allows no discussion on its principle. As Nancy says, “the world is not a unity of the
objective or external order; a world is never in front of me or else is not my world. But
if it is absolutely other, I would not even know, or barely, that it is a world’82.
Singular existence is played out at the level of the taking place of the world, but
only inasmuch as the taking place of the world is all a matter of my existence.
The extension of the world, which has overcome any possible shape and epitomical
city, is the distension towards all the sharing out that our existences are. To put it in
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other words, the existence of the world is nothing else than the distance – the play of
the distances – we take from one another. The configuration in which something
happens between ‘us’ finds its articulation in this touch in distance, it is the very touch
of distance.
To say that the world is worldly amounts to saying that a world makes sense, while
at the same time the sense of this world circulates, never leaving our borders but also
never resting on them, circulating around and among us.
The sense of the world is a sending (‘le sens est toujours le sens d'un chemin’, says
Derrida in a text devoted to Heidegger83) from one side of the world to the other, a
sense that, although it never stops traversing the world, lacerating its texture, never
falls outside it. This sense is the play of the world that worlds, the truth of the without
principle. The principle of reason as read by Heidegger says that one can apprehend
the world as that whose sense has no principium, no appropriable beginning and no
absolute rendered reason. Instead the sense of the world continuously crosses out the
possibilities for its own completion.
We experience the world and our experience is (and not represents or gives) the
sense of the world, in that the world is a suppression of any sending out, of any sense
residing somewhere else than in the world itself, but it is also a suppression of any
resting of sense on a grasped and granted ground. What is worldly about the world is
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that it is our taking place, not as an otherwise than the world, but rather as that which
makes the world what it is, the promise of sense84.
The trajectory of this reflection leads us to the core of the question, to a triad, to
three quotations, one building upon the other and producing a sort of climax, that one
is now ready to understand: ‘the world is such for those who inhabit it’, ‘sharing
singularity means to configure a world’ and ‘the world is our fact’.
Outside this configuration, the world is not a world anymore; rather it becomes
what Nancy defines as a glomus, that is exactly its opposite, the dispersed
juxtaposition of beings, a confused solidity. Glomus would here be the exact opposite
of the word mundus, which originally stood for the pure (‘Omnia munda mundis’, says
St.Paul). That the world is an ordered system is a definition that dates back to
Pythagoras and his school.  For our purpose the word ‘world’ resonates with a much
subtler tone, as it means, simply, the age of man, but also this world as opposed to the
afterlife.
This very long analysis of the world – touching mainly on Nancy’s reformulation of
Heideggerian motifs – brings back our initial question, the question that concern ‘us’.
Two points should have emerged:
- the world happens as the taking place of a us;
- we take place as a being-in-the-world or as a being-world ;
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Double postscript
The film opens with a peasant wearing a traditional straw hat walking in front of the
camera until he comes to occupy the entire frame. Far behind him a smaller-than-real-life
version of the Tour Eiffel cracks the horizon filled with skyscrapers.
In the following shot a woman on a train answers her mobile phone: ‘I am going to India,
has Fenzghuo bought food?’
The camera then follows the little train as it passes in front of the Arch de Triumph and
indulges for few seconds on the Pyramids, while a voice-over says: ‘See the world without
ever leaving Beijing’.
Guards in uniform stroll around, sometimes riding a horse, moving quickly from London to
Rome and from Notre-Dame to Manhattan (‘haven’t the Twin Towers been destroyed?’ says
someone, astonished, at some point). The weather never changes.
The shot of the Tour Eiffel, aligned next to contemporary skyscrapers overlooking a lake in
a foggy and sultry morning, recurs for the whole duration of the film, up to the point of
becoming its trademark. The titles appearing at some point read: ‘Paris in Beijing suburbs’,
‘Tokyo in Beijing suburbs’ and so on.
This is the only manner in which one can represent a world without principle (the title of
the movie is in fact ‘The World’85). The only way this world lets itself be represented is by
repetition, by a duplication, by an infinitely extending pleonasm, which can collapse, all of a
sudden, whenever a passage appears as being too brusque (as it’s the case with the Twin
Towers). Once cut from references to the real, this duplication loses completely and absolutely
its sense.
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4 - Cinema as philosophical model
In his extensive analysis of cinema Gilles Deleuze identifies a cinematographic
mode he calls the ‘cinema of bodies’.
It has already been said in the introduction that cinema will be treated as a mirror to
the philosophical discourse here attempted. The link between the two is the question
of the world. In the introduction it was said that the world of bodies recalls and
demands the same kind of philosophical exploration as the cinema of bodies. This is
so not only on the level of the forces constituting it, but also with regard to its coming
to presence. As the world essentially happens and happens between us, so cinema
‘contributes to free a motion, which is that of a presence in the process of making
itself present’86.
Cinema takes place at the crossing of this double demand: the world as being
without reason – delivered to the exposition of singularities – and always caught in a
process of happening by letting free.
According to Deleuze modern cinema re-establishes our belief in the world. This is
configured as the belief not in another world, but in this world here, the one in which
we live. According to Deleuze ‘the cinematographic image showed us the link
between the man and the world’87. This belief, this speaking with terms that belong to
(or appear to strictly emerge from) the realm of faith, might seem in apparent contrast
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with what has been said earlier on drawing on Nancy and Heidegger. However this
belief points to the world as the lack of any principle, the world of the without reason,
or what one would have to call the world of bodies. Deleuze adds: ‘belief is no longer
addressed to a different world or a transformed world. Man is in the world as if in a
pure optical and sound situation’88. Belief can replace knowledge only if it becomes a
belief in this world and in this world as it is, since the link between us and the world,
or between us and the sense of the world, as a sense that calls forth something beyond
this world, has broken. The belief of believers would instead be a belief in a world that
precedes or jumps beyond itself, a belief that navigates the rim of the world without
really touching on this world. Where believers, when asked about the world of today,
claim the need for recovering a lost enchantment, the world’s detachment from an
ultimate sense, the belief of the non-believers demands that they think of a world
‘moving of its own motion, without a heaven or a wrapping, without fixed moorings
or suspensions’89.
This is the belief that modern cinema gives us: a belief not falling from the sky -
cinema speaks also of the silence of God90 – but arising from the bottom of our bodies,
from our feet as it were. This belief, outside any restoration, must be discovered in the
spelling of the word ‘world’ itself. Cinema gives us the world so that we can give it
back, so that we can enter its existence and reopen the simultaneous presence /
absence of its significations.
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Modern cinema presents us with this truth, the collapse of the other world: ‘what is
certain – Deleuze says – is that believing is no longer believing in another world, or in
a transformed world’91. It is through the mode of evidence that cinema affirms belief
as possible solely in this world or, to be less ambiguous, belief as possible only if
addressed to this world that belief itself takes part in. In this way modern cinema
opens inside itself the world whose sense is withdrawn and must be recreated, as
opposed to a world where sense is always projected.
Deleuze analyzes the shift between classical cinema and modern cinema. On one
side one has an organic regime of sensory motor images, and on the other, a crystalline
regime of time images. To put it in other words: kinetic as opposed to chronic.
Here it is important to dwell for a while on the power of the false definition that so
prominently dominates the crystalline regime. Deleuze starts by tackling three
categories: description, narration and story. A crystalline description detaches itself
from an organic one by the relation it initiates with its object. In fact, in crystalline
descriptions the object is both created and erased in order to generate series of other
descriptions ‘which contradict, displace or modify preceding ones’92. The kind of
cinema these descriptions lead to is a ‘cinema of the seer’, a cinema that the agent is
no longer able to dominate; rather, the agent, who necessarily does not possess enough
qualities to be called an agent anymore, is plunged in pure optical and sound
situations. The abovementioned redefinition of descriptions in the new context of a
crystalline regime leads to a number of consequences. Where the organic description
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kept the real recognizable by mean of what Deleuze calls consistency and continuity,
thus functioning by triggering the localization of relations and the actuality of links
between imaginary and reality, the crystalline [cuts off]/severs any actual motor
linkage. What one finds in crystalline description is a play between imaginary and real
leading to a confusion of roles, to indiscernibility of the two positions. Real
connections and localizable relations cease to boast their own domain; instead they
propel, are triggered and merge with eminently virtual situations.
The cinematographic image is delivered to both realms, the virtual and the real, and
this results in a loss of control over them, their crossing and passing over having been
uncertain since the beginning. What one thus ends up with is exactly a constant
crossing, a blending, which constitutes the image itself. If one was to analyze modern
cinema by trying to trace the moment in which these crossings happen, one would
inevitably fail, for the imaginary and the real, the real and the virtual, are in constant
opening93. As Nancy puts it ‘neither a ‘realist’ nor a ‘fictional’ phantasm, but life
presented or offered in its evidence’94.
This new status brings fore some necessary remarks on a second element
constitutive of the two regimes: narration. Organic narration is to Deleuze true and
truthful, because time remains necessarily chronological time. What Deleuze means
by truthful narration is that ‘it claims to be true even in fiction’95. Narrations proper to
the different kinds of organic image developed out of sensory motor schemata to
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which the agent reacted in order to unfold a particular situation. For instance, the two
schemas of the action-image Deleuze had traced in Cinema 1, the small form SAS and
its correspondent large form ASA, were both depending on the domain of qualities
and powers actualized in a concrete and specific space-time. Both structures are
delivered over to the reaction to real situations, and that reaction takes the shape of
real actions. The structure itself, with its circular shape, implying a movement
backwards to its initial point of emergence, already invites a reading on the basis of
discrete actions.
In crystalline narration, on the other hand, sensory motor schemata tend to collapse,
leaving no reaction to characters, because characters face pure optical and sound
situations. Structures like the ones one finds in the action image can’t possibly take
place in the crystalline regime, where the anomalies of movement become essential,
substantial and constitutive of the image. While the organic image tended to push the
anomalies to the realm of the accidental, binding them to its essential continuity, the
crystalline regime revolves around spaces that lack ‘a proper spatial definition’. In a
similar fashion the world as described by the title ‘world of bodies’ is the place of a
taking place, thus a solely spatial definition will not apply to it.
Spaces defined in this way lead to non-localizable relations, which assume the form
of direct presentations of time. Hence anomalies, the ab-normal, become the necessary
element in the presentation of time, and movements are therefore necessarily false
movements. It is interesting to see here what happens to montage as, Deleuze says, ‘it
becomes a mean to decompose relations in a direct time-image in a way that all the
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possible movements emerge from it’96. Within such a new configuration, narrations do
not try to absorb the imaginary and virtual into the real by reducing it to actuality and
localization.  In fact, quite the opposite happens: while in the organic image fiction
was true even when pushed as far as possible from real – fiction was as it were fiercely
true – here it becomes essentially false, the false being its dominant creative power.
To be more precise, the prevailing quality of narrations now turns out to be their
power to establish themselves as essentially false, without losing, as it were, their
credibility. Saying that does not amount to saying, Deleuze warns, ‘to each fact its
own truth’, as if it were a matter of establishing a kind of relative system in which any
act/fact finds its innermost truth and coherence. This is by far a more radical
movement, which finds its principle in the play between two poles of the false:
‘simultaneous incompossible presents’ and ‘not-necessarily true pasts’97. Cinema
detaches itself from the problem of truth. At this point, then, cinema carries itself
beyond the problem of truth and untruth, imposing what one could call an existence, a
discontinuity of these two poles. As Nancy says: ‘this existence identifies itself as
thought and that means that this existence relates to a world: set down, felt, received as
a singular point of passage in the circulation of meaning98.
Between cinema and the world does not subsist a relation of analogy. Cinema does
not represent the world, that is it does not mirror it; in cinema experience is not
reduced and incorporated. Instead the impossibility of capturing it under the regime of
truth liberates once more experience’s evidence as undecidability.
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However, one is not confronting a system of variable content; rather, what is at
stake is to determine the false as cinema’s productive power. Deleuze says: ‘The
truthful man dies, every model of truth collapses, in favor of the new narration’99.
There is one deep-seated consequence of this new regime of narrations, which retains
its value in the present discussion and has to do with the relational model established
by falsified narrations. What is of particular importance here is to stress the fact that
the model of freedom touches on the model of identification.
Deleuze says: ‘Contrary to the form of the true, which is unifying and tends to the
identification of a character […] the power of the false cannot be separated from an
irreducible multiplicity. ‘I is another’ has replaced Ego = Ego’100. This point skims
over the whole question: what happens between us. In particular it offers a model to
think the ‘us’. The false exists only in a set of relations, where mastery over the
situation keeps circulating.
Once cinema has entered the mode of existence as opposed to the mode of the truth,
then the question is posed to our gaze. Cinema starts pressing against it and
demanding that a respect is enacted in our gaze. It impels us to give back the sense of
the world that has been opened inside the image. It is then a matter not of receiving the
world and its senses but of deciding over the real as given to us by cinema. This
decision passes through our way of looking as a way of articulating the evidence of the
world. The image under the regime of existence cannot simply be accepted; it must be
done again, recreated. Revault d’Allonnes speaks of insignificance and non-evidence
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of reality as the lack of guaranteed significations: ‘modern cinema is seized here by
the possible and sudden evidence of sense […] at the opposite in classic cinema we
face a world of assured, established and permanent sense’101.
Therefore metaphors are avoided, unless those come from within the world itself
and only when they express the play, the absence of an ultimate sense.
This evidences set in front of us by cinema correspond to a disclosure of the world.
The world is delivered and therefore separated its character of mere given. Evidence
would stand for the fact that the indeterminate totality of the world is presented to us
as a sparkle that extinguishes itself. That the world is given and given as a whole
wouldn’t make sense if it weren’t for the continuous singular evidence that on one side
exposes it and on the other discharges both the world’s wholeness (the world’s grip on
itself) and its givenness (the world’s eternal resemblance to itself, or what one could
call representation). The absolute referentiality of the world is interrupted so that
referentiality keeps happening. Understood in these terms, the being of the world is
thus the ‘discontinuity of what keeps happening’102, wholeness gathered only in
indefinite evidences.
According to Deleuze what one now has is this: falsifying narrations free
themselves from the system of actual, localized and chronological relations; the
elements are constantly changing according to the relations of time into which they
enter and the terms of their connections. Narration is constantly being completely
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modified. We witness the emergence of purely cinematographic powers. The agent
dissolves into an ‘I as another’ structure. My gaze becomes the agent, not only what
sees but what participates.
There is something of a doing in my looking, a mobilizing of the world, an
agitating and an organizing. In a truly Heideggerian way, Nancy remarks that
‘presence is not a mere matter of vision: it offers itself in encounters, worries,
concerns’103. Presence is always coming to presence, passage: the technique of
exposing (bringing forwards) reality.
It is because of the active role of my look – which engages with the real, with the
image as what carries the real – that Nancy can play on the words regard and égard, on
the coming together of look and regard: ‘looking is regarding and consequently
respecting’.  Nancy notes that ‘the word respect also comes from regard (respicere): it
is regard towards…guided by attention, by observance or consideration’104. Our gazes
disclose the real without trying to master it. ‘Looking just amounts to thinking the real,
to test oneself with regard to a meaning one is not mastering’105, this is what a respect
for the real means in a cinema that works under the mode of existence. Inevitably this
implies engaging other gazes, becoming intimate with otherness at a distance.
‘A common task, that is to say not at all collective, but a task imposed on us all
together […] to say us exactly there where this possibility seems to vanish sometimes
into a ‘one’, sometimes into an ‘I’”106. Relationship is precisely across this distance.
                                                
103 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Evidence of Film, trans. Christine Irizarry and Verena Conley (Brussels: Yves
Gevaert Éditeur, 2001), 30
104 Ibid., 38 (translation modified)
105 Ibid., 38
106 Jean-Luc Nancy, La Pensée Dérobée, (Paris: Galilée, 2001), 116 (translation mine)
180
What remains, Deleuze says, are bodies, forces without any linkage with/to a
centre, forces confronting each other. For Nancy it is a matter of a cinematic
metaphysics: ‘cinema as the place of meditation, as its body and its area, as the taking-
place of a relation’107.
Under the mode of existence – differently from the mode of the truth where the
character could be judged according to external criteria – every being, and the world
itself, has to be judged with regard to the life which it involves, and only with regard
to this: a world without principle / reason; sense as a rebound from one end of the
world to the other.
The power of the false reestablishes then the belief in the life this world ‘here’
involves, the life as the taking place of this world.
One finds cinema in a completely new situation, responding to a radically different
definition. If previously the fitting definition was ‘art of looking made possible and
required by a world that refers only to itself and to what is real in it’108, now cinema
becomes ‘a matter of life as it happens and passes’. The relation between cinema and
the world becomes the sharing of an intimacy crossed by a distance and therefore
never absorbed: ‘the evidence of cinema is that of the existence of a look through
which a world can give back to itself its own real and the truth of its enigma’109.
Deleuze too describes this proximity in distance: ‘there is a point of view which
belongs so much to the thing that the thing is constantly being transformed in a
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becoming identical to point of view’110. The point of view – in Deleuze’s lexicon – or
the look / gaze – in that of Nancy – are always working in this proximate distance,
whose measure is the passing of an existence. This distance, as it will be articulated
more clearly in the following pages, is exactly what allows not just the relation
between cinema and the world to rest entirely on the real (which is therefore not
alienated but confirmed and reopened in images), but also the relations within the
cinematographic image – almost inside, in the silver nitrate – to take the real into
account as his ultimate horizon: ‘the reality of images is the access to the real itself,
with the consistence and resistance of death, life,…’111. This does not amount to
attributing to cinema a constructive relation to the world, as if what is real is real just
because the camera poses its gaze on it or makes it a particular point of view in a
series; quite the opposite, this indicates that the existences variously produced in and
by cinema identify themselves always in relation to the world taken as a point
traversed by sense. Right distance: cinema engaging itself with a world whose
evidences never surmount those of cinema.
The power of the false, as traced by Deleuze is exactly this: it is not a matter of
truth anymore, but of existence. It is not just about images and the laws of their
accordance.
It is about images ‘as opening onto what is real and insofar as they alone open onto
it’112 and this opening goes all the way into the givenness of the world.
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There is still a last point in this reconstruction of the Deleuzian argument in which
one inevitably is to find the world: the story.
The story concerns the subject-object relationship and the development of this
relationship. The new kind of story no longer refers to an ideal of the true, which
constitutes its veracity, but becomes a story that simulates, or rather a simulation of
the story: objective and subjective images lose their distinction, but also any
possibility of identification is abandoned, substituted by a new circuit where they
contaminate each other.
The shift is not as much between fiction and reality as in the story itself, because
the story affects both: ‘what cinema must grasp is not the identity of a character, but
his objective and subjective aspects. The real character when starts making fiction’113.
This is the ground on which cinema poses questions to thought, or better where
cinema starts enacting questions that have thought, thinking, as their primary
references.
The question of thought, Deleuze says, concerns cinema as long as the image no
longer follows the rule of the sensory motor schemata. When the sensory-motor break
appears, cinema is then able to reveal a link between man and the world. This is the
moment where the belief in the world- that particular kind of belief I have mentioned
few pages earlier – draws the limit. Cinema, as seen in crystalline narrations, gives up
metaphors and metonymies, ‘because the necessity which belongs to relations of
thought in the image has replaced the contiguity of relations of images’114. The
reconfiguration from organic images to crystalline ones, then, is such that cinema not
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only ceases to be true, but leads to a limit, that which, by mean of a traversing, marks
a surfacing. This limit is structured on two main points, on two ends, and imposes a
thinking that moves from leftovers. As Nancy puts it:
Cinema stretches and hangs between a world in which representation was in
charge of the signs of truth or of the warrant of a presence to come and another
world that opens onto its own presence through a voiding where its thoughtful
evidence realizes itself115.
What remains is: on one side, a belief in the world, a belief nevertheless entirely
immersed in this world, as a point of view on itself, an imminent belief; on the other
side this belief is articulated by bodies, forces, whose most proper quality is their
being relational.
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5 - Contrapuntal close-ups
A person in our picture is judged more as a person
than as a performer – from the point of view that they
have to add something as people
The mistakes that you make in your own life, in your
own personality, are assets on the film.
John Cassavetes116
Deleuze defines the cinema of bodies as that cinema where characters are
fundamentally reduced to their bodily attitudes and the plot, too, is undone in favor of
those attitudes. Deleuze identifies in John Cassavetes the author that more than any
other draws the limit, which means the emergence, of such a cinema. Deleuze says:
The greatness of Cassavetes’ work is to have undone the story, plot, or action,
but also space, in order to get to attitudes as to categories which put time into the
body, as well as thought into life117.
In fact the cinema of Cassavetes responded to a precise concern. By no means was
it accidental that he was to develop a cinema of bodies.
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Speaking about Faces Jean Comolli develops the definition of ‘alcoholic form’
Characters define themselves gesture by gesture and word by word as the film
proceeds. They are self-creating, the shooting is the means whereby they are
revealed, each step forward in the film allowing them a new development in their
behavior, their time span coinciding exactly with that of the film118.
When Cassavetes says: ‘when you cease to know the way home, things go wrong.
And then you get detoured. And when you can’t find your way home, that’s when I
consider it’s worth it to make a film,’119 he is putting forward the entire program
underlining most of his mature works. This is something that Deleuze had not failed to
understand,  as when he says that Cassavetes’ originality lies in having addressed the
question of film as
interesting oneself in people rather than in the film, in the human problems more
than in the problems of the mise en scene; so that people do not pass over to the
side of the camera without the camera having passed to the side of the people120.
Deleuze understood that Cassavetes was one of those directors walking within the
distance that brings the cinematographic image to the point where what is at stake is
not fiction or reality, but rather their continuous crossing (a sort of double-crossing).
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Deleuze seems to pay a debt to the long-sighted analysis published by Comolli in
Cahiers du cinema just after the first European screenings of Faces in Cannes:
‘Cassavetes does not use cinema as a way of reproducing actions, faces or ideas, but as
a way of producing them […] We start from scratch, the cinema is the motor and the
film is what causes event to happen121.
What Cassavetes strove for was a cinema that could tackle the ‘right distance’,
taking the risk to approach the image not as a given, but as the outcome of the
interruption of lives and contacts. Deleuze realized that Cassavetes’ imagination as a
filmmaker pointed at creating an ‘indirect discourse operating in reality’, pushing
further the powers of the false. The philosopher saw that the director was concerned
with getting to people, to others (or even, in a formula, probably not far from
Deleuze’s lexicon: getting to people as the other of cinema, although this other is not,
in any way, beyond cinema, but rather its very evidence).
There are two ways in which Cassavetes – whose directorial style was forged
around a feeble presence behind the camera, balanced by a strong presence on the
stage – accomplished his plan to make movies on people who cease to know their way
home. The first one rests on the analysis that Deleuze devoted to him and to the
cinema of bodies. The second might be interpreted as an exacerbation of the set of
gestures identified by Deleuze in relation to the cinematographic device of the close-
up.
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With Deleuze one could say that Cassavetes maintained his promises by
interpreting cinema mainly as a cinema of body. Cassavetes would approach the
cinematic by undoing the plot and exposing characters to the experience of the
camera. This means that characters do not present themselves through the internal
consistency implicit in or delivered by the plot; quite the opposite, they come to the
screen by opposing themselves to that coherence. Characters are constraints, barriers
placed in front of the camera, turning the camera movements upside down, or even
moving the camera in an uneven way (most of Cassavetes movies were shot with
handheld cameras).
The confusion a movie like Faces might create depends exactly on this. The
character must struggle with the story and with the presence of the camera to get there,
to see his birth on the screen. Once dialogues and situations migrate from the script to
the screen, what takes place is an operation of undoing, as if the script were banging
into bodies, literally failing to flow. The script lets bodies coil it.
Among other examples, one could mention Gus’ love night in Husbands, where the
two bodies engage in repeated sequences of twists and position-taking, as a
consequence of which the hotel room they are occupying seems to enlarge. In A
woman under the influence the scene where Mabel’s confronts the doctor and her
husband Nick, shows the erratic and frantic movements of the woman turning a
familiar setting – the living room of the house – into an uncharted space.
As Comolli says, with Cassavetes one always starts with nothing, that is to say that
one starts with a complex set of exposures, but with no time and no spaces, with
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characters with no inner experience; one has bodies exposing one another: ‘cinema of
bodies: the character is reduced to his own bodily attitudes’122.
With regard to the second strategy the point to be made here relates to how the
presences on the cinematic screen trigger a particular kind of relation.
Once more one needs to restate that initial remark: Cassavetes’ aim was to make
movies on people, on people who cease to find their way home (it would take another
kind of reflection to show how this happens). Cinema of bodies then, but also a
cinema that should engage ‘us’.
Although Deleuze spends a considerable amount of pages on Cassavetes, there’s no
mention of the American director in the study of the close-up. For the sake of clarity,
here one needs to quickly revisit this analysis. Deleuze, quoting Eisentein, defines the
close-up as ‘the face’. The face acts on two poles, as reflecting surface/quality and
intensive series/power; although the two poles do not occur by closing  one another
out, preventing the other from appearing, they always realize themselves by letting
open a possibility. The criterion of distinction revolves around the following point:
‘we find ourselves before an intensive face each time that the traits break free from the
outline, begin to work on their own account and form an autonomous series which
tends toward a limit’, on the contrary ‘we are before a reflexive or reflecting surface as
long as the features remain grouped under the domination of a though which is fixed
or terrible, but immutable and without becoming, in a way eternal’123.
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Deleuze’s concept of ‘the face’ does not apply solely to the human visage, but to
any image that could be said to occupy these two poles: ‘each time we discover these
two poles in something […] we can say that this thing has been treated as a face’124.
Opposing the idea of the close-up as the upsurge of the partial object, Deleuze turns to
Balász to say that the close-up ‘abstracts it [an object] from all its spatial-temporal co-
ordinates. That is to say, it raises it to the state of an Entity’125. What is more, the
close-up allows us to abandon the three ordinary roles of the face: individuating,
socializing, and communicating. ‘The close-up has merely pushed the face to those
areas where the principle of identification ceases to hold sway […] The close-up
suspends individuation’126.
In Deleuze’s opinion it is Bergman that has pushed this suspension, this nihilism, of
the face to a limit.
Cassavetes operates a very different gesture with regard to the close up; he does
erase the face (or objects standing for it) but not just to prevent identification, rather to
add a condition, a co-essential condition to it, the face is posited always as co-
belonging.
Faces in particular is a film where the close-up is used to the point of violence, that
is to say to the point where it somehow acts violently towards the smooth flowing of
the film. In fact there is nothing smooth about Faces; rather, the apparent simplicity of
the plot is continuously interrupted and then proceeds not from but in the interruptions
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themselves. Exactly by interrupting the plot, the close-ups establish almost a register
that precedes the story. While the film depicts a rather stiff social situation,
characterized by individualism, the social constraints of marriage and a rather well-
known collection of middle-class repressive norms and betrayals (on the line of:
middle age people just want to have fun), what is liberated in the series of successive
close-ups is a distance that sends for a different model of being-with.
A first set of succinct remarks is needed to open the way for the discussion:
- like Bergman, Cassavetes operates an erasure of the face. He does so in that,
surpassing the face as entity, surpassing the poles of quality/powers, he places the
face there where it shouldn’t be: there where everything else is expected, where
all the others should be, all that which takes place off the frame. Saying that
amounts not to affirming the face as a bearer, an icon, as if it were a sort of visual
synopsis, a herald or promise, but exactly to taking it as that which testifies for the
dispersion of the evidence, that which goes as far as saying: there’s no movie
here, this is not fiction but rather the dispersed presence of a reality which a look
agitates. Faces is a film of dispersed (and agitated) presences, which, perversely,
find their peak of dispersion in the play of close-ups. The close-up is constantly
trapped in this leap towards an outside of itself as if it were there to declare its
impossibility, the impossibility of recollecting in itself any meaningful statement.
- The faces in Faces do not just suspend individuation.  This suspension triggers the
circulation of sense within the film: the sense of the film as situations rendered by
a sending toward, rather than by a meaningful closure; the sense of the film as
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materiality on and through which looks encounter one another. In other words,
Faces is a film where no one is allowed to stay alone; conditions, locations and
positions open into absences and at the same time these absences make the
happening of relations most evident. Close-ups link one presence to another; they
do not lead anywhere as they are there to underline the importance of what the
spectators cannot see, the distance required by relation. Close-ups show what is
beyond their reach; they carry this beyond in and carry away what falls inside the
frame.
- Cassavetes managed to put in the close-up the openness of a long shot by
accumulating one close-up after the other. Once the face appears, it appears as the
excluded and the intruder at the same time. Close-ups serve to allow the
characters to stay together and to prevent one character from standing out, from
being singled out. Therefore what is at stake in Cassavetes’ use of close–ups is the
impossibility of affirming the face, as this always come as the presence of what
lies outside the frame.
- Cassavetes’ close-ups work towards establishing a mode of relation without
relation, a model where what is at stake is a coming of the relation without this
having to be announced. The relationship here is realized in the action and is not
then the substratum that channels, motivates and directs the action. In this also
resides the great vulnerability of the faces of the film. The measure of this relation
is itself incommensurable.
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6 - Pan-orama and dis-stance
At the very beginning of The evidence of film Jean-Luc Nancy says: ‘capturing
images is clearly an ethos, a disposition and a conduct with regard to the world’127.
It is interesting to see here how the relation ethos/world comes back. What is Nancy
expressing here? The capturing of images exposes the world’s standing on itself and
opens our standing in it. Capturing images is a way of exposing the world and a way
in which the world exposes itself.
The way Cassavetes uses the close-up is an ethos. The close-up is not just a
particular device among others, thanks to which a director arranges the internal
structure of his work; rather, it becomes an offering oneself to the world, a particular
way of happening in the world and of the world going through the image. Here the
close-up becomes the way to capture and make remarkable the world in its evidence.
Cassavetes’ habitus revolves around an attempt to wind up the ‘us’, winding the
‘us’ up, exposing the actors to our looks, as if to say that one not only needs to ‘go to
the movies’, but that one is then called to do so in a precise way. What the director
demands on our part is to abandon both an all-encompassing gaze (objects of the film
are signified regardless to their singularity) and an absorbed one (the objects of the
film replace reality by providing a vision of it). Not a panoramic perspective, but our
distance to the film and the distances within the film.
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As the word indicates, panorama, from the Greek παν−οραο, means to see
everything, or better said, to strive in order for everything to become visible, apparent,
for everything to surface and occupy a place in front of us.
The concept of pan-orama should here work on two levels. On one side the
panorama is what allows us to gain an overview, a general gathering in front of our
eyes, a gathering where presence presence melts into a plurality that forecloses any
singularity appearing and anything  appearing as singularity. This is the panorama as
whole. One the other side the panorama also gives to the eye the opportunity of seeing
not the whole, but each and every thing, every tiny detail. In this scenario things come
from an infinite distance, and we descend into them apprehending their porosity,
grasping their granular, corpuscular texture; things become permeated by our sight.
It is interesting to note how in Faces no character is devoted enough space so as to
be alone, to transform into the character. The shot-reverse shot composition, which
would wrench the individual out of the context, is almost never employed. At the same
time one never has the impression of receiving a general overview, or a visual
synopsis of any kind, although the film remains an extremely choral one. Bonitzer is
right when he notes that the camera in Cassavetes accompanies a system of crises128.
Cassavetes aims to play in between the uprising of the main character, a detail that
one is forced to take as everything, while he at the same time escapes the whole, the
idea of presenting everything inside the frame. He is not a director who believes solely
in the image, nor a director who tries to document reality. Rather, his gesture is
something like a play with distances.
                                                
128 Pascal Bonitzer, Decadrages. Peinture et Cinema (Paris: L’Editions de l'Etoile, 1985), 8 (translation
mine).
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As Raymond Carney says: ‘Cassavetes works to resist the individual effort to
isolate himself’129 and also, one could add, to prevent the individual performer from
elevating himself above the in-common into which he is plunged. So much of the
personal point of view is privileged that we almost forget that there are others. This
means that the individual is not allocated enough room and time to control the visual
space, to wrap the frame around himself. Rather, as Carney notes again, the character
‘is everywhere put back into a series of relationships’. If one were to fix all this in a
formula, one could say: Faces starts with us. The being-in-common, our being us, is
never given; rather, it is something that takes place beyond any construction and takes
place in this world here as that set whose holding together is the constant reframing of
its given senses. Characters do not put themselves to work to reach as it were a kind of
communality; quite the opposite, the picture is almost always about desegregation, it is
not an oeuvre or a composition; it holds nothing of a per-forming.
The way Cassavetes starts with ‘us’ is by orchestrating the close-ups mainly in a
contrapuntal way. As cinema lacks a similar concept, one has to borrow it from music
— this simply means that close-ups are independent but harmonically related. They
are independent in that they appear not as intimately chained to the series they – at
least because of a temporal succession – belong to, but as always interpendent in that
they are not there to identify anything or to underline one’s role, gesture, words, face,
but to introduce another close-up that will revolve around something different.
                                                
129 Ray Carney, American Dreaming. The films of John Cassavetes and the American Experience (London:
University of California Press, 1985), 98
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Cassavetes seems to try to reply to the demand to “say ‘us’ otherwise than as ‘one’
and otherwise than as ‘I’”130.
Carney notes this as well: ‘Cassavetes intercuts and edits together close-ups of over
forty interrelated glances, responses and adjustments of position’131 and this works as a
constant reminder of simultaneous presences. In this way Cassavetes starts with ‘us’,
‘us’ becoming almost a white noise, which never falls into complete silence.
By means of contrapuntal close-ups, Cassavetes is able to oppose to the double
signification of the pan-orama, a play of distance, or more properly a dis-stance. He
never allows us to see the whole, nor every detail of a given situation. He plays in
between these two categories of the panorama. Distance written as dis-stance (in
which also resonates this-stance) should be thought here as that standing, posture,
taking place, which is also a habitus, an ethos towards something or someone, which
by means of the prefix dis indicates a movement outside, a difference that is
constitutive of one’s own place. Dis-stance works here as the impossibility of closing
oneself from others, by pushing them to an irreducible distance. Every distance is
always a happening outside, towards, an occupying a place by trembling. Distance as
self-standing passes and traverses every other self-standing, since the beginning, even
before the film starts, but in particular in the span of time in which the film, rather than
separate us from reality – constantly delivers us back to the world. Distance is
impossible if not as an approach, not out of an intentional humanitarianism, but as that
gesture which I can’t, by any means, completely limit.
                                                
130 Jean-Luc Nancy, La Pensée Dérobée (Paris: Galilée, 2001), 116 (translation mine)
131 Ray Carney, American Dreaming. The films of John Cassavetes and the American Experience (London:
University of California Press, 1985), 99
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To conclude, Cassavetes’ contrapuntal close-ups and all the faces of Faces, bring
fore this evidence of distance as a dis-stancing, a bringing towards, a going out, the
irreducibility of a being-with. Distance is here the opening of my stance to the other;
my stance is always already a standing out, something I cannot fully appropriate nor
withdraw within. I am always already delivered to this opening, which is also the
taking place of the sense of the world, the sense of the world as the singular difference
of a passage, or as Nancy puts it in his discussion of the multiplicity of the arts:
the sense of the world is only given by dis-locating at the origin its unique and
unitary sense of “sense” in the general zoning that is sought in each of the many
differential distributions of the senses […] There would be no world if there were
no discreteness132.
                                                
132 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Muses, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 18-
19
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Conclusions
Cinema says something about what happens between us because the world and
cinema don’t stand in an analogical or mimetic relation. The world on the screen is
still the world. Although things are not available for use, nonetheless their evidence
sizes the circulation of sense. Nothing is manifested on the screen if not the sheer
existence of the world, its being ‘remarkable’.
Cinema shows a discontinuity in the world and this discontinuity opens up a place
for ‘us’: we are at the crossing between the indistinct world and the evidence delivered
by cinema.
The world in cinema becomes remarkable: it becomes the ‘disclosure of a look in
the middle of ordinary turbulence’133 (this turbulence is the movement of the everyday,
the Heideggerian Bewegtheit). On one side the world on the screen holds on us the
same obvious grasp as in the everyday; on the other the fact of it being placed at a
distance – made evident – submits it to the unseen, as that which needs to be marked
once more. Its sheer existence is once again weighted down by sense.
Cinema does not support the signification of the world, it shows the obvious fact of
the world, that is also the not-yet-signified. Within this obviousness the abyssal sense
of the world becomes evidence. Obviousness and abyss indicate the fact that the world
is common, sharing itself in constantly creating itself as world.
                                                
133 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Evidence of Film, trans. Christine Irizarry and Verena Conley (Brussels: Yves
Gevaert Éditeur, 2001), 22
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That a model of truth is replaced by one of existences shows a world whose sense
constantly reopens its references (its ‘sense’) and is sustained on possibilities to be
realized, meanings to be taken up, discontinuities not yet sublimated.
On the screen the reality of a world without principle is mobilized, which also
means that it necessarily calls us to engage in what is there delivered. Cinema does not
seal the sense of the world by drawing world-pictures, nor does it replace the world
with pure appearances, the play of fantasies. The world exposed by cinema is one in
which the absolute accountability of sense is continuously handed over to ‘us’ to be
readdressed. It is in this way that cinema precisely constitutes the crossing of the
question of the world and the question of ‘us’. Cinema makes evident a constellation
where the world is a set of relations in constant disclosure; this disclosure is operated
in the distance ‘us’ as being-with takes from its inscription in a closed horizon of
sense. As Nancy puts it:
the common, having-in-common or being-in-common, excludes interior unity,
subsistence, and presence in and for itself. Being with, being together […] are
precisely not a matter of being ‘one’134.
The opposite of this is what a world-view would entail or promise: sociality finally
assured once and for all, grounded around a tension that makes sense unavailable to it.
The reference in this case would not be to our happening together, but to the
transformation of the togetherness in the essence of what has always happened. This
                                                
134 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O'Byrne: (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2001), 154
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means that ‘us’, instead of existing on the register of deliverance across otherness (this
has been here called its ‘happening’), is returned to the register of an autonomic
charisma, where everything is immanent and within which everything is already
resolved. This scenario founds itself on the same structure and proceeds in the same
way as the juxtaposition of the crowd, where the dispersion is not a singular exposure
of sense, but the collapse of sense by disengagement.
‘Sense is the singularity of all the singular ones, in all senses simultaneously […]
the sense of the world is thus in each one as totality and unicity at once’135.
The world remains the task and the responsibility of ‘us’, as long as ‘us’ always
opens its own presence and makes it remarkable. ‘Us’ happens only in the world as
long as it does not close the world within a natural intimacy. Cinema unlocks this
intimacy by showing and ex-scribing the uncertainty of what we have always already
seen, between us.
                                                
135 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World, trans. Jeffrey Librett, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1997), 68
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SEPARATIONS
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“Would we accept being alone?” – “Alone, but not each one for
his own sake; alone in order to be together.” – “Are we together?
We aren't completely, are we? We're only together if we could be
separated”
Maurice Blanchot1
                                                
1 Maurice Blanchot, Awaiting Oblivion, trans. John Gregg (London: University of Nebraska Press,
1999), 19
202
Introduction
At the end of the last chapter the question ‘What happens between us?’ found
articulation in the discussion of the concept of the world, once this becomes free
from an external substance.
It has been argued that a deconstruction of a certain metaphysics positing the
world as a substantiated term, directly depending on a substance or essence
external to it, would allow for the first time the appearance of the world as that
which exists. Also the process described made it possible to trace the emergence of
the world as that which is always already there, though hidden under the
determinations of a substance. A related movement highlighted the idea that a
certain conception of God was to identify God itself with the notion of the world.
This could happen by way of a shift that became increasingly evident (though it is
not simply a matter of chronology here) at the beginning of the rationalist tradition,
in particular with those thinkers – Bruno, Spinoza and Leibniz for example – who
had God as an intelligent principle rather than as a creator, demiurges or architect.
The account of this deconstructing process reopened the question of the creatio ex-
nihilo, by way of which what is has come to be as a growing out of nothing.
The analysis of the world has been considered to be a step in view of a more
consistent look on the question ‘what happens between us’ and its various
declinations. If it has been argued that ‘we are the world’ it is now time to engage
with the measure of this world, namely with the ‘we’ or with the between us or
simply with the ‘with’.
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In analyzing the thoughts of Jean-Luc Nancy and Emmanuel Levinas one will
have to focus not as much on the traits constituting their difference as on the
difference itself: on what the difference says and on what precisely this difference
is, what it resides on and what it pushes for, rather than on the forms it assumes.
For the sake of clarity, the proximity that has been the object of the first part of this
discussion will be revisited. It has been argued that Nancy and Levinas do not
occupy completely distinct poles with regards to the argument on the body, if only
because they both attribute great importance to it while coming to discuss ideas of
otherness.
The three elements that will be considered here as separating Nancy and
Levinas are:
- the idea of the world,
- the syntax used to identify the relationship with the other,
- the notion of an element beyond the terms of this relationship.
The pattern encompassing the following line of reasoning relies on one
constituent motif: both breaches that Nancy and Levinas engage with are possible
within a Heideggerian perspective. It is within Heidegger, which also means in his
absence, that one can meaningfully join the two sides and follow them. The
absence of Heidegger allows Nancy and Levinas to pursue their reflection and
uncover new implications and problems; for this very reason they can also find an
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original angle from which to address conceptual questions2. One should obviously
not forget that this same rule is, in the end, a Heideggerian formulation:
What is unthought in a thinker's thought is not a lack inherent in his thought.
What is un-thought is there in each case only as the un-thought. The more
original the thinking, the richer will be what is unthought in it. The unthought
is the greatest gift that thinking can bestow3.
Accordingly, the following discussion, inasmuch as it proves to be a productive
reading, should not just determine something on Nancy and Levinas’ thinking but
also provide insights as to the originality of Heideggerian thought. The dynamic of
thinking in this case could well be grounded on an absence and the methodology
must be that of clarity for ‘one thing is necessary for a face-to-face converse with
the thinkers: clarity about the manner in which we encounter them’.
                                                
2 Heidegger himself warns about the peril of such a venture: ‘What a thinker has thought can be
mastered only if we refer every thing in his thought that is still unthought back to its originary truth. Of
course, the thoughtful dialogue with the thinker does not become any more comfortable that way, on
the contrary it turns into a disputation of rising acrimony’. Martin Heidegger, What is called thinking,
trans. Glenn Gray (London: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), 54
3 Martin Heidegger, What is called thinking, trans. Glenn Gray (London: Harper and Row Publishers,
1968), 77
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1 - We are the world
It has been said that Nancy follows Heidegger rather faithfully in understanding
the disclosure of the world and its mundane character as the very springing of the
question what happens between us. This question does not hold onto anything but
the world as world, as a system of relations or references, into which we are
always and already plunged. It has been underlined more than once that this
‘always already’ should not trigger the idea of the world as a Pascalian cachot;
quite the opposite, it composes the very plane where sense, including the sense of
the world itself, can be and can remain open.
The opening towards others is then an event taking place not as much ‘in’ the
world as that inside which would then be in correlation to an outside, but as the
world. The fact that singularities are open towards each other is the fact of the
world and is our fact. I have already argued the dependence of this conception on
the structure of the Heideggerian being-in-the-world and in particular on the care
Heidegger takes in defining the ‘in’ not on strictly spatial grounds. The world is
not a container, but rather the place of transcendence: the set of relations one
engages in order to reopen existence. The world – as it has emerged from a
deconstruction of metaphysics, or, to give the term a more precise connotation, the
deconstruction of western onto-theology – lies there, stripped bare of any principle
that would not in the end somehow return to the world itself, to the transcendence
of the world towards itself. Sense, as long as one shows it to be that which does not
rest on determined significations4, takes place as world. Following Heidegger,
                                                
4 ‘What is essential to this sense is that it neither grasps nor presents its unity or its oneness’. Jean Luc
Nancy, ‘A finite thinking’ in A finite thinking, ed. Simon Sparks, trans. Edward Bullard, Jonathan
Derbyshire and Simon Sparks (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 8
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Nancy states that ‘we have already come into sense because we are already in the
world; we are in the world because we are in sense. One opens the other’5.
In Nancy’s view the idea of an outside of the world is conceivable only if one
again refers this outside to the world, the outside as the differential character
immanent to the world. It is not that the world so conceived holds a secret that one
can disclose or reveal or for which one can create occasions that would unravel its
very secrecy. The outside is always already this differential trait, wherein the world
can’t conceive of itself as identical, dignified or vilified by the acquisition of a
meaning. As long as the world is the plane of this disclosure, then it is that which
lacks a principle; it neither refers to a beyond nor signals or points towards it, ‘the
whole of being is its own reason; it has no other reason, which does not mean that
it itself is its own principle and end, exactly because it is not ‘itself’’6.
The world is neither the ‘creatum’ nor the evidence of ‘a ens perfectissimus’ but
that which holds itself as its own difference. To say that the world is a difference,
to say that its structure does not respond to formal logic or metaphysics but
embraces a dynamic, implies also that one is at times able to envisage this
difference; one could call this moment when one is able to picture the difference –
which means that the difference has already moved the world somewhere else
anyways – the irreparable. The irreparable in this case also indicates that the world
is never simply ready-at-hand or a given:  it always is that which is constantly
                                                
5 Jean Luc Nancy, ‘A finite thinking’ in A finite thinking, ed. Simon Sparks, trans. Edward Bullard,
Jonathan Derbyshire and Simon Sparks (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 11. Nancy’s
point of departure here is mainly Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.
6  Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2000), 86
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different from itself. Giorgio Agamben says that: ‘at the point where you perceive
the irreparability of the world, at that point it is transcendent’7.
It was shown in the second part of this analysis that one can hear the sound of
the question what happens between us, only if one has previously lent an ear to the
question of the world. This is so because the world is never something that simply
contains the references that constitute it; rather these references constitute an
outside that is nonetheless never beyond the world itself. The world is then that
relational totality from which one starts all the relational work. Every decision thus
takes place as an opening of the world; every sense makes sense as a migration
from the world back to the world. If the notion of a multiplicity of worlds wouldn’t
be already overloaded, one could say that sense is that which goes from one world
to another, though this is not an otherworld.
At this point one is called to register and stress the relational aspect of the
worlding of the world. Heidegger again is quite clear on this. The analysis of the
ready-at-hand, which marks the first steps of Being and Time, emphasizes that the
relational characteristic of the world is what is – at each and any time – at stake.
Saying that amounts to expressing the fact that the world is not the outside of an
inside, the outside of God or the outside of subjectivity, the externalization of an
intimacy. It might still be right to say that the world is an expression, provided that
one pays attention to term expression. Expression means seeking the ex, seeking
the movement towards an outside. The world is the expression in its most
productive meaning: an ex that is at any time gambling with itself. It would be a
mistake then to reduce it to a pure juxtaposition of beings, which find themselves
                                                
7 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming community, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1993), 105
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chained to one another. Relation must mean something else because being-in-the-
world defines not a bare proximity, but the event of disclosing this proximity, of
opening up the sense of this proximity and sense as proximity. This is what makes
the question of the world so important for the discussion on what happens between
us. Heidegger always thinks of the world in terms of involvement (the discussion
of the ready-to-hand as opposed to the metaphysical present-at-hand could already
bear witness to this). Heidegger’s concept of world does not merely give priority to
subjective projections; it constitutes the ontological underpinning of every mode of
engagement with things, including theoretical encounters. The world is then
defined by significance and involvement, something that is both implicit and
explicit in Heidegger’s text:
The context of assignments or references, which, as significance, is
constitutive for worldhood, can be taken formally in the sense of a system of
Relations […] the phenomenal content of these ‘Relations’ and ‘Relata’ is
such that they resist any sort of mathematical functionalization; nor are they
merely something thought, first posited in an ‘act of thinking’8.
Before moving forward with the discussion it is necessary to pay attention to the
first point announced in the introduction. What can come from within Heidegger’s
notion of Being-in-the-world? This question somehow demands to return Levinas
to Heidegger, to read as it were Levinas from within Heidegger’s thinking. This
does not amount to reducing Levinas to a plain reformulation of Heidegger.
Levinas himself remarked more than once of his debt to Heidegger, although this
                                                
8  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (London:
Blackwell, 2006), 121
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was always counterbalanced by an ‘irreversible abomination’. In a lecture
delivered in 1987 Levinas stated once more his ‘admiration inspired by a
philosophical intelligence among the greatest and the irreversible abomination
attached to National Socialism, in which that brilliant man was somehow able to
take part’9. A number of commentators have been reassessing the extent of this
debt. As Peter Gordon says: ‘to argue for an enduring continuity between
Heidegger and Levinas is not to condemn Levinas. It is, quite simply, to challenge
the notion that Levinas is capable of effecting this separation without recourse to
the very philosophy he opposed’10. Though explicit disputes with Heidegger are
more evident in Levinas’ preparatory texts (mainly in On Escape and Existence
and Existents) than in his mature works, nevertheless Heidegger’s influence never
really ceases to play a role in Levinas’ thinking. As Manning puts it, ‘Levinas’
own philosophy is both a heavy borrowing from Heidegger’s philosophy and also a
constant argument against it’11. Jacques Rolland, in his introduction to On Escape,
is even more explicit in pointing out that ‘what is taken over from Heidegger
without contestation is a certain comprehension of philosophy, by virtue of which
one problem will be considered as philosophical par excellence in as much as it
confronts us with the ancient problem of being qua being’12.
It is time to confront that which has just been outlined with regard to the
Heideggerian questioning of the world in Being and Time with Levinas’ idea that
                                                
9 Emmanuel Levinas, “Dying for…” in Entre nous. Thinking-of-the-other, trans. Michael Smith and
Barbara Harshav (London : Continuum, 2006), 179
10 Peter Eli Gordon, “Fidelity as Heresy” in Heidegger’s Jewish followers, ed. Samuel Fleischacker
(Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 2008), 203
11 Robert Manning, Interpreting Otherwise Than Heidegger: Emanuel Levinas's Ethics As First
Philosophy, (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1993), 29
12 Jacques Rolland, “Getting out of Being by a New Path” in Emmanuel Levinas, On Escape, trans.
Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 6
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‘in contradistinction to the philosophers of existence we will not found the relation
with the existent respected in its being […] on being in the world, the care and
doing […] Doing, labor, already implies the relation with the transcendent’13.
                                                
13 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University
Press, 2005), 109
The original French text says: ‘Nous n’allons fonder la relation avec l’étant respecté dans son être sur
l’être au monde, sour le souci et le faire du Dasein heideggerien. Le faire suppose deja la relation avec
le trascendant’. Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini, (Paris: Livre de Poche, 1990), 111
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2- A matter of hyphens
The compound expression ‘Being-in-the-world indicates that it
stands for a unitary phenomenon.
Martin Heidegger14
Levinas omits the hyphens, but here he is explicitly arguing with Heidegger. A
few lines earlier though, Levinas had also pointed to Husserl in order to criticize
the latter’s use of terms such as intentionality and consciousness of…, for these
terms underline a thematic understanding of the Other, one that forecloses the
access to Infinity; the thematization always seems to bring with itself a
reconciliation that  occurs to detriment of the Other.
Levinas thus proposes an approach, named metaphysical relation, which ‘does
not link up a subject with an object’. It seems then pretty obvious that here Husserl
and Heidegger are coupled in the charge of having mistaken the relationship to the
Other in the world as that of an object facing a subject. Being-in-the-world would
then be a natural evolution of Husserlian thematization of the Other, for, Levinas
argues, the world is already a way of confining the Other within the Same. It is
then a matter of seeing how this confinement takes place and what kind of reading
allows Levinas to impeach Heidegger with the above-mentioned accusation.
Levinas writes in Existence and Existents that ‘existence is not synonymous
with the relationship with a world; it is antecedent to the world’15.
                                                
14 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (London:
Blackwell, 2006), 78
15 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 2003), 8
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What Levinas is concerned about, almost weary of, is the fact that to be in the
world is to be attached to things. The problem here lies in the kind of attachment.
Levinas seems to always take the attachment as the mastering or cognitive
recognition (one could call it thematization or substantiation), the panoramic
apprehension of every fold of the world. This preoccupation is disseminated in a
number of Levinasian texts. Whether he addresses it as the attachment of the other
to things (‘in the world the other is […] never separated from things’) or as its
becoming object (‘in the world the other is an object already’) or affirms that ‘it is
one thing to ask what the place of the world in the ontological adventure, and
another thing to look for that adventure within the world itself’16, the concern
implicit in these remarks is the same: in the world, as in the Heideggerian
formulation of the concept, the Other is absorbed within the Same. It should then
come as no surprise that in this early study Levinas at some point turns to Husserl
in order to challenge Heidegger. The notion of epochè allows him to say that ‘it is
not by being in the world that we can say what the world is’17. As one can see,
Levinas often cuts off the hyphens and this gesture seems to convey important
consequences. By lifting the hyphen and translating being-in-the-world for being
in the world, Levinas loosens that which is most dear to Heidegger, namely the
definition of being-in-the-world as an existential. By way of this erasure, which at
times could be said to take the form of an upsurge, Levinas dispels the existential
dimension and reduces the Heideggerian motif to its constitutive pieces. One
should be careful in undertaking such an operation as it seems that the consistency
and novelty of the Sein-in is lost as soon as the tightness between its constitutive
                                                
16 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 2003), 33
17 Ibid., 35
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terms is loosened. Without the hyphens one is left more or less with the
denotations of ‘in’ and ‘world’ that Heidegger sets out to refuse. Once the terms of
the expression are made independent, the tone changes: they no longer collaborate
but instead tend to withdraw, moving back towards the accepted meaning of ‘in’, a
container, and ‘world’, a given that contains. Some splendid pages are devoted to
food, enjoyment and dwelling, but they all take their cues from the removal of the
hyphens, so that the reflection on the ‘in’ as an having that has the character of a
being, the in as ethos, fades out. The expression ‘being in the world’ does not do
justice to the Heideggerian effort. It is true that Heidegger as well starts with
separated terms, for the analyses of ‘in’, as derived from innan, habitare, diligere,
and of the ‘world’ as existential must first be  set free from their traditional (in the
literal sense of the term, as referring to a thinking tradition) meaning. Nevertheless,
as the analysis advances to the point where one can feel comfortable using the two
terms, they can’t be pronounced separately any longer, for this would mean
plunging them again in the tradition, thus stripping them bare of their fecundity. It
would then be necessary for Levinas to reformulate the two terms ‘in’ and ‘world’.
Separating the terms in the compound expression being-in-the-world, thereby
returning them to their substantial position after they have been carefully
composed, does not suffice to silence their articulation, as if by tearing them apart
one were triggering an elastic movement which then binds them together with
more strength. In his discussion of Husserl and Heidegger’s concept of world,
Alweiss says that ‘the hyphens between the words being-in-the-world are crucial
for they emphasize Dasein’s dis-location: this essential interdependency between
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Dasein and the world’18.
Levinas, in short, seems to rely on a definition of the world that Heidegger is
explicit in refusing. A great deal of the claims Levinas advances relies on the
definition of the world as the totality of entities that can be present-at-hand within
the world. This is pretty much the idea of the world that has prevented, in
Heideggerian terms, the world from being accounted for in any meaningful way.
The notion of the world as a totality present-at-hand, or if one wants to put it in a
different way, as the given, prevents us from unveiling the world. But if the
phenomenon world has never seen the light of the day, covered as it is by the
corrective definition of totality, then Levinas’ critique cannot really be addressed at
Heidegger; rather, it sounds more proper when addressed to the same ‘enemies’
with whom Heidegger engaged. With regard to the question of the world at least
Levinas might be therefore much closer to Heidegger than he seems. At times it
appears as if Levinas, in his attempt to overcome Heidegger, is just placing himself
at a distance, which means he is already concerned with and maybe even in-spired
by, Heidegger. Levinas breathes in the novelty of Heidegger’s breeze.
It is nonetheless necessary to investigate the Levinasian strategy, the route he
covers in order to reach a beyond the world, in view of transcendence, as that
which is already implied in the relation with the existent. Step by step, to the top of
the world.
                                                
18 Lilian Alweiss, The world unclaimed: a challenge to Heidegger's critique of Husserl (Athens: Ohio
University Press, 2003), 79
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3 - Desire-in-the-world
I see life as a struggle and the real romance is
not walking away from it
John Cassavetes19
It is now worth summarizing the structure Levinas formulates in order to
explain why he will not find ‘the existent respected in its being in being in the
world’ and the transcendental relation that, according to him, every doing already
implicitly assumes.
The argument develops from the intention to explain interiority and the section,
right in the middle of Totality and Infinity, is largely devoted to explain this idea.
Although Levinas’ style precludes the possibility to draw a schema of its
development, the skeleton of the analysis nevertheless appears quite clearly. Man’s
relation to the world, an exteriority not alien to man himself, takes its first step as
enjoyment. Our apprehension of things in the world is envisaged under the heading
of enjoyment, which means that it is oriented towards the satisfaction, in
happiness, of necessary needs. The notion of enjoyment is worked out, as already
mentioned in the first chapter, thanks to the concept of living from… Enjoyment,
‘the very pulsation of the I’, ‘a quenching’, is the very fact of living; men move
into it by the simple fact of living. It is, Levinas says, different from the
Heideggerian disposition towards Being, for it always exceeds Being. It is both an
accomplishment and an opening, as its order is disclosed in the incomplete nature
of a being. As the very pulsation of the I, enjoyment, or better the independence
and sovereignty this produces, is also the place where subjectivity originates. It
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does not go unnoticed here that there is an implicit critique of Heidegger’s concept
of being-in-the-world; as Thomas, among others, remarks ‘for Levinas, to live
from something is neither to act on it in an everyday immersion in the world, nor
to act by means of it, utilizing the world as tool or implement’20.
The instantaneous enjoyment, by which man recollects himself and becomes
familiar with things in the world, is then completed by the concepts springing from
dwelling: habitation and possession. These concepts elevate the independence
already achieved in enjoyment to a more mature level. Habitation and possession
again should not be intended the Heideggerian way but as the separation of a
being, which recognizes itself as both needy and happy, able as it is to overcome
indigence, the nudity, and find in itself the encounter with the Other. Levinas calls
this progression separation, that which is necessary for the constitution of the idea
of the Infinite and, later on, for that of justice. As Levinas says: ‘enjoyment
separates by engaging in the contents from which it lives. Separation comes to pass
as the positive work of this engagement […] To be separated is to be at home with
oneself’21.
As I said earlier on, one can find within Levinas’ works a series of statements
that lead in the same direction, albeit moving from different angles. Having
sketched out the structure of Levinas’ enjoyment, I will proceed by analyzing a
series of quotations, in order to expand on the effects this structure has on Levinas’
understanding of the world.
When Levinas writes that ‘it is one thing to ask what the place of the world is in
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the ontological adventure, and another thing to look for that adventure within the
world itself’22, he seems to be taking this to mean that it is not by investigating our
attitude towards the world that we can understand something of that world. One
could translate the statement by saying that by being in the world, by being
immersed in things, we can’t account for it, as our experiences of things prevents
us from understanding the relationships enacted therein. This reproach, however,
seems hardly imputable to Heidegger. One can’t have a picture of the world as one
finds itself in it; every possibility is laid down as world, the latter being not just the
taking place of possibilities, but the very possibility of these possibilities. Thus in
saying what the world is, which would then be the starting point of the ontological
adventure, one should not look for an account of for the totality of existents, but
for the conditions of possibility of such a totality.
The ontological adventure starts exactly by questioning what ontological status
can one ascribe to the world. The two questions then are not at all different, as
Heidegger says in On the Essence of Ground: ‘Dasein is not Being-in-the-world
because and only because it exists factically; on the contrary, it can only be as
existing because its essential constitution lies in Being-in-the-world’23. If one
questions the existence of the world, its place as it were, one finds that the world is
not a place, that means it is not something ‘within’ which, as a site, the ontological
adventure takes its first steps; rather, it is the access into or plane of disclosure for
Dasein’s possibilities, there where ‘Dasein always faces the question of which
possible mode of existence it should enact’24. As Dreyfuss says in his volume
devoted to the first section of Being and Time, Dasein’s submission to the world
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belongs essentially to its Being, therefore ‘being-in-the world is ontologically prior
as the ontological condition of the possibility of specific activities’25. This indicates
that even if Heidegger stresses practical activity, he does so in order to describe a
more fundamental involvement with the world, a concerned absorption with the
world that could not emerge from a subject-object understanding of intentionality.
If the world is primarily ‘the structure of all possibilities’26, then ontology
cannot start within it, as the world neither has a within nor contains the ontological
adventure; rather, it exists as the ontological adventure, that means as an existential
ontological concept for which no substance (no what) or set of qualities could
successfully account.
In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, while discussing the schemata of
ecstatic temporality, Heidegger explains that ‘self and world belong together in the
single entity, the Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object
[…] but are the basic determination of the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure
of being-in-the-world’27.
The misreading seems then to rest on the question of the within or better of the
with-in. If one were to write them separately one would see that with in this case
would address a relation, while in again would address the way in which one exists
(in the transitive) this relation. Thus the question would now be translated as: it is
one thing to look for the ontological adventure within the world and another thing
to look for that adventure as the with-in the world is. The world is the set of
relations that traverses it and the way one traverses these relations. The
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consequence of this is that ‘as being-in-the-world Dasein must take a stand on
itself and must be understood in what it does, uses, expects, avoids’28.
The question of the world is asked ‘in ignorance, by one who does not even
know what led him to ask’29.
Levinas, however, is also looking for a way to be in the world that would break
with the imperative of existing, referred to as ontologism. This theme, imbued with
the implicit understanding of being as overwhelming plentitude, was developed for
the first time in On Escape, where Levinas’ main concern is ‘getting out of being
by a new path, at the risk of overturning certain notions that to common sense and
the wisdom of the nations seemed the most evident’30. The analysis of pleasure,
need and nausea will find a more thorough development in Existence and Existent,
where Levinas writes that ‘to be in the world is this hesitation, this interval in
existing; to be in the world is precisely to be freed from the last implications of the
instinct to exist’31.
The question that could arise here is: in what way does this differ from what
Heidegger says? Isn’t Heidegger perhaps saying exactly this by pointing out that
the world is open before our thematization of it, that it is preliminarily open?
Totality and Infinity indicates that the possibility to return the world to the
singular life freed from the ‘instinct to exist’ is achieved through enjoyment, the
great missed chance of phenomenology and in particular of existential analysis.
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For Levinas the concept of ‘enjoyment – ultimate relation with the substantial
plenitude of being, with its materiality – embraces all relations with things’32.
Levinas operates a shift in emphasis by redefining, as Harman describes, ‘the
‘ontic’ realm as the zone where ontology stakes its genuine claim’33.
Enjoyment is the positive event through which Levinas tries to break with
being-in-the-world as concerned absorption, ‘attempting to describe a subjectivity
in relation to a world that does not fit into the ontological categories of Dasein’s
being-in-the-world’34. The moment of separation triggered by enjoyment allows for
an identity disengaged from immersion, departing from the world of work, as
Heidegger describes it. According to Levinas things are grasped primarily in the
love of live, ‘the primordial relation of man with the material world is not
negativity, but enjoyment and agreeableness of life’35.
Three further questions arise at this point:
- Levinas sees in enjoyment both a ‘primordial relation’ and the ultimate
moment of the utilization of tools36, but before apprehending things in
enjoyment, shouldn’t there be something akin to a disclosure that allows us to
envisage the fact that we will enjoy those things, or at least that one can intend
those things as the ones leading to enjoyment? How can enjoyment render
things accessible? It seems that Levinas at least has to acknowledge the fact
that things are disclosed – they come to be pres-ent, they rejoin themselves –
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and then enjoyed. The world presents itself to us as the relational encounter of
singularities; in the multitude of entities, each entity is defined each time as
being what it is. This disclosure of singularities, the fact that Dasein works out
its conduct as being-in-the-world, does not rule out enjoyment or sincerity.
- Isn’t the enjoyment Levinas refers to still an in view of… ? Namely, isn’t the
kind of beyond-utility, grasping amd themes Levinas seeks to attain still a way
of unleashing things for Dasein’s own sake? Although one never finds in
Being and Time the word enjoyment, or words like pleasure or happiness, as
Harman points out in commenting on Levinas’ sincerity, ‘Heidegger
obviously realized that the invisible system of reference only tells half of the
story’37. In particular one should retain that the analyses of Zeughaftigkeit
might in fact lead there, albeit in an implicit way. Does the pleasure that one
derives from food not always imply feeding oneself? The same goes for
building a house and for labour in general. Surely building a house does not
stop at finding a shelter, but at the same time a house is not simply decoration,
carpets and wallpapers. Although one cannot negate the aspirational side of
things, nevertheless one should assume the fact that they introduce themselves
not firstly and only as aspirations. It might be true that ‘enjoyment embraces
all relations with things’, but at the same time it is not true that all relations
with things lead to enjoyment, not even in the sense Levinas attributes to the
term enjoyment. One cannot expose oneself to enjoyment unless one has
already entered, exposed oneself to the referentiality that allow us to stick to
things, by letting them be, without ever exhausting them. One should then start
thinking of enjoyment as the non-exhaustion of the referentiality proper to the
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world, for the referentiality is always prior to enjoyment, although enjoyment
can ultimately come to pervade it.
- By saying that doing and labor already imply a relation with transcendence
Levinas wants to suggest a movement beyond the simple possibility of using
things, towards what he names ‘desire’ (defined as that which does not
exhaust itself in apprehension, but operates a movement surpassing itself38).
One should pay attention to the fact that in Heidegger’s text the dimension of
usability is often linked to the description of moods. In particular in §18 and
then in §28 onwards Heidegger refers to a more poignant comprehension of
the wordly nature of the world. Does not this more refer to a letting be that
also assumes on itself the possibility for Dasein to be affected by intraworldly
beings? Heidegger says it explicitly: ‘to be affected […] becomes
ontologically possible only in so far as Being-in as such has been determined
existentially beforehand in such a manner that what it encounters within-the-
world can ‘matter’ to it in this way’39. If Levinas’ critique can be translated to
mean that things experienced in the world are present and then clothed with a
meaning, so as to be enclosed in themes, Heidegger replies by bringing fore
the notion of ‘involvements’. This designates a grasping of things different
from thematization, at least not in the mode according to which Levinas seems
to understand thematization. It is important to pin this down at this moment,
for the discussion ultimately leads to the question of sense as that which
allows something to be comprehended, namely something that refers to
something. As Heidegger says ‘the context of assignments or references,
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which, as significance, is constitutive for worldhood, can be taken formally in
the sense of a system of relations’40. This last quote puts forth the idea that the
sense of things has to be grasped beyond their pure presence, or even their
pure readiness, or even their bare consumption. Rather it must be disclosed in
terms of relations, as a referring within the original density of referrability,
where things are always somehow delayed and do never offer themselves as
bare as they are.
As Heidegger writes:
In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some
naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when
something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question
already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the
world, […] The ready-to-hand is always understood in terms of a totality of
involvement. This totality need not be grasped explicitly by a thematic
interpretation41.
Levinas might then be wrong in thinking that Heidegger is simply
trying to privilege the practical; in fact, he rather seems to attempt a
description of involvement that escapes the traditional model subject-
object.
It is not only in the phenomenology of enjoyment though that Levinas points
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his finger against the Heidegger’s presupposed understanding of the world as
the world of work. In the discussion of possession Levinas once more makes
explicit that his intention is that of providing a different horizon from which to
understand the world. When he says that ‘the doctrine that interprets the world
as a horizon from which things are presented as implements, the equipment of
an existence concerned for its being, fails to recognize the being established at
the threshold of an interiority the dwelling makes possible’ he is again reducing
Heidegger’s propositions to the primacy of readiness-to-hand, concluding that
‘it is not the world that makes things possible’42.
As already pointed out Heidegger does not stop at arguing that the primacy of
theoretical cognition should instead be accorded to practical activity. As Dreyfus
puts it, Heidegger is rather attempting to drift away from ‘the traditional relation
between self-referential mental content and objects outside the mind’43.
Being and Time does not establish a priority of readiness-to-hand to presence-
at-hand. Rather, what Heidegger says is that theoretical contemplation does not
allow one to take hold of aspects of the practical mode of activity, which is
particularly relevant for Dasein’s worldliness. As Mulhall points out:
overlooking our worldliness, we overlook something ontologically central to
any form of human activity, theoretical or otherwise; and if this notion of
world grounds the possibility of theoretically cognizing present-at-hand
objects, it cannot conceivably be explained as a construct from an array of
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purely present-at-hand properties and a sequence of value-projections’44.
Heidegger reads in Being-in-the-world the overcoming of intentionality when
this is understood according to the subject-object articulation. Given that Being-in
points to the structure of transcendence, his aim is to work out that what remains
unresolved in the relation between a subject and an object is precisely the relation
itself. The subject-object relation is for Heidegger ‘less original than the self-
transcendence of Being-in-the-world’45.
Heidegger is quite explicit on this: ‘one of the main preparatory tasks of Being
and Time is to bring this ‘relation’ radically to light in its primordial essence and to
do so with full intent’46. Dasein is always already open to the world. The kind of
opening at stake in Being-in-the-world is a mode of Being before any knowledge
and subjectivity. This means that Dasein is already open to entities in the world,
without making them the objective correlative of intentionality or appropriating
subjectivity. Thus for Heidegger the problem is not which intentionality gives us
the best account; instead, the attempt is that of getting beyond traditional
intentionality.
It seems then that Levinas is here drawing near Husserl and Heidegger right
there where the Heidegger’s effort to differentiate himself is greatest. Dasein can
have a world; in fact, the very possibility of being open to the world, prior to
knowing it, means that Dasein is not purely an intraworldly being. If it were so,
Dasein could not properly be-in-the-world, but only be contained/present in it.
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Heidegger says that ‘an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-the-world in
such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the Being
of those entities which it encounters within its own world’47. Having a world does
not mean overcoming it by encompassing it: it is a mode of Being, by which
Dasein is open to Being prior to knowledge; it is an existential, a ways ‘in which
Da-sein is, whereas the corresponding categories show themselves as properties
and attributes whereby the being of things can be determined’48. As existential
Being-in-the-world is thus an a priori character of the Being of Dasein and as such
it has an ‘active’ form.
The distinction between existentials and categories proves here to be
particularly important. Heidegger – who seems to derive it from Dilthey – puts it
like this:
all explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by
considering Dasein’s existence-structure. Because the being-characteristics
of Dasein are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them ‘existentialia’.
These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call ‘categories’ –
determinations of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein
[…] Existentialia and categories are the two basic possibilities for characters
of Being49.
Existentials always refer to Dasein, they always respond to the question of
whom, while categories respond to the question of what. Somehow Heidegger here
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seems to invoke the notion of necessity, for something has to exist in a particular
way if it has to be Dasein.
Oddly enough at times Levinas seems to be turning to Heidegger, although not
explicitly, in order to criticize Husserl, as he had already done at the beginning of
his philosophical adventure. As Derrida notices50, in Theory of Intuition  Levinas
turns his back to Husserl and grounds his analysis on a reading of Being and Time.
Not by chance, the critique revolves mainly around the concept of the world and in
particular around the notion of the world, not as a totality of perceived objects, but
rather a ‘centre of action’. Levinas says that Heidegger goes further in that he
thinks the world is not given over to the glance, but ‘in its very Being as a center of
action, as a field of activity or of care’51. Although, as Derrida says, one cannot be
sure whether Heidegger would have retained the definition of the world as a
‘center’ and in particular as a ‘field of activity’, nevertheless one should notice that
Levinas seems here to fully understand the referential trait of the Heideggerian
world. This gesture, to read Heidegger in opposition to Husserl, also resurfaces at
times in Totality and Infinity, leading to a sort of confusion with regard to the point
Levinas wants to make. Some remarks – a series of moves of rehabilitation by
which Heidegger, kicked out from the door, gets into the discourse through the
window – appear to be contradictory. After all that has been said so far, one still
finds in Totality and Infinity a peculiar accent, which seems to lead once more
back to Heidegger. After having detached himself from the idea of being-in-the-
world, Levinas expresses himself in these terms: ‘the world I live in is not simply
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the counterpart or the contemporary of thought and its constitutive freedom, but a
conditioning and an antecedence’52. One is not too far from Heidegger here; what
suddenly resounds is that the world is prior to any acknowledgment (and
possession). The idea that the world is disclosed beforehand, primarily,
anticipating its thematization, or the fact that ‘if the world can, in a way, be lit up,
it must assuredly be disclosed’53, is a motif that Levinas had already used in the
30s. Even when his discourse moves overtly against Heidegger, it still draws lines
that intersect from within the Heideggerian horizon.
There are significant examples that could add consistency to these comments.
For instance, before moving on to discuss elements and things, Levinas pins down
once more that: ‘the world I live from is not simply constituted at a second level
after representation would have spread before us a backdrop of a reality simply
given, and after ‘axiological’ intentions would have ascribed to this world a value
that renders it apt for habitation’54. What is crucial is to show that in understanding
the relation with the Other as metaphysics, Levinas needs a world that is not
immediately thematized, instead disclosed, and as such open as the always already
open. Levinas needs, as it were, the ‘same new world’. This, it seems, can be found
only in Heidegger’s work. The fact that Levinas wants to stress the structures of
enjoyment and happiness, labor as living from… does not place his discourse in
the apparent antithesis he attempts to reach.
Levinas’ understanding of the world cannot do without the Heideggerian
critique of Descartes and of presentness-at-hand. Only in this way can it be
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effective and only in this way can Levinas introduce desire in the world. It seems
thus as if the author has never really left, at least with regard to the world, as per
the perspective he had already adopted in Theory of Intuition. In order to overcome
the subject-object relation, as it has been constituted up to Husserl and reinforced
by him, Levinas necessarily turns to Heidegger. One can surely show that the
register of enjoyment is absent from Heidegger’s lexicon. Nonetheless one should
also ponder that all the ‘negative’ connotations that Heidegger seems to assume in
describing Dasein’s relation with the set of relationships the world is must be
specified not as negative in the sense of a lack of, or as the dialectical antithesis of
a positive movement. At the opposite they should be intended as possibilities. The
not indicates a condition of possibility. Heidegger himself takes care to specify this
in many passages. Whenever one finds a privative expression, one should always
be reminded that those express something positive, as when he says: ‘in such
privative expressions what we have in view is a positive phenomenal character of
the Being of that which is proximally ready-to-hand’55. The series of not, which
seem in the end to concern and even grip Levinas so much, do not necessarily
foreclose positivity, desire, permission, aspiration, hope, enjoyment; those are not
necessarily forces of anonymity or, even more so, powers of negation. Quite the
opposite, this emphasis on ‘possibility’ suggests perhaps the emergence of powers
of existence. One should then consider their function as that of opening conditions
of possibility. When Heidegger says that ‘if it is possible for the ready-to-hand not
to emerge from its inconspicuousness, the world must not announce itself’56, one
should read in these two instances of ‘not’ the very method to approach the in se of
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the world and of things in the world. Heidegger makes it clear, years after the
publication of Being and Time, in the Letter on Humanism:
The reference to ‘being-in-the-world’ as the basic trait of the humanitas of
homo humanus does not assert that man is merely a ‘worldly’ creature
understood in a Christian sense, thus a creature turned away from God and so
cut loose from ‘Transcendence’ […] in the name ‘being-in-the-world’,
‘world’ does not in any way imply earthly as opposed to heavenly being, not
the ‘worldly; as opposed to the ‘spiritual’. For us ‘world’ does not at all
signify beings or any realm of beings but the openness of Being […] with the
existential determination of the essence of man, therefore, nothing is decided
about the ‘existence of God57.
The discussion of enjoyment previously undertaken calls for one more question.
Levinas writes ‘in the ontological adventure the world is an episode which, far
from deserving to be called a fall, has its own equilibrium, harmony […] to call it
everyday and condemn it as inauthentic is to fail to recognize the sincerity of
hunger and thirst’58.
This passage deserves to be analyzed in light of the Heideggerian concept of
fallness. Levinas seems to imply that enjoyment and sincere happiness cannot find
their place in the Heideggerian treatment of the world because fallness precipitates
Dasein into some kind of ruination. Therefore the mode in which enjoyment and
sincerity take place, that of the everyday, would be a priori disqualified or, as
Levinas says, inauthentic.
                                                
57 Martin Heidegger ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Basic Writings, trans. David Farrell Krell (London:
Routledge, 1978), 228
58 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 2003, 37.
231
As King points out though, what Heidegger means by fallness is not the
situation of something ‘fallen perhaps from a state of grace into corruption, but the
movement of falling. This movement, moreover, is not one of the accidents that can
befall Da-sein in his factical existence but is one of the basic ways in which Da-
sein can-be-in-the-world’59. Falling is then an existential structure of Being-in-the-
world: Dasein already finds itself falling: an ontological motion, but without
nostalgia. Heidegger writes: ‘in falling, nothing other than our potentiality-for-
Being-in-the-world is the issue, even if in the mode of inauthenticity […] On the
other hand, authentic existence is not something which floats above falling
everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness
is seized upon’60.
Heidegger is explicit in refuting that fallness designates that it is not a matter of
the bad side of things and that falling contains no assertion about a possible
corruption of what is human.
The concept of fallness then does not necessarily imply a curse, a
‘condemnation’ as Levinas seems to put it. Terms like ‘average understanding’,
‘idle talk’, ‘everyday’ do not address a judgment; rather, they constitute sites
where Dasein’s decision towards its essence (that is its existence) takes place. As
Nancy puts it, it is precisely in adherence to existence that Dasein’s interest
towards itself is disclosed. Rather than being the world of banality, of the general,
the everyday is adherence to existence itself, ‘the taking-place, of the each time
according to which existence appropriates its singularity’61. Therefore it is not
simply in deserting the everyday that we ‘attain another, more “authentic” register
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of existence’62.
The inauthentic should then not be thought of as the ‘decline into an inferior
form’63 or the negative reduction of the authentic. As Agamben explains while
discussing the concept of love in Heidegger’s thought, ‘authentic existence has no
content other than inauthentic existence; the proper is nothing other than the
apprehension of the improper’64. From the two works just mentioned, it emerges
that when Heidegger talks about the inauthentic, one should be extremely careful
in deriving from this any sort of judgment.
Recalling Nancy’s elaboration of the question of the world one could say that
the world as such comes from the withdrawal of Gods and constitutes itself as the
spacing of sense. The world is what matters as what it is, it refers to and networks
with itself; ‘in short, it has started to comprise a co-existence’65. As one can see
then Nancy’s reading is close to Heidegger in linking the question of the world to
that of Being-with and otherness. The reference to co-existence appears every time
the question of the world is at stake. What need to be traced are  exactly how the
two questions unfold together, how one shapes the other and finally how both are
intersected by the question of sense. One could attempt one provisional formula,
expressed in three modes: the world is the co-existence of sense; co-existence
exposes the sense of the world; sense circulates as the co-existence of the world.
This co-existence, for this is what will be investigated from now on, is not a simple
juxtaposition of things: as Nancy puts it, ‘it refers to everyone and to no one, the
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circulation of a sense that nothing either retains or saturates, a circulation found in
the movement between places and beings, between all places and all beings, the
infinite circulation of a sense that will end up having its entire sense in this with’66.
Saying ‘you are absolutely strange because the world begins in its turn with
you’ or that ‘the world is the generic name of this ontological curiosity’67 means
inscribing in the world the problem of being-with or, better said, taking the world
as the only plane in which those questions become meaningful. It is by way of an
access to sense as sense of the world that one can gain an entrance into the sense of
the other. ‘Co-appearance, then, must signify that “appearing” (coming into the
world and being in the world or existence as such) is strictly inseparable,
indiscernible from the cum or the with’68. In Nancy’s thinking the Heideggerian
structure that links Being-in-the-world, sense and Being-with is respected.
What appears at the end of the analysis is that where Levinas understands
being-in-the-world mainly as instrumentality, a being-near-things which tend to
turn the world into a category, Nancy reads it in terms of the abandonment to
possibilities – ‘offered and set free: this is what ‘in the world means’’.  Therefore
rather than being a constraint, it is the very site where the enactment of sense as the
opening beyond a principle becomes possible.
Where for Levinas the world forms part of that system from which one needs to
find a way of escape, through nausea or pleasure for instance, Nancy sees the
breaking as the world itself. As Nelson writes ‘individuation as the break of
indifference can take place because Dasein’s neutrality is already broken by the
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facticity of its existence’69. The world is open to the facticity of singular existences
in a way that makes it the open par excellence, the very factical breach constantly
re-opened.
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4 – Two versions of originary otherness
In truth, it was possible that for some time he had been
giving me considerable help. He had put me to my task by
creating a void around that task and probably by letting
me believe that the task would be able to limit and
circumscribe the void.
Maurice Blanchot70
For the sake of clarity, the following argument will proceed by separating what
in fact in Levinas’ work is not separated. This means that the question of Being-
with (or better of the refusal of Heideggerian Being-with), the I-Thou (relation to
the Other person) and the question of Illeity (the third term, God, Justice), which
form in Levinas’ texts one single journey, traversing its entire philosophy with
admirable solidity and consistency, will here be treated not as different themes,
but, for the sake of analytical clarity, in different moments.
The argument will set off on the discussion of Levinas’ rejection of the notion
of Being-with as articulated by Heidegger in section §26-§27 of Being and Time. It
will then move on towards a questioning of the I-Thou relation, as the preferred
field where the ethical can emerge; here particular references will be addressed to
the thought of Martin Buber, and the symmetry that Levinas contests. Finally the
last step will be devoted to the theme of Illeity, the Third term. Appearing as early
as in Existence and Existents, the term remains at times ambiguous, for it contains
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references to God and also explains the resolution of the I-Thou situation in the
ethical relation, what Levinas will then name justice.
A number of these considerations will appear again at the end of this work, in
relation to the thinking of Jean-Luc Nancy, who proposes a treatment of Being-
with, which, seemingly at least, goes in the opposite direction of the one
undertaken by Levinas. The endeavor at that stage will be to show how the two,
moving as mentioned on radically different paths, attempt in the end to propose the
ethical not as a set of norms, but as absolute, as something that compels the human
from beginning to end. Levinas proceeds by introducing what he terms
metaphysical desire and the links this establishes with a third term that does not
take part in desire or in relation while nonetheless judging it and adjusting the
measure of one’s responsibility to the other human being. On the contrary, Nancy
places the ethical problem in a more apparent Heideggerian way: this is not outside
ontology, but is rather ontology’s central problem. The ethical can follow only
from a reformulation of ontology that would take into account a co-existential
analysis, an ontology that takes the world of bodies as its starting point. One then
goes, or at least attempts to, beyond ontology, the other at the very bottom of it, at
its core. According to Levinas one reaches ethics by stepping into otherwise than
being, while Nancy finds it at the core of Being as the co-essentiality of with and
Being.
Perhaps one is not that far from the question Heidegger poses to the thinking of
Being in Letter on Humanism when he says that ‘if the name “ethics” in keeping
with the basic meaning of the word ethos, should now say that “ethics” ponders the
237
abode of man, then that thinking which thinks the truth of Being as the primordial
element of man, as one who eksists, is in itself the original ethics’71.
Levinas seems to dispel the notion of Mitsein entirely, in view in particular of
what Heidegger was ‘in 1933, even if he was that for only a short period’72. One
should not be too quick, however, in assessing this opposition. As it has already
been argued with regard to the question of the world, a reading of Levinas starting
from Heidegger might still prove to be productive. Without pushing this too far
one could argue that Being-with still poses a horizon on Levinas’ thinking. On
several occasions Levinas proves to be fully aware of the debt one is to pay to
Heidegger if one is to philosophize these days. As early as in the Theory of
Intuition (a text from 1930) and as late as in the interview from 1982 quoted above,
Levinas attributes to Heidegger an enormous influence. He is as explicit as to say:
‘For me Heidegger is the greatest philosopher of the century, perhaps of the
millennium’. One should always keep in mind a certain ambiguity, a sort of
conscious resistance on Levinas’ side to the seduction of Heideggerian thought:
great respect and admiration, but also an almost spiky opposition with regard to
some crucial philosophical questions. It is within this ambiguity that one could
situate the questions here at stake. On one hand it is apparent enough that Levinas
rejects a great deal not just of the Heideggerian perspective, but of the tradition,
which Heidegger deconstructs and in so doing reinstates, and of his way of
rereading the masters; on the other hand, this might be less evident, but it has
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already emerged in the notes to the question of the world.  It is still from within
Heidegger, a certain Heidegger at least, that Levinas finds his own solutions.
Levinas poses a number of reasons for not articulating the question of otherness
in terms of Mitsein. Already in Time and the Other he devotes half a page to the
refutation:
The other in Heidegger appears in the essential situation of Miteinandersein,
reciprocally being for on another […] the proposition mit here describes the
relationship. It is thus an association of side by side, around something,
around a common term and, more precisely, for Heidegger, around the truth.
It is not the face-to-face relationship, where each contributes everything,
except the private fact of one’s existence. I hope to show for my part that it is
not the preposition mit that should describe the original relationship with the
other73.
Levinas will restate his concerns in a very similar manner in an interview,
almost forty years after Time and the Other: ‘In Heidegger the ethical relation,
Miteinamdersein, the being-with-another-person, is only one moment of our
presence in the world. It does not have the central place. Mit is always being next
to […] it is zusammensein [being-together], perhaps zusammen-marschieren
[marching-together]’.
The second passage in particular calls for a separation in analysis. What Levinas
seems to be refuting here is:
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- the fact that, according to him, Being-with is just a moment and its centrality
is subordinated;
- the ‘with’ is then not ‘ethical enough’ (if one could use this expression); it
simply states a juxtaposition, a being next to that does not involve any sort of
responsibility but remains as it were, free of charge.
In addition, a twist occurs at the end of the passage. The question of what
Heidegger was in 1933 becomes more poignant. The ‘with’ does not only fall short
of the ethical command, it also constantly runs the risk of embodying a violent
movement: a crowd walking side by side escalating to the vicious rustling of a
march, men in black boots lifting their arms at unison. One can find here a thinly
veiled reference to the question of destiny and to the theme of the people, about
which Levinas is rightly more than suspicious. This last remark also establishes a
link with what has been said in regard to the world, for Levinas finds always
present in Heidegger’s thinking a kind of distorted geographic constellation, a
prevalence of the people, of some people to say the truth, namely Germany and
Central Europe: ‘there are texts in Heidegger on the place of man in Central
Europe. Europe and the German West are central to him. There is a whole
geopolitics in Heidegger’74.
Before moving onto questioning some of the statements Levinas makes in his
few references to Being-with, and before analyzing them in relation to the way
Nancy takes up the Heideggerian theme, it seems proper to describe the trajectory
Levinas undertakes. It is all too known that Levinas’ ‘big idea’ lies in having
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(re)discovered the question of the Other, in having opened a way, at the very limit
of Western thought, through which the Other might come to be questioned as that
which is always in a position to overcome, overtake, overhaul the possibility for an
I to thematize it. Levinas’ great formula has the Other as that (non) phenomenon
opening the way to Infinity, opening dialogue and language as the question of
responsibility, a question going well beyond the confines and the realm of
knowledge and understanding. Ethics as first philosophy is in the end nothing else
but this welcoming of the Other, an act of welcoming which precedes any
approach by the Other, any demand for hospitality. The relation with the Other is a
relation with Infinity, with something that cannot be contained, that therefore does
not return to Totality (this, as Derrida says, is always a finite totality), a relation
where the I can finally surrender.
In order to reach these conclusions Levinas not only turns to Heidegger when
arguing against Husserl, as it has been seen, but often turns to Martin Buber –
someone who lies at the very border of the philosophical tradition – in order to find
notions such as ‘relation’ and ‘meeting’. ‘In the beginning is relation’75 says Buber.
In this statement one finds a decisive orientation, a way to access Levinas. As
Levinas puts it:
the discovery of that order (the ethical relation) in its full originality and the
elaboration of its consequences, and, if one may designate them this, its
‘categories’, remain inseparable from the name Buber, whatever may have
been the concordant voices in the midst of which his own made itself heard76
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In associating his name to that of Buber, Levinas is not just referring to a
tradition, that of Jewish mysticism and of Jewish thinking in general: he is also
delineating a pathway following which one would from time to time find oneself
outside the philosophical tradition of the West. Anyone who has read Levinas has
perceived, in pages that are among some of his most inspired, the attempt he
constantly undertakes to breach the history of Western philosophy, operating an
opening that would allow him to find a way out without leaving that tradition
completely. Staying within it, without fully living it. Buber seems to offer Levinas
this very possibility. In I and Thou there are very few references to the ‘tradition’,
apart from a couple of winks to Kant and a final ironic rephrasing of Spinoza. Most
of the book speaks on a different register, one that recalls certain proceeding of
negative theology and mysticism. Surely a particular Jewish tradition plays a great
role  there, but , through the consideration paid to ‘primitive’ cultures or nature
peoples – Zulu, Fuegian, Kaffir, Native Americans all make their appearance there
– Buber also seems to advance towards the terrain of cultural anthropology.
Mysterious powers and the magical emerge quite frequently in Buber’s major text,
much more often than the tradition of the Reason, if one can so name that curve
that stretches from the Greek up to contemporary thought. Buber seems to resort to
a different background, to traditions of the otherwise, in order to resolve something
he thinks cannot be found in ‘our’ authors. Even when he turns to Christianity he is
most likely to turn to the Christ of Eckhart, then to Augustinian or Aquinian
theology. Towards the end of the volume, for instance, while discussing union and
duality, nowhere does Buber to the Parmenides; instead he resolves the aporia by
turning to the story of Indra and Prajapati from the Upanishads. Although Levinas
almost never dares pushing his set of references too far from the Western tradition,
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this element nevertheless definitely attracts him to Buber. It should be noted that
the calling fore of primitive cultures and of Eastern philosophy is not only a formal
adventure; rather, it  constitutes a core aspect of Buber’s proceeding.
Having said that, it is not simply this leap outside philosophy, or at least
philosophy as the established corpus of Western thinking, that draws the two close:
there is something more seductive in Buber that catches Levinas’ attention. This
could be said to be already evident in the title of Buber’s work: I and Thou.
Without attempting to degrade Levinas’ originality, the present argument  will try
to uncover Levinas’ refusal of the notion of Mitsein by underlining the influence of
Buber’s conception of relation, the primary importance of relation as meeting, in
the form of an I uttering a Thou.
The privilege Levinas accords to the one-to-one encounter will emerge better if
read in light of Buber’s thinking. This privilege is not without consequences and
can be seen at work in every Levinasian reformulation of his ‘big idea’. Whether
he tries to express the encounter with the Other, to formulate the concept of Illeity,
to express the surfacing of Justice, or to argue with regard to the State, Levinas
seems to always bear in mind, or start from, a one-to-one situation. The same fact
that he uses the Face as the concept that unleashes the ‘power’ of avoiding the
return to the same could be intended as a telling sign of the fact that facing,
whether one takes it as a shock, a breach, the exposure of gentleness, or the
condition of responsibility prior to decisions, constitutes the situation par
excellence, excluding all others, or including, which is to say submitting, all others
to it.
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Levinas finds in Buber a model that  allows him to both reformulate the
Husserlian subject-object relation without having to, as in Theory of Intuition, turn
to Heidegger and to start freeing the Other from the Same, Totality. Very much
like Buber, Levinas will structure his thesis around the bursting forth of a meeting,
the encounter with the Other as ungraspable. Moreover, as in Buber, one finds in
Levinas’ thinking the motif of language as holding primarily onto a dialogical
nature, thus always being readable in the form of the address, a sending to the
other human being.
In particular with regard to the first point – the subject/object relation – Buber
distinguishes himself since he posits the I-It relation in a different realm from the
dialogical relation I-Thou. While for Heidegger Dasein is always caught in the
understanding of the Being that is at stake for it, whether it encounters things
ready-at-hand or it is solicited to and by other human beings, for  Buber the two
spheres, the world of things and other human beings, other ‘Thous’ in his lexicon,
do not cross. Analytically they have an independent life.
Buber opens his work with these words:
To man the world is twofold, in accordance with his twofold attitude. The
attitude of man is twofold, in accordance with the twofold nature of the
primary words which he speaks […] The one primary word is the
combination I-Thou. The other primary word is the combination I-It […]
Hence the I of man is also twofold77
Therefore he can immediately distinguish the appraisal of things from dialogue,
the meeting with a partner or a friend, the turning towards the unknown neighbor.
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One shouldn’t however be too quick in saying the ‘appraisal of things’, for Buber
maintains that even when one addresses things, the It, one is still addressing an
interlocutor, one is nonetheless in the midst of dialogue. The response one gets
from the It is surely different from the one received when the Thou is uttered, but it
still has to be conceived as a response. Buber places this realm at the threshold of
mutuality and describes the intercourse one has with it in this way:
It is part of our concept of a plant that it cannot react to our action towards it:
it cannot ‘respond’. Yet this does not mean that here we are given simply no
reciprocity at all […] In the sphere we are talking of, we have to do justice, in
complete candour, to the reality which discloses itself to us78
It is important then to underline what Buber makes clear in the very first pages
of his text, that even the It is primarily the calling forth of a relation: rather than
simply facing objects, an I calls them forth, insisting not on their presence, but on
the relation that can be established with them. It is from within this relation and as
this relation that a world of It, a world of things, exists. Its existence springs from
dialogue, from an interrogation. Objects would not just be inexistent without this
call being put through: in addition there wouldn’t be an I without the relation I-It.
The constitution of the I is always bound to the uttering of a composite mode, it is
always then to be found in the midst of a relation. The existence of subjectivity as
such, the I alone, is considered to be impossible. Prior to dialogue the subject has,
as it were, nothing to say.
This conception – speech as dialogue and dialogue as the opening up of
relations constituting a meaningful plane – is displayed in a more radical way
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when Buber comes to describe the relation with other human beings. This point is
the one that Levinas finds dearest and also the point where he finds an entire
register with which to address the question of otherness. Buber says: ‘if I face a
human being as my Thou, and say the primary word I-Thou to him, he is not a
thing among things, and does not consist of things’79. To say that the other human
being escapes the direct grasp of things amounts at saying that I am not in relation
with a set of quality, but primarily with a response that comes directly to me and to
no one else, a response that follows my addressing one and a single man. Every
utterance of the Thou singles out an other Thou, who is immediately also an I
readdressing me in the same way. It is therefore impossible to encounter another
human being without addressing him as a whole, as part of a dialogue in which I
will never stop having to respond, having to also question myself as a Thou, for his
speech will always already have addressed me as this Thou. I can try, Buber goes
on, to exclude some quality of the human being I am facing, but in doing this/so I
am already losing him, not losing control over him, which I don’t hold anyway, but
losing the relation, losing the only possibility I have of approaching. As such,
every time I attempt to draw something particular, a quality, out of a Thou, I am
already stepping outside, Thou flies out of my reach. Therefore – now one starts to
see the relevance this could have for Levinas – there is no experience of a Thou:
experience is a mode that is not given in my relation with the other man. This
relation will always be commanded by his light, nothing else exists if not through
the light cast forth by our dialogue, by our unending calling and responding, at
every time reversed, since when he responds to me I cease being an I and become a
Thou. In Buber’s words: ‘I do not experience the man to whom I say Thou. But I
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take my stand in relation to him, in the sanctity of the primary word. Only when I
step out of it do I experience him once more. In the act of experience Thou is far
away’80.
The same concern is expressed few lines afterwards in a dialogical fashion:
- What, then, do we experience of Thou?
- Just nothing. For we do not experience it.
- What then do we know of Thou?
- Just everything. For we know nothing isolated about it any more81.
Not just experience is ruled out of the encounter with the other human being,
but also seeking, looking for, any intentionality that aims to draw the Thou close,
that would bring him within my sphere, subject to manipulation. It is certainly
through an act that I address the Thou, but this act is not an act of my will, one
actions among others: rather it  has something of the unknown, an unconditioned
reflex, an impulse I follow with my whole being; my very being is completely
engaged in a leap towards the Other. This is what gives to Buber’s notion of the
meeting its force; it holds the traits of a drive, urgent, compelling, undeniable.
While reading Buber one sometimes has the impression that his understanding
of the meeting follows the logic of the passion, the swinging between excess and
passivity, that which, as Kierkegaard has it, ‘opposes itself to learning’. In fact, if
one lends an ear to Kierkegaard for one more minute one can heed this echoing in
both Buber and Levinas: ‘To this end passion is necessary. Every movement of
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infinity comes about by passion, and no reflection can bring a movement about’82.
No agency, no subjectivity, meet the requirements. No idea of I, no self-
consciousness or extrapolation suffices to account for the encounter with another
human being: the vanishing point of this relation terminates right at the feet of
infinity. ‘Only when every means has collapsed does the meeting come about’83
says Buber.
Buber translates passion in the fashion of a refusal of any sort of objectivity or
abstraction; his philosophy is very much bent towards life, the living man. ‘You
and me’, ‘real living’, ‘actual man’, ‘our life’ are recurrent formulas, stock phrases
that Buber employs to inscribe at least the first section of his volume in a sort of
concreteness, which rids itself of the world of ideas, postulates and possibly tries to
detach itself from a more general attitude of philosophy, that of neglecting the
‘province of the lived’.
While this is the lexicon employed, one shouldn’t be mislead and consider
Buber a thinker of accidents; the I-Thou relation should be thought, as Derrida puts
it, prior to its eventual modifications.
What is relevant here is that Buber adopts a language that aims at real life, very
much as Levinas will do later on in his descriptions of enjoyment, need, happiness
and the elements. In doing so Buber refuses, or at least attempts to, what he names
objective speech, that register that ‘snatches only at a fringe of real life’84.
Objective speech aptly expresses only ‘shadowy solicitude for faceless numbers’,
without thus taking the meeting into account and foreclosing the way to God and
the infinite.
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This brief detour on Martin Buber’s philosophy was intended to provide an
entrance into Levinas’ reformulation of some unending questions within
continental thought. If one were to draw a Levinasian genealogy, one would find
Buber on the opposite side of Heidegger and Husserl, the other two crucial
influences. He provides Levinas with a mean with which to hold the tradition in
reserve, without having to dismiss it completely. Buber’s reflection is tangential to,
but does not properly confront the masters of, Western thought; one should
therefore not be surprised by the fact that Buber does not set himself to contest or
argue against that tradition, that this kind of analytical effort is completely absent
from I and Thou. Nevertheless, or properly because of this, Buber addresses
questions in a way that Levinas finds inspiring in his attempt to redefine some of
the structural questions of continental thought.
At the analytical level the proximity between the two thinkers could be said to
revolve around two core points, from which many others spring:
- the subject-object relation: Buber understands it in terms of a bursting forth –
his preferred expression is meeting – in which a degree of reciprocality is
always possible. Although Levinas will then distance himself from Buber by
the adding the crucial concept of asymmetry to the meeting, in this he is still
closer to Buber than to Husserl or Heidegger;
- language: the primary dimension of language is not the naming of things or
the expression of Being, but the triggering of relations; the relational tone of
language, therefore the primacy of the dialogical mode, structured around few
primal words (Grundwort) allows man to meet the world and the Thou, as an I
that utters the relation. Although here one should keep in mind that the
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Levinas of Otherwise than Being introduces the distinction Saying/Said85,
which finds no place in Buber.
From this two points one could draw a series of secondary ones: in order to
express a different subject-object relation, Buber adopts a different lexicon, a lived
lexicon if one could dare using this formula, one that relies much more on
‘concrete situations’ than on references to the authors and masters of the tradition
of reason. In such a relational system, the notion of meeting becomes crucial. The
way Buber structures it will flow into Levinas’ formulation of the encounter with
Other as a step towards Infinity.
While Levinas says that Infinity is that which overwhelms what tries to contain
it, Buber elaborates the meeting as:
- that which happens outside the sphere of experience: ‘Only when every means
has collapsed does the meeting come about’;
- that which – in relation to the Thou – belongs to no space and no time, but will
unleash itself as the uncontained: ‘The world of Thou is not set in the context
of either of these (space and time)’;
- that which sets forth the world as destiny and man as free man, free in that he
is in need (and awaiting) of this destiny: ‘he intervenes no more, but at the
same time he does not let things merely happen. He listens to the course of
being in the world […] in order to be brought […] I said he believes, but that
really means he meets’.
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What is most important for the present argument though is to understand the
meeting as a device that liberates the I-Thou relation, what John Llewelyn puts in
terms of Levinas endorsement of ‘Buber’s insistence that it is an evasion of
responsibility to turn the I-Thou relation into a conscious experience of sociality
[…] that relation is dialogue, where dialogue is not to be conceived
metaphorically’86.
Although Levinas will argue against Buber that his characterization of the I-
Thou as mutual, reciprocal and symmetrical does not allow him to enter the
properly ethical field, the mode of relation ‘discovered’ by Buber allows Levinas
to move, to an extent at least, beyond Being-with.
Between Buber and Levinas there are nonetheless consistent differences. For
Levinas what triggers the relation with the Other is not as much my uttering a
Thou, although this dialogical irruption constitutes an important moment, as my
responsibility for him, which does not need to be triggered by any particular event;
rather, it  lies always there, before any encounter, before experience and before any
actual, concrete, eventual call. As such I am responsible anyway, no matter what
my position with regard to the Other is and regardless of the way in which the
Other depicts me. Levinas often refers to Dostoyevsky in order to elucidate this
more clearly: “We are all guilty of everything and everyone, towards everyone,
and I more so than all the others. The superlative degree of guilt does not refer to
any personal history”87. Thus from this one can already envision that the relation to
the other cannot reside in reciprocity and symmetry. Quite the opposite, it rests on
the original difference ‘neither mediate nor immediate’ that proceeds by a-
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symmetrical confrontations. This might sound surprising given that the privileged
mode of this relationship is the face-to-face (one-to-one), but it is exactly because
the face-to-face is played out within a situation that never manages to include itself
– I can never really see the face I am confronting – that Levinas can name this
relation as the ethical itself. While in Buber a Thou called is always an I calling
another Thou, thus establishing an intimate reciprocity, Levinas founds his thought
exactly on the overcoming of reciprocity, what he terms ‘the dissymmetry of inter-
subjective space’88.
The main difference then lies in the stress Levinas puts on the ethical, as a term
and as the primal term. In particular the word responsibility is to me what draws a
line between the two. In Levinas’ words: ‘In my own analyses, the approach to
others is not originally in my speaking out to the other, but in my responsibility for
him or her. That is the original ethical relation’89
Buber does not exactly have this, his meeting does not speak of responsibility
for the other man in the same way Levinas does. It seems like Buber stops a
moment before, and instead he  turns his eyes towards God and the relationship
with the world. In Buber the same term ethics is almost absent: his philosophy is
more inclined toward  opening a breach to reach the other, before the question of
responsibility and decision might come in.
Despite the abovementioned differences, Levinas’ face to face is still very close
to the I-Thou relation at least in the contempt he feels towards neutrality. The face
to face is still structured as an intimate relationship, for Levinas seems to use it in
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order not to have to turn to Being-with. Although Levinas, it will be discussed later
on, at some point introduces the third term, he nevertheless remains rather faithful
to the one-to-one relationship as the primal mode of every access to the other.
Levinas never really rids himself of a privilege for intimacy, although it is an
intimacy that tends not to exclude the third one, the other Other, but to bring him
in.
While arguing against Buber Levinas is much closer to him than he would like
to consider himself to be: in his attempt not to give into Being-with, he goes back
to the pair, the couple, though this time to an open couple. The couple is Buber’s
domain, it has been Buber who established it, as Levinas is ready to admit.
Now, having seen the privilege Levinas, though somehow reluctantly, has to
accord to the couple – then to Buber – one can turn to see where the contempt for
the proposition ‘with’, this tiny crucial word, comes from.
It is largely a reversing of terms one has to operate here. It is a reversal that
motivates Levinas since the beginning: ‘Being before the existent […] is freedom
before justice […] The terms must be reversed’90.
Contrary to what one might think one does not find in Levinas’ texts many
references to the Heideggerian ‘with’, nor to Being-with or Being-with-each-other
(Miteinandersein) and in general very few explicit mentions of sections 26 and 27
of Being and Time.
It seems as if Levinas’ intention is then that of reversing the terms of the
question: the face to face would be more original than the with, for the with would
still be referable to an understanding of sociality where the former could be in the
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end communicated as a unity. In this view individuals would be aggregates
undertaking an always latent process of fusion. As Michael Lewis writes,
‘Levinas’ criticism is first of all stirred precisely by its subordination of the
relation between self and other to a relation that is named ‘being-with’ and which
by invoking ‘being’ neutralizes the asymmetry of a relation that can be accessed
only from within that relation itself. Any view from the outside betrays the
relation’91.
Levinas’ concern for the exclusivity of the face to face, his privilege for
intimacy, pushes him to reduce the Mit to the cornerstone of a logic devoted to
master the crowds, directing their trajectories to a single-minded destiny and to
Truth. The reference to marching, the translation of being-with as marching-
together, is also present in more elaborate works. Levinas fears that by placing the
with as the primary mode of relation one would be then obliged to surrender to the
Same; being-with would then be being-within-the-same, an holistic ending Levinas
cannot accept.
Miteinandersein too remains the collectivity of the with, and is revealed in its
authentic form around the truth. It is a collectivity around something common.
Just as in all the philosophies of communion, sociality in Heidegger is found in
the subject alone; and it is in terms of solitude that the analysis of Dasein in its
authentic form is pursued92
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There is one fundamental misreading that appears to motivate Levinas’ refusal,
although this misreading contains elements that are possibly truly at stake, as
Being-with appears more and more as the unfulfilled promise of Heideggerian
analysis.
In Time and the Other Levinas writes:
It is the collectivity which says ‘us’, and which, turned toward the intelligible
sun, toward the truth, experience, the other at his side and not face to face
with him…Miteinandersein also remains the collectivity of the with, and its
authentic form is revealed around the truth […] we hope to show, for our
part, that it is not the preposition mit which must describe the original
relation with the other93.
As Derrida points out, Levinas is taking Being-with as a ‘derivative and
modified form of the originary relation with the other’94. While Heidegger
explicitly says that ‘this ‘with’ is something of the character of Dasein’, Levinas
appears to evoke what is an existential possibility under the traits of a
category95.
This has a number of consequences:
- It means to interpret Being-with as instrumental intersubjectivity, the plural
readiness-at-hand of actual individuals. As Heidegger says: ‘the kind of
Being which belongs to the Dasein of Others, as we encounter it within-
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the-world, differs from readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand’96. In this
way the Mit is reduced to an incident of solitary Da, and – as Lewis puts it
– ‘being-with is taken to be little more than a placatory appendix to a
description of what is ultimately a solipsistic ego’97.
- Levinas seems to underline an undifferentiated equality at the heart of
Being-with, overlooking the fact that the equality that makes co-existence
(Mit-dasein) possible rests on the being-open of entities to one-another.
This openness prevents the constitution of a pure subject (therefore also of
a pure sociality, which Levinas names philosophy of communion), to which
world and others would be added98. This is confirmed not just by
Heidegger’s statements throughout sections 26-27 that he does not intend to
start from an isolated ‘I’ or that the being-there-too (Auch-da-sein) is not a
simple Being-present-at-hand-along-with, but also by the fact that the with
constitutes a relational difference, where every and each Dasein discloses
the world as a with-world. While Levinas seems to highlight a kind of
constraining empathy, Heidegger explicitly refutes this. As King suggests,
‘another way to explain the non-categorical characteristic of Da-sein is to
compare Husserl’s view with Heidegger’s. Heidegger avoids founding his
solution on empathy (Einfuhlung), because it assumes that the other is a
‘double’ of oneself’99, while the access to the world others provide can be
understood just as absolute curiosity.
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- Levinas stresses Being-with as simply the realm of the They and thus takes
the They as the purely the negative moment of banality. As already
explained in the discussion devoted to being-in-the-world, the They,
although it constitutes the moment of indifference (Dasein does not
recognize its absorption), must also mean, in Nancy’s words, ‘the site of
disclosedness’100.
Although one can, as Nancy does, advance the critique that Heidegger’s
question of the with as co-existential to the Da basically leaves open just two
possibilities – a crowd with no proper names or a People forged around the
destiny of its Proper Name – nevertheless one should be careful not to step into
the mistake of taking Being-with for a category or draw conclusions from some
exemplary modes. What one would rather reproach Heidegger for – Jean-Luc
Nancy does this effectively – is that, although the German philosopher stresses
the cruciality of the question of the co-essentiality of Being-there and Being-
with, all the same he never really dwells on it. Being-with floats on the surface
of the analysis of Dasein while it never becomes as fundamental as, according
to Heidegger’s announcement, it should be.
Nancy points this out by saying:
In his analytic of Mitsein, Heidegger does not do this measure justice. On the
one hand, he deals with the indifference of an ‘uncircumspective tarrying
alongside’ and, on the other, an ‘authentic understanding of others’ […]
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Between this indifference and this understanding, the theme of existential
distantiality immediately reverts back to competition and domination101
This is the legacy one is left with, something that Heidegger does not attempt
to resolve even in his later writings. It seems like Levinas duplicates this
Heideggerian gesture: he claims to be attentive (and he proves to be in many
regards) to the Heideggerian reworking of the problem of existence, but when
approaching the big question – the Other – he quickly glances at the
Heideggerian articulation of the problem (Fürsorge is mentioned just a couple
of times in Totality and Infinity), but never really attempts to discuss it at
length.
What the few occurrences just underlined seem to show is that in general, by
taking Being-with as a category (not an existential possibility necessary to
Dasein, but an occasion of its world) Levinas can criticize the fact that by
calling into question Being in the compound expression Being-with Heidegger
describes a relation that refers constantly to an element outside of itself.
Brought into play in these terms Being would thus overshadow the
asymmetry necessary for the relation to be ethical (which means at this stage for
a concern for the Other to really emerge). The relation to the Other would then
be reduced or mediated by a relation to an overarching totality, which assumes
the Other as part of itself. If Being-with though is taken as an existential
possibility (necessary if one is to identify something as Dasein), then the Being
in the Heideggerian formula should be understood as a singularity not reducible
to the anonymous totality. From this it follows that the other that Being-with
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invokes is precisely the other whose otherness remains intact (as it remains
intact his possibility to disclose a meaningful world). As Lewis puts it ‘Being is
the uniqueness of a Being, the singularity of an entity before and beyond any
wider horizon of meaning which might subsume it and render it
comprehensible’102, which could be rephrased as the fact that the shared world,
the world-with as Heidegger has it, is always made available as the sense open
from a singular perspective. Therefore, even when Dasein is alone, even in
solitude, Being-with does not cease being its existential possibility; as King puts
it, ‘even when Da-sein thinks he does not need the others, when he withdraws
from them and has nothing to do with them, this is still only possible as a
privative mode of being-with’103; Dasein’s access to the world is always
guaranteed by an access with-others.
Also, once Levinas has turned Being-with into a category, his work ‘against’
ontology begins. One could read it already in the following passage:
From the start I repudiate the Heideggerian conception that views solitude in
the midst of a prior relationship with the other. […] the conception seems to
me ontologically obscure. The relationship with the Other is indeed posed by
Heidegger as an ontological structure of Dasein, but practically it plays no
role in the drama of being.104
Here Levinas is pointing out that Being-with remains nothing more than a
missed chance, since ‘it plays no role’. He is not going as far as to say that the
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notion forecloses access to alterity, but at this point it already seems to him
‘ontologically obscure’. From here on though Levinas’ formulation will become
sharper, meant to highlight not just an obscurity, but a real darkness at the heart of
Mitsein, a darkness that makes it impossible to retain the alterity of the Other:
Beginning with Plato the social ideal will be sought as an ideal of fusion. It
will be thought that, in its relationship with the other, the subject tends to be
identified with the other, by being swallowed up in a collective
representation, a common ideal. It is the collectivity that says we, that, turned
toward the intelligible sun, toward the truth, feels the other at its side and not
in front of itself105.
If one takes Being-with as a categorical, then one naturally finds oneself to
argue on something Heidegger never says, namely Being-with defines purely the
human being as a social animal. Being-with should instead be taken as that which
exposes a logic of separation rather than companionship, differentiation rather than
fusion.
Nancy shows this dynamics, completely opposite to the one Levinas seems to
detect: ‘we do not have to identify ourselves as “we” […] we have to disidentify
ourselves from every sort of “we” that would be the subject of its own
representation’106. If one formalizes Being-with in the way Levinas seems to do
(zusammen-marschieren), one entangles Being-with in significations that are, if
not foreign, at least posterior and eventual and that tend to reduce Being-with to
the truism ‘man is social’.
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It is easier to read Being-with as applying to Dasein in a second stage.
Understood in this way, there would be no need at all for Being-with, but maybe
there wouldn’t be any need at all for Dasein either. Heidegger probably wouldn’t
be ‘the greatest philosopher of the century’ if he had just restated some kind of
dialectic that philosophy had been aware of for quite a while.
Levinas himself explains this when, simplifying for the sake of an introductory
work, he says that Heidegger’s effort is diametrically opposed to that of dialectical
philosophy, which far from seeking the ontological foundation of knowledge is
concerned with the logical principles of Being. Therefore there must be something
other than the simple discussion of the with proceeding from an I and a world and
following those two constitutive terms. All attempts to thematize the ‘with’ in
‘Being-with’ simply take one of its occasions – ‘being-next-to’, ‘marching
together’ – and make of that the exact definition. In the word ‘exact’ one should
hear the force of the ex, before it assumes the idea of method, of a thoroughly
examining. Ex-agere, the pulling out of something: the action of isolating and
bringing something out. This is what exact means in this case: the interpretation
isolates one aspect of Being-with and uses it to cover the word itself.
The question then that should be reopened at this stage is: what does it mean to
say that Being-with is an existential and not a categorical and what does it thus
mean to co-exist?
One can try first advancing two negative arguments, namely by indicating what
co-existing is not. On the one hand, co-existing cannot simply be the co-
appearance of a series of entities alongside each other. A chain of human beings,
slaves chained and sold at the market, does not make co-existence (and not even
co-appearance). On the other hand being-with cannot be a universal destination,
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the common ground on which to build the People. This second connotation would
in fact lead to the violence Levinas warns us against.
What one has to try and revert to is something different: it is the logic of the
with thought immediately alongside Being, something that would go beyond
ontology if ontology stops at the thinking of Being (thus excluding the co-
extensive with) or that would change ontology (by pushing it to a place it has not
yet been able to occupy, namely taking the with acutely, as Being’s most intimate
problem).
What needs to be thought if one still wants to try taking Being-with seriously is
an originary with, knowing though that one cannot get back to this origin, for ‘the
with is strictly contemporaneous with all existence, as it is with all thinking’107.
What the Mit in Mitsein invites one to think of is the exposure of our being-
many; that is to say plurality as such, which does not mean plurality disentangled
from the one. The two terms have now to take a new undertone. In the word
plurality one should now hear the plurality of existence, and in the word one, the
one-to-every-other, simultaneously many and each one. Alterity, in its inner
structure, is made possible by the way the many confronts the singular always as
an each-one, never simply as crowd; each one even when alongside and not in
front of each other. There is though nothing fortuitous here: this register of
positions, simultaneity and being-alongside, does not fall back into the crowd and
so it is employed to address the configuration of Being-with as that which
establishes a being-together founded on separation. Being-with makes separation
possible: ‘together only if separated’, as Blanchot puts it108.
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The concept of distance used to describe Cassavetes’s work becomes
particularly relevant here. Being-with exposes this contrapuntal logic whereby the
singular is called an ‘each-one’ each time it exposes itself to the many. In this
process the ‘each-one’ is not constructed (then destructed by society), rather it is
exposed to its own being-social, it finds itself as the singular as long as plural.
Again, this is not the old fashioned constructivist formula, by way of which the
individual understands how to behave in society; quite the opposite, the singular
apprehends nothing and loses nothing, it simply happens to be among others, and
this happening is the very essence of its existence. In discussing the work of
Cassavetes, Deleuze for example points out that: ‘linkages, connections, or liaisons
are deliberately weak […] sometimes the event delays and is lost in idles periods,
sometimes it is there too quickly but it does not belong to the one to whom it
happens’. A bit further Deleuze also says that: ‘the characters can act, perceive,
experience, but they cannot testify to the relations which determine them’109.
 The close-up identifies in order to let the identified singular play with the
plurality that its identification exposes. Identifying the singular in this case would
be also and at the same time opening up, gaining access to the plurality. Cassavetes
makes clear that the regime of identification is inseparable from a regime of
distancing, of even minimal spacing, sharing and circulation. The movement in the
close-up is not directed from one to many, but passes both types and rests in this
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passing and therefore never really rests on anything. It takes place between us,
between the each-one and the many.
The attention paid in every close-up to the singular and the repetition of this
gesture for other singulars, without ever letting one be the only One, are not just
cinematic gestures responding to an attempt to achieve a choral composition. They
don’t simply aim at establishing a common ground. They rather are an attempt to
reach the eventual trait of our being-together. Being-together: explosion of
singularities exposing each in its own way an access to the plurality they also are.
By using the close-up in a contrapuntal way, by cutting several close-ups one
next to the other, Cassavetes (dis)organizes the composition: the close-up makes
sure that the sociality, the being-there-together, is purely happening and is
sustained only by the fact that it is happening (the communality of the social
situation is sustained not by the choral fellowship of the many, but by the displaced
appearances of each one). Sociality is not reduced but exploded in these situations,
exploded because what makes it solid, what prevents it from dissolving all of a
sudden, is that everyone poses a distance which can’t be reduced if not in view of a
betrayal of sociality itself. Many authors have identified a sense of ‘destruction’ at
work in Cassavetes’ images. Kouvaros speaks of ‘a tension between composition
and annihilation at work in the very construction of the image’ and of a filming
technique that tends to ‘to eat away the characters, showering them in too much
light or losing them in a deliberate underexposure’110. Jousse puts it in terms of
elusiveness when he says that ‘the aim of Cassavetes’s cinema is to show the
streams which surround a person, a constantly moving rhythm between beings and
                                                
110 George Kouvaros, Where does it happen? John Cassavetes and cinema at the breaking point
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 149
264
things which is beyond the self, elusive’111. As already noted, Deleuze often insists
on this point. With particular reference to The Killing of a Chinese Bookie and
Gloria he argues that locations can abruptly change coordinates as empty spaces
can be filled all of a sudden, creating the effect of an ‘event which exceeds its
actualization in all ways’112.
Sociality in Cassavetes – and all his films are in this way utterly ‘social’ – never
rests on an obligation, a principle: it always takes an adverbial form. Contrapuntal
means exactly this: that the simultaneity is not simply an appearing of subjects, but
the appearing of distinct subjects, whose appearing together is for them neither the
reception of an extrinsic property – an accident – nor the giving of intimacy – the
unleashing of an a priori. Contrapuntal is the distance of one from the other when
those ones are together. This is barely presentable, if not as the time it takes from
one cut to the next, from one close-up to the next, the non-consequential
appearance of one face after after another.
Not presentable because it cannot be reduced to one single vision, this is what
makes the with appear and withdraw at the same time. To some extent one could
say that those are not images, or barely so, if the image is what detaches itself
completely and lies in a temporary isolation; those images never completely
disentangle themselves from the multiplicity of other images. The process of
extraction that the image necessarily propels is not completely accomplished. This
is why someone can speak of Cassavetes’ films as having an alcoholic form113:
filming is never simply the attempt to render a narrative or a silent act of
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witnessing, rather the camera flings the mundanities of day-to-day life towards a
constant crisis whereby we are no longer sure how things come together or what
the proper order of things is; the everyday is taken as a portion of eternity.
Characters appear, become solid, as long as they always have the possibility to
revert their presence into an absence, into circulation. The fact that those films tend
to be long and almost exhausting for the viewer, the fact that the action is followed
always almost in real time, spanning across a short period of time, a matter of days
or even hours, depends on the fact that there’s no need for any reference external to
the film itself. The realism of Cassavetes’ films lies in the fact that they avoid
resemblance, they resist it; likeness can’t affirm itself because the film does not
institute a relation with something beyond itself. Rather than delivering the film to
the real, the film sucks the real in. Things are left without ‘the time to corrupt
themselves nor the origin to find themselves’114. Realism is here not an attempt to
reproduce a status quo or to draw the image close to it; the real should be taken as
Blanchot does: ‘that with which our relationship is always alive and which always
leaves us the initiative, addressing that power we have to begin, that free
communication with the beginning that is ourselves’115. The birth of the film has no
other resource than what is happening in front of our eyes, and what is happening
is the impossibility of a presence that is not also making itself present and is
therefore always on the verge of becoming the instinctual flow of time. Cassavetes
seems to say: we are always there, but this is given not as a condition or
agreement, but as the affirmation of something that lives just as this affirmation. In
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a paradoxical formula what those films say is: there’s no reason for being-here-
together, therefore we are-here-together.
If plurality is then not a mere multiplicity and the one is not the only one –
subject, Man – then what in fact needs to be thought is a different exposition of
Being, a reversal of the philosophical priority. Not Being and then its correlations,
but Being as correlation, exposing a logic that in one stroke names both ‘together’
and ‘singularly’.
One immediately hears at this point the objection of all Levinasian scholars, for
whom Being would already mean the finite totality, which forecloses access to the
Other.
This position can nevertheless be challenged. To the Levinasian objection that
the unity of ontology addresses a finite totality precluding access to the Other,
grasping the Other in order to betray him, Nancy replies that in fact the unity of
ontology must be taken as the distancing, the in-between of its singular-plural
articulations. The apparent encompassing totality of Being is here dispossessed of
its powers, since Being becomes simultaneity, simultaneously singular and plural,
which means also with itself, without ever recovering itself: ‘Being does not
coincide with itself unless this coincidence immediately and essentially marks
itself out according to the costructure of its occurrence’116.
Where Levinas affirms that the recurrence to Being is a threat posed to alterity,
Nancy affirms that alterity lies at the heart of Being. In a footnote to Being
Singular Plural Nancy in fact writes that: ‘in a sense Levinas testifies to this
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problematic in an exemplary manner, but what he understands as ‘otherwise than
Being’, is a matter of understanding as the ‘most proper of Being’117.
It is hazardous to simply translate the lexicon from one thinker to the other. This
operation is the one that Blanchot attempts in the Unavowable Community, where
he criticizes Nancy’s reworking of the concept of community by rephrasing
Nancy’s line of reason in Levinas’ terms, so that ‘Nancy’s skepticism towards
Levinas is discreetly rebuffed by Blanchot’s infinite skepticism towards Nancy’118.
This kind of translation always runs the risk of betraying as it were the letter of the
texts, by plunging the text into a context the text is not necessarily ready to respond
to. An alternative strategy, the one attempted here, could be of letting the two
arguments run somehow separately, paying attention to the differences – and even
in some case to the incommensurability – of the two registers.
Nancy’s argument can be reconstructed in this way: if one is to reread the
Heideggerian Being-with, the problem of otherness cannot be posed simply with
regard to the Other as the Other concrete human being, the problem must be posed
at the heart of Being itself, concluding that Being is Other, by being with itself.
This configuration presents itself as even more originary than the ontological
difference, or better the ontological difference at this point becomes the question of
the with: difference between Being and Being.
If the critique Levinas moves to philosophy – to always and only conceive the
Same, perennially returning to itself – is grounded on the understanding of Being
as the One, that whose horizon is its own unity, then it seems that any mention of
Being would return philosophy to a standstill. The languishing position in which
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philosophy rests is an inaptness to detach its sight from the splendor of the system,
questioning Being as solid. Being as an indeterminate and abstract predicate,
‘seeking to cover the totality of existents in its extreme universality’119. Thinking
Being would then always mean to think the Other as a category of Being itself.
Levinas addresses this comment to philosophy in general, but he has Heidegger in
particular in mind. It is though from within Heidegger that perhaps the criticism
could be probed. If the critique rests on the fact that Being reduces the Other, then
learning to think Being as the other (and not the Other than Being) could reverse
the terms: not the Other in being, but being-as-other. Being-as-other means
understanding the plurality at the heart of Being itself, the impossibility on Being’s
side to recover itself, or opening the possibility to understand the solidity of being
(being-one) starting from being-with-one-another. If Being is not solid, neither a
state nor a quality, but graspable only in the action of being with, then the
Levinasian critique loses much of its force. As Nancy points out in a text on love –
one of the few explicit debates with Levinas’ thought – ‘There is the ‘each time’ of
an existing, singular occurrence. There is no existing without existents, and there is
no ‘existing’ by itself’120. What Nancy is pointing out once more is Levinas’
misunderstanding of the Heideggerian emphasis on Being as the thinking of a
generality. The Being at stake is rather a Being that is both multiplied and singular,
‘hard and cut across’. Being-with – co-essential and constitutive of Being – takes
place as the cutting across of a singular occurrence.
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Saying not just that being is an unnecessary term, but that, understood in this
fashion, existents are again simply juxtaposed, could allow for one further
reproach. The critique would repeat the one brought by Levinas against Heidegger:
side by side instead of face to face; alongside and not in front of. Nancy replies
that ‘our being-with, as a being-many, is not at all accidental, and it is in no way
the secondary and random dispersion of a primordial essence. It forms the proper
and necessary status and consistency of originary alterity as such’121. The
proximity or togetherness offered by Being-with is thus one that always takes itself
as a problem. In Nancy’s intention co-existence should be not as much the side-by-
side or the taking others into account as the fact that we constantly, on an everyday
basis, do not accept juxtaposition and that we open the sense of our being-together,
reopening in this way sense at large.
From what has been said one could easily already envisage a critique to the
capitalization of the word Other. If otherness is understood as an originary
situation, attached to the question of the world, made patent primarily in the
unleashing and circulation of sense (without otherness there wouldn’t be sense),
neither missable nor appropriable, then a ‘great Other’ would here be misleading.
The mode of Being-with requires an access to the originary other that considers no
appropriation and no loss; it has nothing to do with these two terms. It is composed
in a logic that accepts only the exposition of others as always already coming. On
the other side/hand the great Other demands a making, a welcoming that is in the
end still a construction, which is the sight turned towards an eternity. The Other
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becomes a fixed eternity, ‘the exalted and overexalted mode of the propriety of
what is proper’122.
Having analyzed these differences one might be surprised to find Levinas – in
the end of his notes on Buber - saying that ‘the Da of Dasein is already an ethical
problem’123.
From here, from this brief statement, almost an abandoned note, one seems to
see a ‘poros’, a way out of the aporia. If the Da of Dasein is ethical, this is because
the Da of Dasein is always already a Mit-da, a there-with.
Although in fact Levinas is here pointing out the fact the fact that by occupying
a ‘there’ I am already necessarily depriving someone else of his place, one could
try and read this as something different: the Da of Dasein is an ethical problem
because my being there always already implies the opening of and towards an
other there. The consequence of this opening, this necessary displacement from
my own Da – displacement which is also access to my there, to the possibility
itself of occupying – is something we, regardless of the position we occupy, all
have in common. The fact of being there is that which we have in common: the
ethical stature of this statement is what Heidegger has left un-thought and what
Levinas himself has tried to overcome without really stepping into it, apart maybe
by way of this claim, almost a leftover.
On one side the neglected message, left on the page of a text called ‘Notes on
Martin Buber’, appears then in a dialogue where Heidegger should find no place.
Buber never properly engages with Heidegger, despite the fact that one could find
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disseminated here and there various assaults to the instrumental apprehension of
things ready-at-hand. Even so, Levinas concludes his notes with this reference, as
if after having walked all the distance hand in hand with Buber, he still has
Heidegger, or an overcoming of him, a beyond Heidegger, in mind. As if the call
for the meaning of Being were, despite great efforts, still there, still calling, still
demanding to be heard.
That the ‘Da of Dasein is an ethical problem’ might suggest that the ‘having to
be’ Heidegger indicates as the task of Dasein should be understood as a ‘having-to-
be-with-others’. Having to be then might mean not only understanding the
meaning of Being, rather to justify one’s own being-with, understanding this being
with, not starting with one’s own position, but moving from the fact that this
position is a dis-position with regard to another Da. Therefore the ethical
dimension of Da, and also its understanding, any form of understanding, even one
beyond knowledge and theory, would start from the with, not as companionship
this time, the light of solidarity shining on the darkness of the thrown subject, but
as the irreducibility of being-there-with to the simple being-there. Mit/with/cum
here are not thus just little mysterious words, they instruct us on what has to be
justified, they draw the trajectory and sustain the momentum of this justification.
The ethical standing of Da as mit-da could be prepared in this way: on the one
hand one receives the impossibility to jump back (though this back shouldn’t
suggest the idea of a return, rather of a defense) into one’s own Da, without finding
this Da already displaced. On the other, the access to other Das is an always, but
not yet, a reinvention of positions one can never take for granted.
What mit/with/cum impose to justify – a word that here bears the connotation of
understanding, as when one says: to justify an argument – is this logic of an
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irresolvable togetherness whose ethical dimension rests on inaccessibility.
Irresolvable because, as already said, one can’t possibly imagine a way out, into
absolute properness (even a limit concept as that of solitude would in fact invoke
the very heart of the with and its logic; Heidegger: ‘Only can be lonesome, he who
is not alone’), and inaccessible because accessible only as the eventual form of a
displacement.
This is only an anticipation of the conclusions; nonetheless, this discourse
seems to be what allows Nancy to say that the ‘ontological disposes what the
ethical exposes’124.
The Heideggerian invitation expressed in the Letter on Humanism, ‘think about
the essence of action’125, very much lays down the guidelines here.
Challenging the well-known criticism that Heidegger does not have a position
with regard to ethics, Nancy attempts to read Heidegger’s thinking itself as a
‘fundamental ethics’126. The work titled Originary Ethics  is devoted to this task.
Many of the motifs presented in this work are in fact recurrent themes in Nancy’s
reformulation of concepts such as world, sense and with.
Fundamental ethics will not lay down a body of principles, nor specify a
particular conduct-- it is an ethics without archetypes and without even the
possibility of man to identify completely in his polis. An originary ethics instead
responds to the demand of philosophy to think of the essence of action as action of
sense. Therefore the ethical interest here will not be merely theoretical or
speculative. The question of an ethics should then be posed starting from the
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particular engagement with existence that is Dasein’s stake and responsibility.
Dasein’s comportment is that of being essentially preoccupied with existence,
therefore with an opening of sense. The accomplishment of this opening has to be
necessarily deferred, an ultimate opening meaning also an immediate closure. This
is, Nancy says, what the finitude of Dasein, on which a fundamental ethics must
rest, calls us to think: ‘unaccomplishment as the condition for the accomplishment
of action as sense’127.
 This means that such an ethics does not rest on or produce values or ideals,
does not as it were refer to an above or a beyond: it announces rather the making
sense of existence, the taking up – hic et nunc – of existence as the rigorous call to
explore possibilities for making sense. Existence, conduct of sense, is both the
moment of inscription of this ethics and its putting back into question. One could
try a provisional conclusion: to position the possibility of such an ethics, one
should pay attention to the fact that Dasein is at any time that which engages with
its own existence, this engagement signaling already an absolute responsibility
towards making sense. Given that the making in making sense is always a matter
of primarily opening the circulation of sense (meaning a co-existence that does not
rest or present an already given evaluation of sense), this leads us to the problem of
being-with and of responsibility towards others. In this way the being-with gives
the measure of the measureless opening of sense. If it is true that no ethics can
exist without measure, the measure of fundamental ethics is this absolute
responsibility to the everyday experience of being-with. Contrary  to Levinas,
there’s no altruism here, unless altruism is taken to mean an an-archic intrusion of
the other in everything that has to do with the opening of sense. As Nancy puts it
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‘the other is going to be essential to opening, which is essential to sense, which is
what is essential in the action that makes up the essence of being’128.  The approach
then to the humanity of the other human being (this expression inevitably recalls
Levinas’ work on the humanism of the other’) will be directed always against and
towards the excess that any definition of man produces. To put it differently: what
needs to be answered about the humanity of the other man lies in the impossibility
to respond exactly to the question. As Lewis puts it there is almost an equation in
Heidegger’s work between thinking and ethics, and Nancy himself seems to
respect this: ‘what counts as ‘thinking’ is anything which does not remain
oblivious to the void or simply, as Levinas might say, to the excess of the totality,
‘infinity’. Questioning is precisely to institute a ‘ontological difference’ in the
totality’129. When Nancy argues that ‘saying ‘man’ will always mean letting
ourselves be conducted by the experience of a question that is already experienced
as being beyond any question to which a signification could respond’130, he
expresses the logic of a questioning that acts sense out, for it does not let itself be
absorbed by any determination. This acting out of sense always has in view the
singular, the singular event of being, ‘an element within a field which cannot be
encompassed within one’s own view of that field, but which rather has a gaze of its
own and thus stares back at the viewer’131, as Lewis perhaps sketchily puts it.
Therefore the question is ‘that of making-sense-in-common, something quite
different from making common sense’132. Provisionally one could then argue that
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ethically reaching to the other means then:
- to act sense out, as opposed to acting on a reserve of available senses
- that this acting of sense is a sharing of finite existence; it means to enter the
sharing that sense is, a sharing that exposes a plural singularity to its own
existential finitude.
Maurice Blanchot has lent his attentive ear to this many times; in his words one
might put it this way: ‘I recognize that you are as unknown to me as you are
familiar. It is a wonderful impression’133. But he also asks, going straight to the
problematic heart of this logic: ‘Are we together? Not quite, are we? Only if we
could be separated’. In another text one finds this: ‘Every meeting was already a
meeting again for us […] it’s always too late for us to meet’ - ‘Too late, it’s true,
because there is no right moment’”134. To finally conclude, beyond every
conclusion, with astonishingly poignant brevity: ‘United: separated’ (with a very
subtle voice, just about to be lost, or just about to reemerge, she replies: ‘we cannot
be separated, whether I speak or not’135).
Maybe one need invoke Blanchot here because one is stepping on the very
threshold of a proximity (and also a friendship, we know this quite well), the
proximity between Emmanuel Levinas and Maurice Blanchot, a proximity that has
the traits of a separated union.
How not to lend an ear now to Blanchot’s description of the third relation,
keeping to his words, and to the man without horizon, affected by this most
terrible, but without terror, relation.
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Blanchot’s third kind of relation is ‘not a relation from the perspective of unity
or with unity in view, not a relation of unification’136. This is then a relation where
the presence of the other does not return us ‘neither to ourselves nor to the One’.
This is a relation of the interval, of interruption, of the impossibility of finding the
way home, of distance (the kind of distance that founds the poetic and
cinematography of John Cassavetes): a relation that rests on ‘the strangeness
between us’. Blanchot is also very cautious in using the term Autrui (the other
person, in Levinas’ lexicon), ‘Autrui is not the word one would want to hold
onto’137. In the same way as Derrida he has the courage to question it; similarly to
Derrida, who wants to ‘examine patiently what emerges in language when the
Greek conception of heteron seems to run out of breath when faced by the alter-
huic’138, he sets off to discuss the linguistic adventure of Autrui. Without much
introduction, in the midst of the discussion, moved by a slight terror, confessing
without hesitation a ‘feeling of fear’, right there where one has to come to terms
with the unknown, or maybe because it’s too late, because one is already
trembling, one already feels the pressure of having just passed some threshold,
without being attentive enough to it, without being cautious enough not to walk on
that spot where ‘the alibi of our relations were about to be exposed’, Blanchot
openly solicits everyone to think: ‘Who is Autrui?’. He does so by clinging onto
the provenance of the word and its proximity to the third term, lui, him or even He.
Autrui is not a word one can use without much caution. He concludes that by
asking ‘Who is Autrui?’ one already distorts what one means to call into question,
for Autrui ‘cannot designate a nature […] is not a certain type of man’.
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In a relation of this kind one is also not too sure who is the other (‘which of the
two of us would be the other?’), a presence in missing, a ‘presence of man, insofar
as he is always missing from his place’. In conclusion: ‘we have to do with a non
personal punctuality oscillating between no one and someone’.
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5 - Ambiguity of the Third
What will be proposed here is that the Third, developing in a philosophy of
Illeity, is on one side a necessary term for the ethical relation, since it allows the
very idea of the face-to-face to be developed, although it won’t cease at times to
take the form of a return to neutrality, to an order that evades the relationship.
The ambiguity between what Critchley calls ‘the alterity of the il y a and the
alterity of Illeity’139 prompts the question whether Levinas is ever able to overcome
the bad experience of neutrality.
That Levinas develops a need for neutrality can be seen in various ways. The
more he engages in getting rid of it, the more the third term seems to affirm the
neutral. It is not a coincidence that when Levinas reaches the breaking point of his
philosophy, the peak perhaps of his attempts, Illeity has become the very concept
from which a surfacing of Justice can be discussed. If one can see in this
‘philosophy of the He’, as Derrida has termed it, the resolution of the Face of the
Other ‘that resembles God’, at the same time the Third seems to undermines the
face-to-face relationship with the Other, by reintroducing a density beyond the
relationship itself.
The third term keeps swinging between two poles: God and the Third Man,
absolution and companionship (intended as the constitution of a common ground).
It is a necessary development, but at the same time it pushes back the radicalism
that should emerge from the face-to-face. Saying that the face is not an allegory,
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not a symbol or metaphor, but what exceeds and breaks visibility, what stubbornly
resists phenomenology, and then claiming that the face of the other resembles God,
or even comes from Him, poses a few challenges.
Levinas is careful in explaining that the resemblance just mentioned does not
fall within mimesis: ‘the God who passed is not the model of which the face would
be an image’140 – rather it is a resemblance that comes as respect for the Infinite:
man resembles God because man is in the trace of God, not because he is the icon
of God. Resemblance between the Other and God means that God can and must be
heard in the voice and in the face of the Other, ‘He at the root of the You’141. As
Levinas repeats, it is not God who makes the revelation – He does not cast it – but
the one who receives it (and receives it without having demanded it, by inhabiting
the trace of God). ‘His (God’s) absolute remoteness turns into my
responsibility’142.
Nevertheless if the face resists phenomenology, shouldn’t it also be prevented
from referring to a higher order, an order that sheds light on it? Marion formulates
the question in this way: ‘if the face does not properly give itself to be seen in the
same sense as does an object or a being, how does it come to me, or reach me at
all?’143
The answers to such questions might come only from the analysis of the third
term itself. More specifically it might come from the way in which the Third
orders the relationship and inscribes in it an externality, the very outside that the
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hypostasis of the Face seemed to have foreclosed from the very start. One can see
the contradictory traits of the third term in Levinas’ writing by undertaking an
analysis of the different connotations it undergoes within his thinking.
In Existence and Existents the third term oscillates between the neutrality of
Being, there is, and the third man, who makes possible my relation to the Other.
As neutrality of Being, the third term is simply the space of horror, space in which
Macbeth and Phaedra wonder.
The attempt in this case is to shed light on the Heideggerian anxiety, the fear for
being, the horror for the rumbling of neutrality, ‘the impersonal, nonsubstantive
event of the night […] like a density of the void, like a murmur of silence […] like
a field of forces’144. What Levinas wants to underline here is that Being, as
conceived by Heidegger, can turn out to be that which makes us all feel the burden
of existence, that impersonal field from which one sometimes feel swallowed.
With the expression there is Levinas expresses an anonymity, that which ‘like the
third person pronoun in the impersonal form of a verb, designates not the
uncertainly known author of the action, but the characteristic of this action itself
which somehow has no author’145. The place from which there is no escape,
suspension is closed off, where ‘negation, annihilation and nothingness are events
like affirmation, creation and subsistence, but impersonal events’. The there is,
neutrality over everything neutral, third term as embracing erasure of
contradictions, is the locus where inevitably our existence strolls without aim.
Levinas will employ this theme again and again, up through his very last texts. In
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the concluding pages of Otherwise than Being for instance he says: ‘essence
stretching on indefinitely without any possible halt or interruption, the equality of
essence not justifying, in all equity, any instant’s halt, without respite, without any
possible suspension, is the horrifying there is behind all finality proper to the
thematizing ego, which cannot sink into the essence it thematizes’146.
This is, though, only the negative side of Thirdness. Thirdness acquires also a
positive meaning, one that allows not just absolution, namely what’s other in the
Other, but also access to Justice.
The question one would want to pose is whether, despite Levinas’ struggle
against neutrality, the Third term does not still lead to the appearance of an
externality with respect to the face to face that seems to impeach the immediacy of
the ethical appeal.
The motif of the third is intimately bound to the notion of the trace. It is in fact
as trace that the positive meaning of the thirds is inaugurated. It is important here
to fix some points, in the way of a preliminary commentary.
Levinas introduces the notion of Thirdness, in the two directions I will show
later on, to overcome a certain intimacy implied in the Face-to-Face relation, the
kind of intimacy for which he reproached Buber.
What is other in the Other cannot simply rely on proximity, the radicalism of
the Face can be pushed even further by relating it to a term external to the relation
itself.
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In order to further bury alterity into an ungraspable otherness Levinas associates
it with the passing of Infinity. This passing holds the character of something that
will never come to an end, it is a passing that will never come to reside on a
substance. Understood in this way, as the passage of Infinity, the third renders
available a process by which the presence of the Other becomes absolute, for it
absolves itself from the kind of presence an object would have, immediately put
under siege by sight, grasping hands, thematic understanding. The purpose is
immediately clear: bringing the Other outside the Same, making its return to the
Same impossible, drawing Ithaca too far from Ulysses. Once the Other is taken as
absolute, the Same cannot advance enough to reach it.
The configuration now is that of an Other that can only be caught in a passage,
and it will be precisely this passing that makes it Other; alterity resides now on the
imperative of a passing, its mode being the opposite of representation, its order
being that of a disorienting of intentionality.    
A first consequence of what has been said so far is that when one comes to
Illeity one can no longer discern Levinas’ program on man from that on God.
The intervention of Illeity, its passage transporting the Other to an order
impossible to consciousness and intentionality, inevitably calls for an explanation
of the concept of God. Levinas intentionally inserts God at this point, and from
now on the discourse on God (which is not at all the discourse on the divine, as
God is here an ‘overwhelming semantic event’) will be inextricable from a
discourse on the other human being. ‘There can be no ‘knowledge’ of God
separated from the relationship with men’147 Levinas says.
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In The Trace of the Other then Levinas writes:
From its infancy philosophy has been struck with a horror of the other that
remains other – with an insurmountable allergy. […] It is for this reason that
it becomes philosophy of immanence and of autonomy, or atheism. The God
of philosophers, from Aristotle to Leibniz, by way of the God of the
scholastics, is a god adequate to reason, a comprehended god who could not
trouble the autonomy of consciousness, which finds itself again in all its
adventures148.
Here Levinas seems to associate the refusal of the Other that remains Other, the
great refusal of philosophy, philosophy’s primal gesture, with the disappearance of
God.
It becomes clear, here more than anywhere else, that Levinas binds together a
project on the other human being with a project on the radically Other, God. A
reversal of the philosophical priorities, from the Same to the Other, goes together
with the emergence of God outside of reason. God as Third term – that which
allows the reversal of terms – must be understood in and as an overcoming of
reason. This overcoming will be dynamic and result in a trace – sign of infinity –
that does not withdraw completely, but does not make itself evident either, being
completely foreign to this kind of play.
To name the trace would here mean to name something that does not conclude
the transcendence by inscribing itself in what is immanent; rather it is by
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remaining an open transcendence (unmemorable) that it acquires its meaning of
trace, a non-graspable relation.
God must then be placed beyond the reach of reason, as this gesture would
match and go along with the philosophical twisting of the Other back to the Same.
God moved back within reason, is just part of a movement that always means to
find itself intact once its momentum has ceased.
By accepting this, Levinas says, philosophy engages in dynamics that in the end
rest on a reassuring inertia: the Other, ‘within reasons’; God as well, but only
‘within reasons’.
At the same time though one must be careful not to intend everything under the
title of the ‘religious’. It is true that Levinas finds in the relation with the Other the
dimension most proper to the religious and that this relation is sometimes divinized
– for the Other and God are somehow inseparable – but at the same time he warns
that ‘everything that cannot be reduced to inter-human relations represents the
primitive forms of religion’. Therefore when he uses the term religious he does so
not in order to address the discourse towards the apparatus or the manifestations of
various religions – phenomenology or anthropology of religion –  but to envisage
something beyond these. ‘The sentence in which God comes to be involved in
words is not ‘I believe in God’149, God is rather pronounced as that which in
religions stands back as the ungraspable, the desire for the ‘tenuous ark that ties us
to the inaccessible’150. Furthermore the God Levinas has in mind does not resemble
the one of theology, apprehensible by knowledge (in analogy) or via its modes and
attributes. Maybe following the contradictions risen by Derrida’s reading one
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could in fact say that this God is still very close to the tradition of negative
theology, in particular in sentences like: ‘the direct comprehension of God is
impossible for a look directed upon him’ or ‘in the impersonal relation that leads to
it the invisible but personal God is not approached outside of all human presence’.
These formulas strangely echo Angelus Silesius’ ‘What God is one knows not […]
he is what I, or you, or any other creature, before we became what He is, have
never come to know’151.
It is important to notice that by naming the alterity of the Other as he does –
passage, desire, Infinity, trace, the imperative of the Third – Levinas further
detaches the relation with the Other from the subject/object relation. The reference
is to a past that allows no memory, a past impossible to awaken, an eternity even,
but too remote to be inscribed into a present. This time from which the face comes
is the time of absolute absence.
In leaping towards the Other it is not enough to follow its trace; or -- what one
needs is respect for this trace as that which does not obey to rules, but on the
contrary asks me to change my own rules.
That is also the reason why the Other in his non-phenomenal splendor remains
enigmatic. Another work that attempts a development of the idea of Illeity is
meaningfully titled Phenomenon and Enigma. Here Levinas insists on the
irreversibility of the temporal dimension, which alterity inhabits and in which it
comes to signify: ‘we hear this way to signify – which does not consist in being
unveiled nor in being veiled, absolutely foreign to the hide-and-seek characteristic
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of cognition, this way of leaving the alternative of being – under the third person
personal pronoun, under the word He [Il]’152.
The reference to a heeding, an intending, a lending an ear to, is not just
incidental, for Illeity, the word Illeity is not just a name, but also a voice, a
command whose demand I follow even before having accepted it. The voice comes
from an unbridgeable gap in time, and it is precisely the gap that allows me to lend
an ear to it, to be respectful. As voice Illeity approaches me and turns me towards
the Other, without me being able to divert or escape it. It commands me to a desire
for the Other that cannot be inscribed in what is contemporaneous, even if the
Other is the closest by. This desire divests me of contemporaneity and moves me
to a desiring of a completely different nature, desire that does not grow simply by
getting close to the other man, but by following the Other in what is most remote
about him.
As Levinas says:
desire, or the response to an enigma, or morality, is a plot with three
personages: the I approaches the infinite by going generously toward the you,
who is still my contemporary, but, in the trace of Illeity presents himself out
of a depth of the past, faces, and approaches me […] I approach the infinite
by sacrificing myself.153
Following the Other into this depth I’ll encounter at the end of the approach his
presence as transcendence, not a transcendence that resists presence, but rather a
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transcendence cutting across presence. In a formula, maybe too rushed, but still not
too far from Levinas’: the presence of the Other rests on his transcendence.
The presence of the Other, coming from the depth of a time I can’t even
calculate, signifies without appearing – it signifies by visiting, but this visitation is
not an appearance I can inscribe into my light, as if it were clearly incarnate.
Coming from the absolutely absent, it visits me in what is disincarnate, interrupting
phenomenology and impeding its movement.
From this it follows that together with Illeity is also introduced the motif of
distance, of a great distance, the absolute distance, absolute in that it absolves itself
from the immediacy of space.
It is important to remark that it is within and because of this distance that the
Other comes to touch what is in my innermost intimacy. Namely it comes to
subvert and substitute the order of my consciousness. As soon as the Other visits
me from this distance I am at stake, for I am indebted to allow his being-without-
horizon to appeal to me.
A provisional conclusion at this point could be formulated: the other is Other as
Illeity, in the trace of Illeity, what eludes my presence, like a verbosity infinitely
withdrawn in an instant of laconism.
A few words should be spent more explicitly on the role that the word God
(with Levinas one is unambiguously called to avoid using the divinity of God or
the concept of the divine), this word at the very limit of the dictionary, this ‘beast’
as Blanchot puts it, plays while discussing Illeity. Movement of infinition,
indivisible, inmultipliable, each time singular in its voice, retaining all the infinity
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of its absence even in the personal order, showing itself through its absence (the
trace); those are some of the ways Levinas retains to articulate the word God.
Without aiming to be too schematic, Levinas often gives the impression of
overlaying the two terms, Illeity and God. To put it differently: Illeity is God
inasmuch as it intervenes as the inner externality of the face-to-face. This also
motivates the fact that Levinas seems at times to bind together the approach to the
Other as God and the approach to the Other as other human being. God is always
already there in the Face-to-Face, the absence of his presence being entangled to
the otherness of the Other.
The process of rendering the Other an absolute, absolute because apprehended
just in the passage and in the trace of this passage, the Face – his Face being not an
allegory but the visitation of a movement belonging not to this world – is what
makes transcendence come upon me. Musil seems to have glimpsed this when
discussing the difference between common and great ideas: ‘(a great idea) exists in
a kind of molten state through which the self enters an infinite expanse and,
inversely, the expanse of the universe enters the self, so that it becomes impossible
to differentiate between what belongs to the self and what belongs to the
infinite’154.
Once I am invested by the transcendental absolution of the Other, I am also in
the presence, a presence always conserving the character of an absenting, of God.
God can and must be heard in the voice and in the face of the Other. Glimpsing the
face of the Other, a glimpse that encounters the non-phenomenality of the Face,
means that one is also witnessing the passage of God. ‘The other, inasmuch as he
lends himself to thematization and becomes a phenomenon said, becomes
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something present and represented – but that by which he is other is precisely the
Ille that eludes my presence […] as an irrecuperable past’155.
Following the trace of the Other, welcoming his face as the encounter with that
which withdraws in the Absolute, I also withdraw to God. Withdrawing to God
means that I grow less interested in my presence, in my own phenomenology, and
become enmeshed with a command falling upon me, without me being able to
substitute that command with something else. Withdrawing to God would mean
that I engage in a process whereby I substitute my subjectivity for something else.
God calls me to this substitution by presenting the Other in his resistance to my
grasp. God conveys to us, wrapped in an enigma, a most simple demand, that we
realize that ‘what we give others comes back to us’. This should not be taken
according to the ‘do ut des’ formula, whereby to every action on my side would
correspond a reaction on the side of the Other that would reestablish an
equilibrium. In Levinas’ understanding the equilibrium is always already broken,
asymmetry is what establishes the ethical situation. Saying ‘what we give others
comes back to us’ means that I can acknowledge my subjectivity only in terms of
substitution. I am a subject as long as I have substituted my ipseity with a
movement (which holds something of a leap) towards the Other. This movement
comes back to me in constituting my subjectivity as a ‘for-the-other’. The act of
giving to others is in the end the only thing that comes back to me; it is not a
reaction from the Other, but the same act I started with. This coming back is
possible since I am responsible for a responsibility for which I have never asked. I
respond to a command coming from a voice so remote that in this absence I can
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hear at the same time God and the Other, illeity ‘slipping into me like a thief’. God
performs this command not by setting up a structure in which I would be his
interlocutor, as there is no correspondence between God and myself. Every
correlation has been already warded off, for correlation in this case would translate
a command in terms of constrain or domination. ‘Illeity – Levinas says – lies
outside the ‘thou’ and the thematization of objects […] it indicates a way of
concerning me without entering into conjunction with me’156. I realize that ‘what
we give to others comes back to us’ in lending an ear to Illeity, to God, but I hear
this pronounced by me, it is in my own saying that I hear this. It is my subjectivity,
once it has entered the play of substitution, that says so and calls me in cause in my
own voice, as if I were saying something without being conscious of what I was
saying, but nevertheless being already totally included and encompassed in what I
am proffering. I offer my own saying to my own consideration. What is at stake is
the acquiring of something one has never even been in need of, ‘glory […]
commanding me by my own mouth’157.
God thus is glorified when one of the terms in the Face-to-Face paradoxically
inscribes itself in an order where the infinitely exterior becomes an inward voice.
A proximity so specified allows Levinas to make a distinction between his kind
of commanding theology and both positive theology and the propositions of
negative theology (with which it nevertheless retains a link). The triad proximity,
substitution and responsibility, which I have summarized in the sentence ‘what we
give to others come back to us’, converts negative theology into an assertive form:
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the absolution of the Other becomes a proximity; in my own saying I am addressed
by the passing of Infinity; substitution makes the blurring of identity the very
excess in which I can find myself again.
God is therefore the very movement of Illeity, Illeity as dynamics – as opposed
to the icon or the sacred – the passage by which the Infinite might be heard and
becomes an insight in life, moving in the opposite direction from the
bion qhoreticon. To put it differently: the Other and God can be approached in the
same passing; what makes their passing what it is being the fact that my
approaching never results in a reaching, but remains in the hesitation.
God is the passage158 where I can see the Other, but I cannot see the Other any
better than by accepting the appeal (to me, only to me) as that which does not
manifest itself, though I can’t avoid responding to it. As Levinas puts it: ‘The
infinite wipes out its traces not in order to trick him who obeys, but because it
transcends the present in which it commands me, and because I cannot deduce it
from this command’159.
What has been said so far regarding God-Illeity and the approach to the Other,
though, gives way to a series of questions. In particular it seems to allow for two
ambiguities. Jean-Luc Marion indicates a first possible confusion: ‘the face which
appeals can be equally assigned to the Other or to God, thus avowing the
indecision of its origin as well as the necessity of questioning both identity and
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individuation’160. The problem highlighted here questions the overlapping between
God and the Other and becomes even more stringent when the theme of justice is
introduced. Marion rephrases it by asking: ‘does the appeal come from the other
person, or it refer me to the Other only from an other than the other person – no
doubt God?’161 It is not clear who’s appealing and what’s the aim of such an
appeal.
A criticism linked with the question posed by Marion emphasizes then a second
perplexity. This calls attention to the fact that the absolute distance that Illeity as
God takes on poses a challenge to Levinas, since it draws God and a neutral
absence (that of the ‘there is’) extremely close.
As Blanchot discusses in Our clandestine companion, Levinas ‘gives us a
presentiment that the infinite transcendence, the transcendence of the infinite, to
which we try to subject God, will always be ready to veer off to the point of
possible confusion with the bustle of the there is […] absolute indetermination’162.
Llewelyn too points out this possible impasse when he writes ‘Anonymous ilyaity
recurs in pro-nominal illeity to the point at which the former may be mistaken for
the latter. Between the one and the other there is a recurring alternation. Under the
weight of responsibility of expiation for the other, elevation is liable to lapse into
lassitude’163.
In the following discussion of justice this issue will be analyzed in more detail,
the attempt being that of showing that the confusion has serious consequences for
the Levinasian project. The possibility ascribed to the Third of introducing justice
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in the face to face and the ambiguity at work in the Third itself (ambiguity that
revolves around the Third Man, God as Illeity and the neutrality of the ‘there is’)
seem to return Levinas to the point he had primarily tried to avoid, namely the
return of a neutral term. As Derrida says: ‘responsibility for the other human being
is anterior to any question. But how does responsibility obligate if a third troubles
this exteriority of two where my subjection of the subject is subjection to the
neighbor?’164.
 If it is the Third that commands me to justice and if this element cannot
disentangle itself from the confusion named by Blanchot, then justice appears as
the site where the face to face has to accept some kind of overwhelming totality
that concludes its trajectory. As a consequence this would mean that the face to
face falls prey to the same accusation Levinas had moved to Heidegger’s Mitsein,
that of being simply a moment in view of something else, the something else in
Levinas’ case being the reduction of the singular ethical encounter to a neutral
justice brought by Illeity behind which one could easily see the shadow of God as
ordo ordinans.  This will become clearer in discussing the concept of justice.
                                                
164 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1999), 32
294
6 - The sky over Justice. Return of Neutrality
At this point one cannot avoid the question of justice any longer, for it is in the
question of justice that something unexpected happens, what Derrida names a
perjury, ‘if the face to face with the unique engages the infinite ethics of my
responsibility for the other in a sort of oath before the letter, an unconditional
respect or fidelity, then the ineluctable emergence of the third and with it of justice
would signal an initial perjury’165.
The question of justice calls for the motif of the Third(s) to be addressed once
more, this time moving from a different articulation. Where before the focus was
on the Illeity of God, now it will be on the Third Man. As the study proceeds it will
become clearer that the link already envisaged between the Other and God is also,
and inevitably so, at work in the development of the idea of the Third Man. Hence
one cannot completely separate God and the Third Man. The way the latter enters
the face to face makes him somehow similar to the figure of the angel, if one
generously sticks to the word in its Greek meaning: that which announces, but
announces something just as long as it announces only itself, its own coming. This
is the role played for instance by the young woman haunting Gena Rowlands
(Myrtle in the film) in Cassavetes’ Opening Night. She is not just the very non-
phenomenon at the heart of the film, but the evidence of a chronic announcement,
always investing the actress from within her own voice. A similar angelic moment
can be seen in Love Streams, where a naked bearded man suddenly appears on a
chair. As Kouvaros says these apparitions ‘put representation into question’,
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introducing ‘a violent tearing of performative space’166. They not only take us by
surprise, they impose on the spectators to bear witness to an unaccountable
singularity, exceeding control and comprehension.   
All the ambivalence of the Third Man comes from this act of pure
announcement revolving only around itself.
The Third man develops in a twofold way: on the one hand the third man is the
other of the other which calls me one among others, and thus breaks the intimacy;
on the other he obliges me to a concern for everyone and therefore for myself.
Therefore the Third Man founds a sort of contemporaneousness, a common
ground. In Totality and Infinity Levinas had already announced the question of
Others, by saying that the response triggered by the Other cannot remain simply
‘between us’, for ‘everything that takes place here ‘between us’ concerns everyone
[…] even if I draw back to seek with the interlocutor the complicity of a private
relation’167. The preferred being, clandestine and in love, is now open to humanity.
A universality clinging onto a higher register breaks through. It does so by simply
announcing its own arrival, announcing justice as non-postponable.
In Walser’s The Tanner Siblings the arrival of Kaspar disposes things from
curiosity and chance, the closed fortuity into which Simon and Klara live, to love
and concern. This is the situation where happiness is not enough, as Klara says: ‘I
am happy, but I can’t bear being happy on my own’168. Justice needs the two, but at
the condition that these two do not shut themselves up.
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The community of lovers is not just, not because in it injustice would prevail,
but because it lacks the means, being played on the possibility of sinking what lies
outside it. Tristan and Isolde are beyond the logic demanded by justice, for they
can still lose the world and the world can just as easily get rid of them, while their
tie remains intact: ‘the world has collapsed’ and they are pulled in ‘the place of the
strange’169. Lovers are foreign to the logic of justice – though they are not exactly
unjust – for the question: ‘why does a man love a woman more than women?’170 is
not yet possible.
Justice is available only to a society where there is no distinction between those
close by and those far off. This is made possible by the arrival of the Third Man.
Upon his entrance the Third Man always speaks a prophetic word, which means it
addresses a universality, though this address never takes universality as a theme
(i.e.: human race, biological genus, common functions). As Levinas puts it
‘biological human fraternity, considered with the sober coldness of Cain is not a
sufficient reason that I be responsible’171.
The analogy with the angel might now appear  less whimsical a formulation, for
the Third Man’s announcement does not announce an horizon, like humanity
united by resemblance; rather, it announces its own coming, the very moment of its
movement into the face-to-face and across it. The breaking through of the Third
Man is straightforwardness: it takes the form of the announcement of its unicity, by
way of which my own unicity is also underlined. This means that the Third Man
does not come to establish differences within a genus; quite the opposite, by
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coming foreign to differences, he makes being-for-one-another a more urgent and
problematic matter.
  The Third Man imposes a problem upon the face-to-face. It has been said that
the Third Man could be read in a twofold way. He makes me one among others by
announcing himself in his forthright coming, thus he urges us to lower our
intimacy, not towards a common cause, but for the sake of a wider command. As
Levinas puts it: ‘the entry of a third party is not simply a multiplication of the
other; from the first the Third Party is simultaneously other than the other, and
makes me one among others’172. At the same time the Third Man imposes on me a
concern for everyone. Given that everyone includes myself, the Third Man also
announces in its coming my responsibility towards myself.  Apart from removing
the face-to-face from clandestinity, it introduces a concern for myself, concern that
comes from the substitution of my identity in the for-the-other, ‘my concern for
myself is triggered by the third party; not the reversibility of the relationship with
alterity, but its multiplication to the second power makes the ethical possible’173.
Proximity becomes a problem. Within this new situation I cannot simply
address the Other that confronts me in the face-to-face but I also have to address
everyone in the face of the Other and myself. Proximity becomes a problem for it
no longer concludes my ethical commitment. It is not enough to address this
proximity in the face in order to be just – justice is the uneasiness of proximity.
Proximity now becomes what simultaneously founds and obstructs the opening of
the plane of justice. As Derrida puts it ‘Comparison is superimposed onto my
relation with the unique and the incomparable and in view of equity and equality, a
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weighing, a thinking, a calculation, the comparison of incomparables, and,
consequently, the neutrality - presence or representation - of being, the
thematization and the visibility of the face’174.
As previously mentioned the closest proximity, of which love is an exemplary
situation, achieves the opening of a realm of respect, the relieving of the all-
encompassing moment, while at the same time the closer the face-to-face becomes,
the more it deepens the intimacy – even when this is played out in asymmetry and
absence – the higher  the barricade it erects against the entrance of justice.
While the face-to-face binds me to the Other, and immerses me in his trace, it
always threatens to leave the Third Man outside the door. This proximity has to
acknowledge the angelic element, since the Third Man is ‘an incessant correction
of the asymmetry of proximity’. There must be a flash of recognition: one must be
able to recognize a positive obsession at the very heart of the face-to-face, namely
all the others that sit on the opposite side of the face-to-face into which I am
engaged.
In the eyes of the one in front of me I must be able to see a plethora of eyes.
They are all looking for me and I am commanded to substitute myself for them all.
The Third therefore commands me to a concern for everyone, which is not meant
to degrade my relationship with the Other in front of me, but imposes on me to see
this relationship as problematic, as bound to fail despite the best intentions. The
Third, Levinas says, is responsibility extended beyond intention.
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6.1 - The aporia of Justice
One is here confronted with a double constraint, because if it’s true that the
Third introduces justice, at the same time it ‘violates in its turn, at least potentially,
the purity of the ethical desire devoted to the unique’175, as if the solution would
dissolve the very thing it tries to preserve. If it is true that the face-to-face is the
ethical itself, responsibility without decision, then this should exclude all
neutrality. Levinas seemingly carries a battle against neutrality, to the point that
one could be led to say that his philosophy is in the end the attempt to push
neutrality to its own limit, there where neutrality is neutral even with regard to
itself and its forces then collapse  under a private inertia.
Levinas’ philosophy seems to move from a demand that holds neutrality as its
most crucial preoccupation. One might easily say that this is a way of considering
Totality and Infinity and that the following works purely from the negative and
critical point of view, overlooking their propositional vigor and the constellation of
positive statements that are there constantly advanced. What I am trying to say
here is something different. The thesis here would be that in the formulation of
Justice there happens an inevitable u-turn, one which reintroduces neutrality at the
very heart of the ethical.
It has been said that the other is Other as long as its infinity is respected, which
is to say that we do justice to the Other as long as we encounter it in the trace of
God. Face to Face means respecting the absolute distance of the Other, his
remoteness in the resemblance to God. A series of questions arise: isn’t God
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perhaps the bearer of Justice and not the Other? If this is the case then the
movement that would reconcile us to a just relation to the Other would be
primarily a look directed to the Other as that which can lead us to God. God is
Justice because it is that of the Other which escapes themes. Every time I try to
reduce the Other to pure theory, it is God that comes to remind me of the respect
for the absolute distance of the Other.
One could try to say this with other words: the resemblance between the Other
and God is made possible by the fact that, as Levinas repeats, the revelation is not
made by God, but by the one who receives it and receives it without having
demanded it, by inhabiting the trace of God. Still, does not the fact that a revelation
is possible indicate the need for an agent beyond the relationship, so as to make
this relationship meaningful, in this case the meaningfulness becoming the ethical
experience?
Marion seems to advance a similar criticism when he asks ‘to evoke ‘the
wonder of the I claimed by God in the face of the neighbor’ amounts to suggesting
that the claim which refers to the face effectively goes back to God, in the fashion
of some strange ethical occasionalism in which the effective cause (God) recovers
and would always precede a simply occasional cause (the Other person)’176.
By introducing God into the elicitation of Justice, does not the requirement
become more important than the terms carrying Justice forth?
God appears sometimes close to a neutral overarching element, the lassitude of
the there is. As Leslie Hill says in discussing Blanchot and Levinas, the reference
to God in the discussion of justice ‘has the potential of turning Levinas’ account of
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the transcendence of the other into precisely one of those philosophies of the
neuter’177.
There seem to be two crucial elements: the face-to-face needs Justice, Justice is
obtained by the intervention of an Illeity, a distance proper only to God; in turn this
distance draws God close to an ordering entity, which can be preserved only if its
neutrality is taken into account.
In this double movement one can glimpse the risk that Levinas’ project might
fail to preserve the non-renounceable, asymmetrical command that makes possible
the reopening of the philosophical horizon otherwise than Heidegger.
From these questions it seems possible to conclude that the neutral, against
which Levinas makes his first move, is in fact taken as the guarantor of justice,
which is – given that Justice makes room for the State and the law – the very
achievement of the ethical experience. Exigency for justice seems to always come
from above, from that which remains equally distant from me and from the Other.
Therefore, in the reaching for justice, Levinas seems to admit to  an impersonal
reason, chaotic otherness, conceptual totality. In Totality and Infinity Levinas
criticizes ‘the obedience that no face commands’178, but the question of justice
seems to bring this right back, for the obedience to which I am commanded if I am
to be just responds exactly to a faceless entity.
It is true that the movement is from the Other to God, an inversion with regard
to theology: it is not God that triggers my kindness, but the other that turns my
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sight to the sky. Even so, God comes as the light – visible only as a shadow – that
establishes a higher level, promoting the ethical beyond knowledge. The ethical
thus confirms itself as God because of this possibility of turning its terms to
something that is not ‘just’ the face-to-face.
Wouldn’t this discourse on justice necessarily reintroduce not only the need for
thinking about being-with even before substitution, but also about what the with of
Being is, as that which would prevent being from transforming itself in an all-
encompassing movement? Does not Levinas, by way of a series of odd moves,
seem to reach a position not at all distant from the one at which Nancy advances
his analysis in the first place? The relation between men cannot simply be taken as
a discourse on individuality and subjectivity because the relation to the other is
itself the position of Being, it is that which commands every other relation, beyond
its terms and beyond the possibility to enact the Ethical before the reference to
being as being-with.
Could one say that Levinas concludes with that which Nancy starts with?
If justice is what needs in primis to give the face to face its ethical dimension,
then how can it do so if the face to face is not the situation of justice? Is this not to
impose on the order of the face to face a higher order, that of pure Justice as it
were?
This order would remain then the true achievement, the energy of ethics, though
still a theory, while the face to face would be a mere, though crucial, step.
Levinas opens Totality and Infinity with a chapter entitled ‘Desire for the
Invisible’. Rather ironically this casts fore at the very end of Otherwise than Being
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the following question: in striving for justice, isn’t perhaps God the one I desire
and not the Other? Desire will then be directed to the Other in the absence of
something better. Once the other is called to merely fill a gap, is he still respected
in its being?
The reintroduction of neutrality seems thus to take this structure:
On one side Justice is called to wrap up the ethical dimension of the face-to-face
by intensifying it as the foundation of State and system; on the other hand, if
justice is that which is possible just thanks to the emergence of the He, interruption
of the face, how can justice be found at work within the face to face without it
being a neutrality, a superior gesture that elevates the face to face and in elevating
it also consumes the face to the point where this loses every expression?
Justice at this point seems to be the very revenge of Neutrality.
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Conclusions
The reflection undertaken in this chapter has tried to assess to what extent
Levinas’ philosophy of otherness could challenge a formulation developed from
within the work of Martin Heidegger. In different terms: how the measure of the
‘with’ could resist the immeasurable face of the other.
The distance between Levinas and Nancy has been evaluated against those
considered to be key stages in the development of the question of the other: the
problem of the world, the I-thou relation and the reference – in Levinas’ thinking –
to a Third Term.
As to the first concept, the line was drawn between Levinas’ need for an escape
from Heidegger’s world and from Nancy’s radicalization of the possibilities of the
Heideggerian world (which is also to say the world as the site of the abandonment
to possibilities).
The two other stages scrutinized contained a more direct reflection on the
question of the ‘with’ and the reasons Levinas holds to dismiss it. It has been
argued that Levinas fails to consider the existential character of the with, reducing
it to a category, thereby offering a reading of Being-with as:
- a stage within a solipsistic trajectory;
- an element that expresses the logic of a grouping together, holding onto on
one side the indifference of the crowd and on the other the overarching power
of the destiny of Being.
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It has then been questioned whether Levinas’ criticism of the instrumentality of
the Heideggerian world does not perhaps rest on a misreading. Levinas’ reasons
for finding access to the other outside the world would thus be challenged: if the
world – as Nancy has it – is in fact not only the place of work, tools and
attachment to things, but also the breaking through of possibilities, then Levinas’
critique becomes less powerful.
The notion of world has been investigated in detail, as it seems to constitute a
crucial moment of distinction between Levinas and Nancy. They both start with
the Heideggerian formulation of Being-in-the-world, but where Levinas opens his
line of reason by finding a way out from the Heideggerian world, Nancy places the
opening of sense right at the heart of Being-in-the-world. This has important
consequences as it also sheds light on the question of Being-with and in particular
on the Mit of each Da.
Levinas subscribes to a common criticism attributed to Heidegger, which
Nelson summarizes in these terms: ‘Heidegger’s thought is inherently unable to
think the social and the ethical’179. It has been argued that this is not entirely true.
Quite the opposite, Heideggerian ethics – which Nancy calls ‘originary’ and
Nelson ‘ethics of facticity’ – seems to also allow Levinas to make his claims, once
it is understood that this originary ethics rests on impossibility to be reduced to a
moral code.
While it is true that Heidegger never puts forward an ethics in terms of moral
principles and codes of behaviour it would be nevertheless hazardous to affirm
there is no place for the ethical demand in Heidegger’s thinking. Even beyond the
explicit answers contained in ‘Letter on Humanism’, the question of Being-with
                                                
179 Eric Sean Nelson, ‘Heidegger and the Ethics of Facticity’ in Rethinking Facticity, eds. François
Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson (New York: SUNY Press, 2008), 141
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already contains a discourse on ethics, if not explicitly then at least by offering a
series of possible developments.
Although Dasein is born and dies in apparent isolation, nevertheless Being and
Time offers passages – in particular in the discussion of being-in-the-world and
being-with – in which ideas of openness, sharing, crossing, and circulation of sense
play a crucial role.
If it is true that Being-with tends to remain polarized between the indifference
of the crowd and the destiny of the people, there are enough elements inviting for a
third reading, one that takes the Mit as the exposure of singularities to each other.
This of the Da of each singularity responds to the question ‘what happens between
us’. It offers itself as a reflection on the between as the space that makes a ‘we’
possible. When Levinas affirms that the Da is already an ethical problem, he seems
to glimpse a crucial possibility for the concept of Mitsein. The question here would
be how Being-with configures the relation of each Dasein when exposed to other
singular Daseins. Being-with or being-together impels the rethinking of the
opening of Dasein towards a common Da, the crossing of many theres that does
not end in the constitution of a new, higher Dasein (this is in the end what Levinas
is preoccupied by).
The measure of the with, if read in this way, should ‘evaluate’ the distance that
singularities constantly cross without giving birth to an higher entity. This makes
multiplicity not an external or acquired quality of each singularity, but the very
measure of each one of them, an intrinsic measure calling each time for the
engagement of one singularity with all others, but only each time and not in a
heightened or separate dimension. The each time of the crossing happens in the
world, also in the midst of the They, for a relative indistinction is needed for a
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constant opening to be possible. The immeasurable face of the other is respected,
for the singular existence is what is at each time at stake: not multiplicity as such,
but the multiplicity that is always exposed as a singular existence.
This dimension, where the with measures the multiplicity opened by each
singularity, would also allow for a relation without mediation, exactly what
Levinas tries to asses by a different trajectory. While Levinas’ attempt seems to
ultimately give in to a Third Term – whose resemblance to an absolute distant God
is ambiguous – that appears to act as a mediator in the accomplishment of justice,
the measure of the with allows for intersections that respond to nothing else than
the originary being-open of a singular existence. The impasse Levinas reaches is
well expressed by Leslie Hill: ‘if it is the case, as Levinas contends, that the
relation with the other is without mediating concept or intermediary of any kind, so
it would follow from this that henceforth there is neither God, nor values, nor
nature between man and man’180.
Levinas’ concern though is not only with the crowd, there is one more point of
tension: the essentially solipsistic nature of Dasein. One could say that while it is
true that Heidegger’s system – as Nelson says – rests on individuation, this is an
achievement that is never fully accomplished. The process is constantly re-opened,
resulting in a system of differential relations, rather than promising the constitution
of an independent subject.
The fundamental structure of Dasein implies that the work of subjectivity is
always ‘threatened’ by openness. Dasein is in the world as the open. Being-in-the-
world means essentially this: that subjectivity is abandoned to its very openness,
where my Dasein might never be realized. This struggle for my Dasein is largely
                                                
180 Leslie Hill, Blanchot. Extreme contemporary (London: Routledge, 1997), 173
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played on the level of a sharing out (rather than, for instance, in the modes of self-
reflection or discoursing with one’s own self). The stresses that Heidegger put on
practices (on having to do with) can thus appear not only as the attempt to
underline our instrumental appraisal of the world, but as the attempt to describe the
world as essentially a system of shared references.
Given this framework, Nancy’s attempt would be to – starting from Heidegger –
dismantle the concept of the subject in order to construe otherwise the question of
relation.
This demand seems to be similar in both Nancy and Levinas, but given this
common point of departure, a main difference emerges: while for Levinas the
ethical is infinity as the interruption of finite existing (break in the world, break in
the holding on things, break in proximity), for Nancy it is an infinite demand to
take finitude into account by questioning the possibility of an ultimate overcoming
of finitude.
Where Levinas places the ethical in the altruism coming from infinity, Nancy
sees it as the sharing that traverses finitude, ‘the question of the between us –
which would be in fact the question of the between, according to which there can
be a “we”’181.
While Levinas starts from an individuality – withdrawal into ipseity (separation)
– opening onto others following the call of responsibility, and then achieving
justice with the help of God, Nancy starts from the space of the relation, from the
‘with’ that distances and unites singularities. It is in the space of the ‘with’, in the
endless circulation of sense and the space that this circulation constitutes, that an
                                                
181 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Being-with of the Being-there’, in Rethinking Facticity, trans. François
Raffoul and David Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2008), 119
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investigation on singularities becomes possible. While Levinas starts with the one
to one and then indicates a Third, a witness or prophet, to complete the picture, to
make the relation a just relation, Nancy starts with the many and the each one, with
the space of multiplicity as essential and proper to singularity. By starting there
where Levinas ends, it seems that Nancy acquires a position from which he can not
just reinterpret the Heideggerian Mitsein, adjusting its interpretation beyond the
crowd and the people, adjusting it on the ethical importance of each Da, but also
achieves the relation without mediation that Levinas in the end of its philosophical
trajectory seems obliged to abandon.
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Being with the undecidable 
 
The us that is imperceptibly and insuperably exscribed 
Jean-Luc Nancy1  
 
 
The following conclusive remarks aim on one side to provide a new opening 
into the analyses carried out thus far and on the other to enrich the argument with 
indications regarding what emerges as the specific gesture of Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
contribution to philosophy: pushing thinking to the limit-thought of existence.  
The following analysis will be structured around three moments:  
- the notion of Being-with will be analyzed once again in light of Levinas’ 
criticism of  Heidegger; particular attention will be devoted to the notion of 
solipsism and its connection with the concept of They;  
- the attempt by Nancy to undo a general prejudice present in Being and Time 
– one that tends to highlight the exceptional and the heroic – provides him 
with the possibility to invest Being-with with a radicalism that Heidegger 
envisaged but at the same time abandoned. By stressing the with as the site 
of the openness of existence to the work of otherness, Nancy seeks to escape 
a philosophical performativity that decides over experience by naming it. 
The result of this is the untying of the with from its destinations and 
                                                
1 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Exscription’, in The Birth to Presence, trans. Katherine Lydon (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 320 
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appropriations, and the possibility to open once more philosophy to 
existence;  
- by exposing thinking – always a finite thinking – to existence Nancy 
emphasizes the importance of preserving in philosophy the openness of 
existence. Existence’s undecidability, as its very power, therefore also 
displaces the ontological order. The fact that thinking becomes possible only 
from the advance of existence with regards to philosophy, understanding, 
knowledge and interpretation constitutes the very project of Nancy’s 
philosophy. In his constant debate with Heidegger, Nancy relentlessly 
evokes powers of existence – singular resistances of existence to the 
mastering decision of philosophical work, so that philosophy in turn will 
continuously loosen its categories and key words in the attempt to decide its 
course according to what happens between us.  
   
The problem of Being-with has been touched upon throughout the current work. 
It was said that Levinas contests Heidegger for not having been able to disentangle 
the with from both an original solitude and an overarching generalization.  
The originality of otherness, according to Levinas, is foreclosed by a philosophy 
that commences with Being and with a ‘who’ trying to address the question of 
Being for its own sake. Heidegger bars the possibility of receiving the other in two 
capacities: on one side, Being-with is too general and therefore doesn’t provide any 
indication about sociality, always sinking the Other in the generality of the crowd; 
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on the other, Levinas insists that the notion of being-with rests on and refers to a 
long tradition of solipsism.  
Levinas is not satisfied with Heidegger saying “ad nauseam” that ‘this being qua 
Dasein is always already with others and with Being not of Dasein nature’2. For 
Levinas it is very clear from the beginning that Heidegger’s philosophy is a thesis 
on solitude.  
Two motifs already mentioned will be discussed:  
- They as the mode of everyday understanding that inevitably swallows the 
Other and confounds the work of otherness;  
- Solipsism as the original mistake of Heidegger’s philosophy, preventing 
Heidegger from accessing the other.  
 
‘They’ is the site of the ontical experience of being-in-the-world as being-with. 
While it is true that Heidegger dismisses the ‘they’ as average understanding that 
understands everything, it is still true that the ‘they’ is the very site of 
disclosedness. Given the structure of Heidegger’s analysis, moving back and forth 
between the ontical and the ontological to achieve a thinking of existence, it 
shouldn’t come as a surprise that They is both the site where everything happens 
and the place of disengagement: ‘they’ is always already satisfied, because no one 
is allowed to say anything that would reach beyond it. However it would be hasty 
to suggest that the everyday is for Heidegger merely deceitful. Heidegger says that 
                                                
2 Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984), 190 
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‘the expression ‘idle talk’ is not to be used here in a ‘disparaging’ signification. 
Terminologically, it signifies a positive phenomenon’3.  
The conversations taking place in the everyday don’t necessarily preclude the 
experience of existence. Instead what Heidegger implies is that one cannot say 
anything that wouldn’t be immediately recuperated within what the other person 
(anyone else) is saying. Therefore everything is understood perfectly well. The 
They is thus not as much condemned as ‘everyday’, as refused as that moment of 
the everyday where every day is considered as any other day, where  the bursting of 
existence (a bursting that happens every day, every minute) is therefore suspended 
in the closure of a past of no interest and a future already calculated. The problem – 
Heidegger says – is that ‘understanding and interpretation already lie in what has 
thus been expressed’4. The surprise that existence is, gets surpassed in the fact that 
average understanding already knows everything. Existence thus comes to be 
comprehended, but once and for all: things are qualified once and for all. Authority 
over existence is established, while at the same time existence itself, as a singular 
decisive event, is passed under silence. It is only because the ‘they’ is there, 
however, that one can hear the silencing of existence, that one can understand 
existence as having been decided upon. It is only because I too am the ‘they’ that I 
can encounter myself there and feel uncomfortable. Existence wouldn’t be in the 
world without the They, for ‘idle talk’ and the curiosity that springs from it 
constitute the very first proof that my world is first of all a shared world.  
 
                                                
3 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 211 
4 Ibid., 211 
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As Heidegger makes clear:  
 
This everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which 
Dasein has grown in the first instance […] In it, out of it, and against it, all 
genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all re-discovering and 
appropriating anew, are performed5. 
  
The attitude just described (an ‘I’ve-seen-it-all’ attitude) reveals something 
about our relation with Others. Heidegger says that in the everyday  
 
The Other is proximally ‘there’ in terms of what ‘they’ have heard about him, 
what ‘they’ say in their talk about him, and what ‘they’ know about him. Being-
with-one-another according to the mode of the ‘they’ ‘is by no means an 
indifferent side-by-sidedness in which everything has been settled, but rather an 
intent, ambiguous watching of one another’6.  
 
The other is there already in the ‘they’, its position is that of being surrounded 
with a curious surveillance. The ‘they’ therefore offers the sort of indistinction 
needed for the Other to spring forth. Particularly because the ‘they’ doesn’t simply 
negate the other, it reduces both myself and the Other to the same. The ‘they’ is the 
negation of singularities in general and their negation in (favor of) the general. It is 
the everyday before each day. It makes no decision as to what happens between us.  
                                                
5 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 213 
6 Ibid., 219 
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The ‘they’ is necessary to establish at least one façade of an original sociality. 
The sociality where the other is simply everyone, where everyone is simply an 
other; another one, upon which to cast a suspicious look. In the ‘they’ therefore it is 
not only the Other that disappears, but myself too, and as a consequence the very 
possibility of a sociality founded on more than an undistinguished inclusion. 
(Perhaps this is the very kind of sociality that a ‘multiculturalism’ advocating every 
difference as equal cannot evade).  
‘They’ is precisely the ‘same’ into which we, the other and myself, are plunged. 
When Heidegger says that ‘this (the They’s) Being-with-one-another dissolves 
one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of ‘the Others’7 he is not 
arguing that Dasein has to overcome the Others so as to retire into a closed 
interiority, the ivory tower of consciousness. Quite the opposite: Dasein is included 
in ‘the Others’. The dissolution of Dasein into the Others means that both the other 
and myself dissolve into a generality into which we both become nobody (ne ipse 
unum). This is also why Heidegger says that ‘existence as together and with one 
another is founded on the genuine individuation’8. Given that Heidegger 
painstakingly separates his notion of ‘self’ and ‘individuation’ from a substantialist 
approach, one should not read the passage just quoted from the Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology as saying that the self should return to itself so as to elude the 
pressure of the others. Respectful recognition of the others is respectful only once 
Dasein has exposed itself to others as a singularity. Dasein’s possibility to 
                                                
7 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 164 
8 Martin Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1982), 288  
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recognize others happens together with Dasein’s recognition of itself as that which 
is open to existence and not closed within. As Nancy has it: ‘any being that one 
might like to imagine as not distinguished, not dis-posed, would really be 
indeterminate and unavailable: an absolute vacancy’9. The problem of Being-with 
as too general plays out at this level, exactly at the point where the discussion of the 
‘They’ crosses that of solipsism.  
 
Critics often identify with solipsism what Heidegger terms metaphysical 
egoicity.  
Heidegger created the term in the twenties, at a time when his terminology 
wasn’t completely worked out. With metaphysical egoicity Heidegger describes the 
possibility for an I-Thou relationship to happen, where the Thou is not simply an 
ontical replicate of the I. Not an other ego, but a ‘you-yourself’. 
This very specific kind of existential solipsism is often misunderstood (Levinas 
is particularly insistent on this) with factual or existential egotism. Dasein’s 
trajectory thus becomes essentially a solitary parade. Dasein would therefore be 
indifferent to or disinterested in sociality. As François Raffoul remarks though: ‘the 
solus ipse, far from signifying the closure of the ego upon itself that occurs with the 
reduction, in fact opens Dasein to the totality of Beings’10. One should be careful 
not to jump to hasty conclusions and to pay attention to the nature of the solipsism 
Heidegger invokes with the term metaphysical egoicity. 
                                                
9 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 96 
10 François Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, trans. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1998), 215 
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A reading of Heideggerian solipsism should not only provide an insight into 
Being-with, but, perhaps paradoxically, it could show how much what Levinas 
expresses as ‘the other remaining the other’ also motivates  – up to a point at least – 
Heidegger’s thinking. When Levinas speaks about love he seems to rejoin the 
necessary movement that cuts across the They and solipsism: ‘Coincidence is 
fusion. For me, on the contrary, sociality is excellence, and one should never think 
sociality as a missed coincidence […] I think that when the other is ‘always other’, 
there is the essence of love’11. One could show that the solipsism Heidegger talks 
about is in the end not at all different from what Levinas terms ‘excellence’.  
Heidegger admits that if the determination of Dasein as metaphysically isolated 
were to mean only that Dasein exists simply to reduce nature and others to its own 
goals, or that a detachment from the world would allow Dasein to regain some 
authentic ground, then his philosophical project ‘would indeed be madness’12.  
Heidegger specifies that the statement relative to the essence of Dasein as 
interest into one’s own being doesn’t present an ontic ethical egoism. Instead his 
solipsism is the instantiation of a singularity, it is the moment of emergence of a 
singularity in a way/fashion opposed to the emergence of a substantial subjectivity. 
This solipsism makes possible the disclosure of singular/plural existence. It is from 
this structure that Heidegger says that factically Dasein cannot avoid being-with-
others, cannot avoid recognizing others as singularities. If Dasein weren’t a 
singularity, it wouldn’t be able to express itself with and through other singularities; 
                                                
11 Emmanuel Levinas, Is it Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Jill Robbins, trans. Jill 
Robbins (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 58 
12 Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984), 186 
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quite the opposite, it would have them standing in front of it in a simply empathic 
relation.  
The problem arises when one interprets Dasein as subject, which means as a 
substance that stays identical with itself, regardless and through the course of its 
modulations. One then needs to look back at the entire project of existential 
analysis, which is aimed at questioning Being so as to reach the most radical 
concept of singular existence. As Raffoul puts it: ‘The question of the meaning of 
Being ‘in general’ becomes inseparable from the question of the specific mineness 
of a particular being, the generality of Being harboring the most radical 
individuation’13. The self in this case becomes a differentiating principle, and Being 
is a question of ‘who’ and not of ‘what’. For the concept of an egoistic subject 
Heidegger substitutes that of a singularly decided possibility always open to Being 
and to others. Always open also means that its relation with itself is an each-time-
open. This implies that singular existence can only be understood on the basis of 
the singular existent’s relation to what it decides upon: the world, other beings, 
other singular existences. Solipsism is therefore a matter of relation. While 
subjective theories in the history of philosophy have posed the self as the moment 
of closure from which to begin, thus to a large extent presupposing its course, or at 
least considering it as ‘an underlying presence of an entity present-at-hand’14, 
Heidegger makes of the singular existent an impossibility: the impossibility of 
grasping one’s own being once and for all. This impossibility produces the constant 
openness Dasein is, each time open to and for itself. This openness, however, is not 
                                                
13 François Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, trans. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1998), 20 
14 Ibid., 27 
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configured as a dialectic, which is to say that one is not starting with a self, closed 
in its consciousness, which opens to other consciousnesses only to then come back 
and recognize itself once more. Quite the opposite, with Heidegger one starts with 
an openness, which can never be reduced; this ‘distraction’ of Dasein with regard to 
itself, cannot be reverted back to attention. An absolute subject – abstracted from 
the world and from others – can at most provide what Heidegger calls a formal 
indicator, always late with regard to what it tries to indicate: that which doesn’t 
remain the same.  
The problem with the subjectivist tradition – and even Kant according to 
Heidegger partially falls prey to this criticism15 – is that it misses out on existence, 
because it starts with the idea of ‘the selfsameness and steadiness of something that 
is always present-at-hand’16. The idea of individuation as the each-time singular 
event of selfhood instead allows us to grasps the continual and originary exposure 
of existence to itself. 
As Heidegger puts it, the very first gesture of his analysis demands the opening 
of this anti-subjectivist horizon: ‘if the Self belongs to the essential attributes of 
Dasein, while Dasein’s ‘Essence’ lies in existence, then “I”-hood and Selfhood 
must be conceived existentially’17. As a consequence of this, these concepts 
demand to be considered from the point of view of an each-time-undecided 
                                                
15 This question should in fact be read in particular in light of Heidegger’s re-appropriation of Kant in 
Being and Time, The phenomenological interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, The Basic problems 
of Phenomenology. For the time being this sentence could suffice to render the tone of the discussion: ‘But 
how does it come about that while the ‘I think’ gives Kant a genuine phenomenal starting-point, he cannot 
exploit it ontologically, and has to fall back on the subject […] and does not Kant himself keep on stressing 
that the ‘I’ remains related to its representations, and would be nothing without them?’ in Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 2006), 367.  
16 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 367 
17 Ibid., 365 
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existence. Dasein has to decide for its own self, which is not given, or better it is 
that which at any time is only given, but in this given one hears ‘delivered over’, 
‘offered’ and ‘at stake’. The givenness of the self here turns out to have the 
character of a putting at stake, of gambling. Selfhood is given for articulation, 
rather than given as that which doesn’t change. 
This brings us back to the question of solipsism. Solipsism works along with 
transcendence. As Heidegger puts it: ‘Dasein transcends every being, itself as well 
as every being of its own sort (Dasein-with) and every being not of Dasein’s sort’18.  
Contrary to what the usual criticism supports, solipsism doesn’t indicate a 
dismissal of altruism: it is this very idea of the singularity/eventual character of 
existence to commence human community. ‘Metaphysical Egoicity designates the 
Being-a-self that is the basis for the I and the Thou, in such a way that the Thou is 
not understood as an alter ego’19.  
It is only as singular existence that the Other and myself as other avoid being 
reduced to generality (They), only in this way that these singularities can be 
exposed to one another.  
In solipsism one finds the manifestation of a letting others be. At this point for 
Heidegger sociality is founded on the exposure of singularities to one another, on 
the surpassing of the notion of a subject always present-at-hand in favor of an 
openness, whose appropriation is not possible. The singular, as that which at any 
                                                
18 Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984), 190. It shouldn’t therefore surprise that in the following paragraph Heidegger calls 
in cause Kierkegard’s choosing oneself as ‘absolute choice’ or a ‘primordial choice’, a thinker with whom 
Levinas often seems to have a profound agreement.  
19 François Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, trans. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1998), 212 
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time stands against itself as much as against others and the world, is that which can 
never be reduced to anything, that which is constantly committed to existing, to 
opening, completely, originarily. Only an existent considered as singular (but not as 
individual) can be this openness, only a singular existent outside participation can 
live with others in a plurality that ‘respects’ (this is the term Levinas says is missing 
in Heidegger’s philosophy) them as singulars. The formula Heidegger offers is that 
of a relationship between an ‘I-myself’ and a ‘you-yourself’. This amounts to 
saying that the singular is not only delivered to others, but constantly offers itself to 
others in the singularity that it is. On the other hand, it receives others as unique 
and irreplaceable accesses to the essence of existence, which means to existence 
itself. There is therefore no recuperating of the authentic value of existence outside 
the respect for others, the respect for the existence they are. Solitary individuation 
individuates itself as open, as exposed, always abandoned to this exposure. 
Solipsism therefore works to prevent the incorporation of Dasein, it aspires to 
found society outside fusion. 
Isn’t this exactly what Levinas aims for? Precisely the detachment of the idea of 
the other from a solitude where the I masters itself and therefore masters 
everything? Isn’t it exactly this that characterizes Levinas’ movement in and out of 
philosophy? When Levinas formulates the question in terms of ethical resistance, 
resistance towards the return to the Same, he is perhaps saying something not too 
different from Heidegger when the latter says that the singular finds itself always 
with-others, but that those others are not same with itself, they are an altogether 
different exposure of singular existing. 
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It is perhaps now surprising to read into the fact that on one side Levinas accuses 
Heidegger of promoting with Being-with a fusional ideal and on the other side he 
reproaches Being and Time because ‘all emotion, all fear is finally emotion for self, 
fear for self’20, solipsism. Perhaps in the interplay between the They as the fusional 
ideal of common sense and the metaphysical isolation resides a sociality of singular 
exposures (a contrapuntal sociality to use the terminology employed in the 
discussion of John Cassavetes).  
The gesture of solipsism seems to aim precisely at this: preventing ‘the 
absorption of singularities into a homogeneous Being-together’21. At the same time, 
it also structures singular existence as constantly open to the other, to that which it 
is not. Solipsism opens to existence as that which must be decided upon but which 
cannot be appropriated.  
As Fynsk presents it: ‘when Dasein finds and assumes itself in its constancy, it 
finds that there is always another with it, speaking to it’22. Here lies the 
Heideggerian concept of otherness, which perhaps (Levinas would probably 
subscribe to this) precedes also sociality as ‘organized otherness’, because it 
anticipates it or better because it insinuates itself both in the singular of ‘me’ and in 
the plural of ‘us’. Although the concept as such has not been developed, otherness 
for Heidegger resides in existence itself as that which we are, but that at the same 
time stands in front of us, always still to be decided upon. Our own selfhood 
belongs to the question of otherness. Our existing in the world, the everyday, is a 
                                                
20 Emmanuel Levinas, ‘From the one to the other. Transcendence and time’ in Entre nous. Thinking-of-the-
other, trans. Michael Smith and Barbara Harshav (London: Continuum, 2006), 117 
21 Francois Raffoul, Heidegger and the Subject, trans. David Pettigrew and Gregory Recco (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1998), 213 
22 Christopher Fynsk, Heidegger: Thought and Historicity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 42 
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question of otherness, and from otherness – Heidegger seems to say – there is no 
retreat. As long as existence is in question, as long as it is the question, otherness 
never ceases to be the point that cuts across everything. Existence and otherness are 
the same, but they do not rest on the Same. Attempting a formula: otherness is the 
essence of existence once existence is its own undecided essence.  
 
Where Jean-Luc Nancy speaks of Being as Being-with, one could perhaps 
translate: existing is the work of otherness, an always inoperative work. The us 
therefore has to rest on this paradox: I am myself the more I am open to the work of 
otherness, the more I let the perpetual and ephemeral ambiguity of otherness be 
exposed to me. The more I exist, the more I become incommensurable to myself as 
‘subject’. In existing (which is the same as experience) the existence that is mine 
exceeds my possibilities of seizing it in comprehension, because it resides 
elsewhere. At any given time existence is the elsewhere that I inhabit. But the 
otherness that existence works on me is not the approach of an identity that cuts 
across mine and then returns to itself. Existence affirms itself as the work of 
otherness without Other, which means that one is not in a position to say who (but 
also what) the other is. Otherness remains essentially (therefore existentially) 
ambiguous, itself undecided. The other is not a mediator (as it sometimes appears to 
be in Levinas’ discussion of Justice), because existing is already this combination 
of given and undecided. The openness of existence, which one could simply call  its 
“with” is itself extension to the extremity of the other without a manifest, necessary 
mediation. The otherness in question with regard to existence is the ‘not yet’ of 
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existence itself, the fact that existence still always needs to be existed and existed 
anew, at every moment other than itself.  
Its characterization is at this stage still too general, but perhaps it will turn out 
that this is also  the work philosophy has to attend to, if one pays attention to what 
Jacques Derrida says about the ‘despair’ of beginnings:  
 
Each text belongs to a completely other history […] It is really as if I had never 
before written anything, or even known how to write. Each time I begin a new 
text there is a dismay in the face of the unknown or the inaccessible, an 
overwhelming feeling of clumsiness, inexperience, powerlessness. What I have 
already written is instantly annihilated or rather thrown overboard23. 
 
 
This last consideration anticipates and delivers the discussion over to the second 
moment of these conclusions: identifying the specific philosophical gesture of Jean-
Luc Nancy. The specificity of this gesture, though, cannot be found simply in the 
re-tracing of an identity, in the identification of a constant signature. What one 
should look for is not a face-value recognition, the closure brought upon discourse 
by key words. Nancy’s remarks sink key terms, so as to make of them something 
less and still more than devices of a meaningful presentation. What they point to is 
always an excess of value and the value of excess; their withdrawal – in favor of 
existence – is always as important as their birth to presence. 
                                                
23 Jacques Derrida, ‘A Madness must watch over thinking’ in Points…: interviews, 1974-1994, trans. Peggy 
Kamuf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 352 
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Once more one has to return to the question of Being-with, which somehow 
constitutes the point of arrival of this work and also the crucial moment when 
Nancy’s reflection both joins and distances itself from Heidegger so that the 
singularity of his voice becomes more powerful. From now on the analysis will 
follow on one side the working on concepts: Nancy’s relation to the constellation of 
models from Being and Time; the extent to which Nancy shapes his own 
philosophical tone by working his way out from Heidegger, thinking the unthought 
of Being and Time. On the other, it will follow the working of concepts, that is to 
say the way in which Nancy phrases his philosophy and how this brings up the 
problematic of conceptual presentation as such. In order not to make philosophical 
language, even one that stresses interruption, rupture and openness become simply 
a justificatory ground, Nancy measures philosophical presentation as such and the 
as such of philosophical presentation. On one side philosophy as a reserve of 
concepts, on the other philosophy as the struggle of presentation, but never simply 
the two on opposite ends. The question is therefore the one posed by Lacoue-
Labarthe in the following terms:  
 
whether the dream, the desire that philosophy has entertained since its 
“beginning” for a pure saying (a speech, a discourse purely transparent to what it 
should immediately signify: truth, being, the absolute, etc), has not always been 
compromised by the necessity of going through a text, through a process of 
writing, and whether for this reason philosophy has not always been obliged to 
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use modes of exposition (dialogue or narrative, for example) that are not 
exclusively its own and that it is most powerless to control or even reflect upon24. 
 
The thin line between the purity of philosophical abstraction that rejoins always 
the heart of concepts available to philosophy and philosophy’s complicity with 
language as a fictional living matter25, that which brings philosophy outside of itself 
and also perhaps closer to existence. Nancy engages with the very question of 
argumentation as that which leads constantly closer to impasses, so to reveal in the 
impasse the need for a decisive transgression. It is also always this exhaustion or 
inability to identify what the right of philosophical discourse is and what is proper 
to it that Nancy tries to make evident. As he puts it in Logodaedalus: ‘there is no 
point in doing philosophy if it isn’t to try to accompany this exhaustion of discourse 
to its limit. Because it is only at the limit that one can try philosophy’s luck’26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
24 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Subject of Philosophy, trans. Hugh J.Silverman (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1993), 1 
25 Giorgio Agamben writes: ‘where language stops is not where the unsayable occurs, but rather where the 
matter of words begins‘. Giorgio Agamben, Idea of Prose, trans. Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt (New 
York: SUNY Press, 1995), 37 
26 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Discourse of the Syncope. Logodaedalus, trans. Saul Anton (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2008), 15  
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The in-common of separation 
 
Despite the criticism addressing the notions of solipsism and ‘they’, it is not 
there that Heidegger closes access to otherness. It is instead in the conceptual 
constellation leading to destiny that Heidegger turns to a closure. As long as Being-
with remains undecided it shows the opening of an access, rather than the closure of 
otherness. 
Nancy exposes this logic in two quotations. They appear in the same text, one at 
the beginning, one at the end, the second perhaps as an answer to the first:  
- “Being-with forms an essential condition for the essence of Dasein. How? This 
is not easy to uncover because of the limits of the analysis presented by the text. 
Why this point of resistance and relative obscurity?” 27;  
- “The limit, the impasse, or the failure, are thus inscribed quite precisely at the 
place of and owing to the very opening of the text of Being and Time”28.   
 
The insufficiency thus belongs to Being and Time itself.  
Heidegger released the problem of an irreducible otherness at the heart of the 
singular’s existent with intense force in Being and Time. Among many others, one 
could cite these two passages: ‘Being-with is in every case a characteristic of one’s 
                                                
27 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Being-with of the Being-there’, in Rethinking Facticity, trans. François Raffoul 
and David Pettigrew (New York: SUNY Press, 2008), 113 
28 Ibid., 123 
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own Dasein […] those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself 
are themselves Dasein’29 – ‘the world of Dasein is a with-world’30.  
The idea of the constant work of otherness at the core of singular and eventual 
disclosures of existence, the thought of existing itself as constant opening to that 
which stands against it as possible (and unknown, insofar as it always has to be 
assumed); the very conception of something that could work only before and 
beyond binary constructions (in particular that of subjects and crowds, of singular 
and plural), that could play the role of un-grounding the latter in the same way that 
transcendence disengages the subject-object relation, offers extremely rich and 
compelling material for thinking the question of otherness. Sometimes one has the 
impression that the co-essentiality and undecidability of Being-with 
matures/develops almost naturally from the overall structure of the book. In a 
footnote Nancy comments that: ‘despite this prejudice, there is perhaps no other 
philosophical text that refers us more forcefully than this one does to the exteriority 
of the experience it attempts to analyze’31. 
The fact that the question of Being-with remains unresolved perhaps also 
belongs to the goals of Being and Time itself. To put this differently: this notion 
should remain the very horizon of Heidegger’s work and should perhaps therefore 
be thematized as the gesture that re-opens the volume beyond Heidegger’s 
notorious firmness.  
                                                
29 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 157 
30 Ibid., 155 
31 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Birth to Presence, trans. Brian Holmes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1993), footnote 45, 406 
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And yet at other times, Heidegger, ‘to a certain extent in spite of himself’, 
retraces the meaning of Being-with towards its very closure. This has to do with the 
prejudice that Nancy highlights, namely the tendency to grant special relevance to 
the possibility for the authentically exceptional to appropriate the originary.  
While Heidegger insists on Being-with as an existential principle, he seems at 
the same time to be able to articulate it only as the actualization of a common fate 
(thus carrying on a gesture similar – as Nancy argues – to a certain German 
Idealism), whose only alternative is an indifferent perpetual activism devoid of any 
content. 
 
In particular what seems to bring Being-with to a standstill is the fact that 
Heidegger sublimates it in – and therefore subjects it to – a destination that 
incarnates the everyday disclosure of existence. This incarnation is the 
appropriation by a ‘powerless superior power’ that sacrifices the singular plural 
play of existence, the fact that at each time what is at stake is a singular decision 
towards existence as the plural otherness that cannot be appropriated but that 
nevertheless one must make one’s own. The with suddenly transforms into an 
essence that has always already appropriated and expropriated existence, the latter 
being relegated to a vanishing point ‘already guided in advance’: fate [Schicksals] 
as the possibility that Dasein ‘has inherited and yet has chosen’ and its crossing 
with destiny [Geshick]. As Fritsche says, the past ‘demands of us that we subjugate 
ourselves to it and defend or re-realize it’32. It is in the past that one ought to seek 
                                                
32 Johannes Fritsche, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1999), 36 
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the actualization of the authentic, while the inhauntetic constantly projects itself in 
the future: ‘with the inconstancy of the they-self Dasein makes present its ‘today’. 
In awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old one’33.  
  
Heidegger proposes a structure where the processes of mastering and 
appropriation are always left open, never properly resolved, but tied together in the 
form of separation. Possibilities are never fully grasped or exhausted, what Dasein 
understands is never completely understood. This is the case for Dasein’s own 
individuation – mineness is an each time, Being one’s own is a recurring threshold 
– but also for its relation to others – the voice of the friend cannot be identified in a 
specific “who”, fascination and guilt disappropriate without then being recaptured 
in and by understanding/theory, being-with doesn’t offer the rule of a unity but 
makes possible a relation across distance. In the end not even resoluteness – factual 
existence firmly determined in remaining in the open of possibilities, ‘letting itself 
be encountered’34 – or decision – where the fact of existence is exposed in all its 
immemorial passivity – does provide a closure to Dasein’s stretching between birth 
and death. The moment of mastery remains always conceived as a deferral.  
On the other end though Heidegger seems to reconfigure an almost opposite 
constellation around the terms connectedness, fate and destiny, according to which 
authenticity is realized: ‘Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its ‘generation’ goes to 
make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein’35. The problem is less that Being-
                                                
33 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 443  
34 Ibid., 374 
35 Ibid., 436 
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with is not developed enough. Instead the stress should be on the fact that in its 
development it comes to master itself; its existential character is exceeded and it 
becomes – in spite of itself – a calculated category, understood now simply 
according to ‘fate’, ‘the ground for destiny, by which we understand Dasein’s 
historizing as Being-with Others’36. In this section of Being and Time resoluteness 
becomes the grasping of one’s fate. The everyday has to be bypassed and 
experiences have to be connected into a destined future, an already decided 
destination. The tension between the ahead-of-itself and the having-been is resolved 
in a common destiny that gathers them together and brings their work to a halt. 
Future as the moving back towards the fact of already existing, of always already 
being in the face of existence, now becomes realized only in the possibility given 
by a destined community that sidesteps singularities. In this connectedness the 
concept of participation, against which Heidegger had struggled while discussing 
the notion of the ‘They’, reappears: a connected community identifies its hero 
surmounting the undetermined who of the voice of the friend. Guilt is expiated as 
response to the call of destiny. Responsibility becomes responsibility not towards 
all our destinies, but towards the destiny of All, a gathering together in the 
sublimation of singular fates. The only trait that distinguishes  the togetherness of 
destiny from the confused homogeneity of the ‘They’ is that while in the latter, 
difference was blocked off by a curious dis-interest, here it is foreclosed by a 
creative catastrophe, where the singular rather quickly turns and locks itself in the 
                                                
36 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 438 
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order of a plural unicum (one could also name this – with Nancy – an 
immanentism37). 
The everyday, which in the first part of the analysis gave the impression of being 
the moment, the ‘at stake’ of a decision for existence, is now delimited as the 
floating ‘coming to pass’. Encountering the everyday means only reabsorbing it 
into a wider, better rooted, purpose38. The dispersal of the ‘between’ stretching 
from birth to death must be made into unity, what comes to pass has become fate. 
Every characterization of each day as the moment of a deferred mastering of one’s 
own possibility proves to simply be a momentary step towards the constitution of a 
horizon channeled by destiny. The between Dasein is – the fact that ‘existentially 
birth is not and never is something past and death is just as far from having the kind 
of Being of something still outstanding’39 – finds an ultimate, but then also infinite, 
end.  
Heidegger says that Dasein is a stretching along. If the value of this is to be 
preserved, then it should not result in a destiny whose only freedom is that of 
giving up. In this way Dasein is destined at every moment to a precise moment, 
which becomes exactly the moment of an ultimate presence. In Heidegger’s words, 
in fact, a ‘moment of vision’ is a principle that exceeds every now. Destiny comes 
                                                
37 ‘A community presupposed as having to be one of human beings presupposes that it effect, or that it must 
effect, as such and integrally, its own essence, which is itself the accomplishment of the essence of 
humanness’. Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael 
Holland and Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 3. This question 
owes a lot to a reading of Heidegger’s ‘national-esthétisme’ by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, art 
and politics: the fiction of the political, trans. Chris Turner (London: Blackwell, 1990). 
38 Particularly interesting could be here a reading of Blanchot at the moment where he says: ‘The Everyday: 
what is most difficult to discover’. Maurice Blanchot, ‘Everyday Speech’ in The Infinite Conversation, 
trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 238 
39 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 374 
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here to represent the ‘right now’ of existence, where existence concludes its 
deciding upon possibilities. In destiny everything has been made actual.  
According to this configuration, the world is not only the dispersion of each 
times, the eventual spacing and relatedness of singular existences, but the plane 
where a destiny is played out. Future becomes that which is acted out by being sent, 
its directionality decided once and for all. The structural connectedness that ends up 
revealing – in a moment of vision – the flowing of fates into a destiny demands that 
existence closes its work towards the future: the now of existence has finally 
occurred. At this point it is only by way of destiny that the community of humanity 
can subsist40. The ‘connectedness of life’ makes of discrete ‘current nows’ a final 
‘Now’, where an ultimate ‘revolution’ becomes possible: Dasein turns towards 
itself and recognizes its always having been in view of the destiny in which it now 
participates. This means also that existence is no longer open to the decision of 
what still lies outside itself, it is no longer that which constitutes itself only by 
being approached (possibilities). The work of existence as resolutely maintaining 
itself in the deferral of appropriation, where what is grasped is also re-sent to a 
further grasping, finds in destiny its right time, where no delay is allowed. Singular 
existence becomes selfsame and still completely oblivious of itself (solitary) in the 
plural unicum, the only one that can legitimately express plurality.  
The call of fate is a final and last call, where ‘the future is all used up’, where 
every who calling from the unknown has been individuated and every we or us has 
                                                
40 One should compare this passage from Being and Time: ‘Resoluteness implies handing oneself down by 
anticipation to the ‘there’ of the moment of vision; and this handing down we call ‘fate’. This is also the 
ground for destiny, by which we understand Dasein’s historizing in Being-with Others’ with the one 
already quoted from The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 190.   
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ceased to happen as a sending / receiving but is already and infinitely named in the 
radical individuation of destiny. Silence  derives not from listening, but from the 
infinite – and final – submission of existence to a single decision, which has, it goes 
without saying, nothing to do with a singular decision.  
 
In this constellation the very possibility of a repetition both of decision and of 
resolution, therefore the possibility for the constant work of existence as unfinished 
opening to otherness, is foreclosed. The finitude of existence, and therefore also its 
eventual character (the each time), seems to get sucked up in an infinite 
permanence where existential possibilities are disclosed only as monuments.  
The only possibility remaining is that of ‘giving up’, freedom becomes the 
freedom to ‘give up in accordance with the demands of some possible Situation’41. 
The throwness of existence is finally ‘accepted’, and ‘incorporated’ in what appears 
to be an ‘ultimate moment of vision’.  
Being-with at this stage has lost its bond with the promises and the powers of 
existence. Rather, it seems that the notion simply collaborates in sending forward 
the connection of dispersed experiences in the together, in unity and destiny. Being-
with becomes the ground through which Dasein ‘pulls itself together out of its 
dispersal and thinks up for itself a unity in which that ‘together’ is embraced’42.  
Heidegger therefore seems to close off and efface the very radicality of his own 
propositions. If it is true that he displaces any appeal to a sociality that derives 
simply from the identity of a subject, he seems at the same time to counterbalance 
                                                
41 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 443 
42 Ibid., 442 
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this with a gesture in the opposite direction, that of presupposing the solution of the 
problem of relation in an incarnated community, the destiny of the Volk. 
It is at this point that Nancy’s reading of Heidegger becomes an appropriation 
from a distance. Right after the formulation of Being-with as coessential with 
Dasein, Nancy’s reading becomes something more, a decision. 
Why with Being-with and not with some other Heideggerian notion? Nancy 
decides on Being-with because its co-essentiality is both the most explicit attempt 
at articulating the question of an existence in the world beyond individual 
subjectivity and also the point at which Heidegger seems to fall outside of itself, 
outside perhaps of existence as he had defined it. For Nancy it is crucial to expose 
this co-essentiality: Dasein and Being-with happen each time at the same time. 
Otherness happens before the self, but not in the connotation Levinas ascribes to it, 
rather in the sense that exposure to the plurality of existence happens before and 
cuts across every possibility of firm identification.  
The other comes only once and never leaves, which also means that it never 
comes back.  
This is possible though only if the with is thought as being the measure of an 
incommensurability. With the notion of destiny, Heidegger imposes on existence a 
measure. Nancy talks instead of ‘measures of the incommensurable’43, one that can 
take place only within a finite thinking, that is within a thinking which renounces 
itself – justice towards itself – in order to be just to existence. This is a thinking that 
loses its properness and assumes itself to be signaling and exposing powers of 
                                                
43 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 81 
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existence. This could also be said in the following, more concise way: thinking 
exposes itself as the thought of singularities, attempting to think the other without 
abandoning the other of thinking. One will have to repeat this many more times 
(repetition is in the nature of what is being said; finitude requires a pollakos 
legomenon, the spoken-in-many-ways44), but for now let’s use Nancy’s words: 
‘existence the truth of which consists in leaving its sense always beyond or short of 
any apprehension’45. 
 
 
In this light then the with should be thought  as that which measures the nothing 
and everything between us. With is the measure of what happens between us – 8 
billion bodies – even when nothing happens – in the figure of indifference or of 
mystic dis-interest46 – or when –and this is perhaps its crudest modality – the 
nothing happens47, but also and still when everything happens (even for Heidegger 
the gift of love confronts and works in the openness of the with).  
One could rephrase these remarks by saying that the with is the open into which 
‘we’ maintains itself and sense keeps circulating, from us to us: ‘to us: to the 
upsurge of our existences, together, as the surging up of sense’48. The with as the 
                                                
44 See Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’ in The birth to presence, trans. Brian Holmes (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), 36  
45 Jean-Luc Nancy, La Pensée Dérobée, (Paris: Editions Galilée, 2001) 21 (translation mine). 
46 For a discussion on dis-interest see: Sean Gaston, Derrida and disinterest, (London: Continuum, 2005). 
47 “We are told that when Holderlin went 'mad' he constantly repeated, 'Nothing is happening to me, 
nothing is happening to me'”. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Poetry as experience, trans. Andrea Tarnowski  
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 21 
48 Jean-Luc Nancy, Hegel. The Restlessness of the Negative, trans. Jason Smith and Steven Miller 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 2002), 78 
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open thus is the place from which and to which we address, as already addressed, 
existence: work of an open otherness measured by the with49.  
All this amounts to saying that the with itself is nothing, but only because it is 
what is always ‘a question of’. The impossibility of turning the with into a political 
strategy or into an absolute moral principle proves its necessity and its necessarily 
open character, whose articulation is always both a naked fact and an impossible 
question. What the with measures is a logic of separation, which makes ‘we’ co-
essential with ‘I’, but only there where in their turn neither I nor we can simply be 
subjects of a self-presentation or of a presentation of the self. The presentation of 
the with therefore escapes the right measure of presentation, after having escaped 
demonstration. The with is the open itself: it manifests itself, if it does, only there 
where one touches in us both our inextricable evidence (the fact, for example. of 
being hopelessly involved in queues and crowds) and the insufficiency of our 
programs (the with produces clefts both in the theme of recognition and in that of 
seduction). This is not a deficiency, or at least not only a deficit. Quite the opposite, 
it presents itself as an affirmation (and an ultimately ethical one). The forms that 
attempt to present the with fall always short of its openness and at the same time 
perform an excess of appropriation: never plural enough, but also too firm in 
presenting the identity of the plural. The with thus remains separated from them, it 
withdraws and still keeps pushing forward (the fact that in the face of wars one can 
always still glimpse some moribund piety or ‘humanity’ – a generous gesture 
                                                
49 This could well be the scheme of the Derridean ‘oui, oui’. Jacques Derrida ‘Numbers of yes’ in Psyche. 
Inventions of the Other, Volume II, trans. John Leavey and Elizabeth Rottenbergh. (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2008).  
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towards the prisoner – doesn’t spring from the essentially good nature of humanity 
but responds to the nakedness of the with).  
  
With celebrates also every relation from me to me, the each time of mineness. 
As Nancy says: ‘“Each time” is the singular-plural structure of the disposition. 
Therefore, “each time mine” signifies primarily “each time his or hers”, that is, 
“each time with”: “mineness is itself only a possibility that occurs in the concurrent 
reality of being-each-time-with’50. ‘Mine’ is nowhere else than in the open of the 
‘with’. Love too sees itself here. If – as Heidegger has it – it’s true that love is a 
task and also a nude task (there’s no knowledge and still one has to fight for and 
through it) than it is there that one can express most vividly the logic of the with, its 
being nothing. It is breaking every relation with us, while constantly setting all 
possibility of relation, according to this existential logic: relation with the with is 
the with out of relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
50 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 97 
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Powers of Existence 
 
The with then can only be occasioned to name a phenomenon of the retracing of 
common sense: with makes possible a retracing by withdrawing at the moment of 
appropriation, by escaping a properness that will reduce it to the opposite of itself, 
that is to say a principle of identical presence. Sense in this way shows that with is 
the logic of every existence that cannot simply afford to say: ‘I and the other’ but 
that necessarily has to put up with the fact that the inside of every I would still be 
with, because it would still have the structure of an each time mine; the Je in 
Jemeingkeit must be re-existed each time.  
 
If sense is therefore exposed as with, there is then no common sense, but only 
the questioning, the putting back into question of this commonality. In a way sense 
is common only when sense is dead (or death itself). A reflection on sense thus 
means  sense’s explosion, the bending and re-bending of sense.  
 
Existence is not the particularization of a universal essence or the degrading of 
principles, but rather the fact that ‘at the point where we would expect "something", 
a substance or a procedure, a principle or an end, a signification, there is nothing 
but the manner, the turn of the other access’51.  
                                                
51 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), p14 
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Exposing principles (the Heideggerian existentials) to the each time of the call of 
existence constitutes the ethical problem at the heart of existence, but also the 
anticipation of every ethical program, an ‘archi-ethos’ as Nancy calls it. 
With a tone faithful to the Heidegger of Letter on Humanism one could argue 
that an ontology can be written only as an ethics and that every ethics is also an 
ontology, or better that ontology not only is ethical but that it must be so as long as 
a questioning of existence is necessarily also a question of not betraying this 
existence by closing its horizon (whether in the name of the I, the Other, or the 
National Community).  
‘Only if the inquiry is itself seized upon in an existential manner as a possibility 
of the Being of each existing Dasein, does it become at all possible to disclose the 
existentiality of existence and to undertake an adequately founded ontological 
problematic”52. Nancy makes of this Heideggerian thesis the chance to revert Being 
into the responsibility towards each parcel of sense, thus making of principles a 
dispersal, perpetual exposure to the otherness of undecided existing. 
Here one discovers something like powers of existence: existence as the force of 
the each time eludes a thinking of its beginning as it eludes that of its closure.     
The formula powers of existence doesn’t mean affirming an ontical priority over 
the ontological, a paradigm of the banal as it were, nor on the contrary does it aim 
at establishing the anteriority of the ontological rearguard over the facts of the 
everyday; rather, it means the utter exposure of both to the otherness of undecided 
existing,  
                                                
52 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 34 
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Powers of existence would thus operate in planting the responsibility of 
mundane existence always as first concern, concern and pre-occupation against a 
principle or value which telelogically itself imposes on existence (such as the 
People) or that dissolves existence and its decisions (such as the Crowd).  
Powers of existence define philosophy as a responsible decision made in view of 
the impossible on always factual and urgent possibilities. 
The intention here is to find under the articulation of powers of existence the 
very gesture of Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy. This articulation seems to constitute 
both the opening and the displacement of ends operated in Nancy’s often 
fragmentary writing (fragmentation itself is perhaps the very enactment of those 
powers).  
In discussing sense, the body, freedom, community, the order of ontology, the 
rule of philosophical presentations, Nancy constantly evokes powers of existence: 
moments that keep true to the claim of existence. The latter demands an opening, 
an always inaugural decision against no horizon (if not the circulation of sense), it 
demands that this decision be inextinguishable (in front of community, meaning, 
but also ethics and politics, and every recognition that runs in and out of those, 
infinitely piercing them to a ground).  
Existence demands to be essentially open to the other, to the otherness over 
which it casts its eventual decision.  
The power of existence is moreover a decision always belonging only to ‘some 
factical Dasein at a particular time’53. It is this decision that responds by keeping 
                                                
53 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London: Blackwell, 
2006), 345 
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existence un-answered – in the answering – but constantly in view; in view in the 
given (that’s the only thing we have) as that which cannot at any time be received 
as simply given. 
Freedom and community, world and sense, body and otherness: these concepts 
have to be existed, that is they have to be crossed over, sliced open by existence, by 
the singular touch of existence. 
Existence is already the very exposure to the other as deciding for possibility. 
This ambiguity – decision is only always a decision towards more openness – 
shouldn’t as someone suggests determine the end of philosophical work54; quite the 
opposite, it delivers philosophy over to existence, over perhaps to a lateness into 
which philosophy doesn’t recollect itself, but keeps enacting the gesture of opening 
itself to otherness. 
 
The very idea of a power of existence imposes therefore on philosophy an act 
ex-scription of experience. Philosophy will neither try to recuperate within its 
system the exteriority of experience (this comes from Heidegger, although it is 
what Levinas challenges him for), nor to cap experience with a factical ideal that 
would pose an asymptotic principle or a ‘better way’. Philosophy rather attempts to 
expose the singularity of the each time as the founding of existence. 
In this way, experience remains both the very site of a philosophical resolution and 
that which thinking can only grasp without deciding for it once and for all. 
Philosophy is not trying to be right. This seems to confirm the formulation 
                                                
54 Paul Ricoeur says: ‘The need to maintain a certain equivocalness of the status of the Other […] With this 
aporia of the Other philosophical discourse comes to an end’. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. 
Kathleen Blamey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 355 
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proposed by Adorno: ‘The very wish to be right, down to its subtlest form of 
logical reflection, is an expression of that spirit of self-preservation which 
philosophy is precisely concerned to break down’55.  
By philosophical resolution we mean here that philosophy measures itself 
against the questions opened within experience – philosophy is not something 
foreign to experience, therefore it doesn’t have to recuperate it – as the act (or 
praxis) that brings the questioning of experience back to the point of undecidability: 
this is experience’s ex-scription. 
For this same reason experience always remains in advance of philosophy and 
maintains open an intrinsic difference through which philosophy cannot (and 
should not) pass intact (this is also the gesture that Levinas advocates for his own 
thinking).  
It is not a question about the foundations or the logic of existence, but a question 
about the resonance of the singular event of existence, at once able to transform the 
sense of the world and incommensurable to any other stroke.  
The question of the ‘who’ is perpetually the question of existence because it is 
always a matter of coming up to what happens at the level of the singular sparkle of 
existence, thus neither what it is before it happens, nor how it repeats itself. 
The kind of philosophical reflection that powers of existence need is one that 
proceeds not by recollecting in the inside, but by bouncing back from existence. 
What Heidegger refers to as Widerschein should here be invoked to name the work 
of philosophy itself, ‘not shut ourselves off from the phenomena by a framework of 
                                                
55 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia. Reflections on a Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: 
Verso, 1996), 70 
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concepts’56. What one should now read in reflection is the fact that philosophy 
doesn’t withdraw from experience and from the fact that experience is existence 
(not that experience makes existence), philosophy doesn’t retire into its own 
foundation, into the very place of its own self-preservation; rather, it finds itself – it 
finds its own saying as well as its very ‘philosophy’ – in the midst of existence and 
only there. It doesn’t have to turn backward to itself, instead it reaches itself and at 
the same time attempts not to remain identical with itself ‘in those things that daily 
surround it’57. Reflection as the understanding of powers of existence, reflection as 
the gesture of Nancy’s philosophy, is the giving of itself to the inception of 
existence. This would be a peremptory, unconditional affirmation of philosophy (its 
passion, its suffering): that of never abandoning existence, everything that is as that 
which always still has to be existed, a ‘going-along-with the givens’58. Philosophy, 
given to existence, receives its action from it.  
It also respects what Heidegger says in terms of ‘the loyalty the philosophizing 
individual has to himself’59 as the only proof of good philosophy. Being loyal to 
oneself means also having entered the hard thought, the limit-thought of existence 
as that which doesn’t have foundations or essence: having decided to decide. It 
means precisely to have resolved some kind of freedom to existence, to the 
                                                
56 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1982), 160 
57 Ibid., 159 
58 Ibid., 161 
59 Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984), 17 
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possibilities of existence, to have already entered ‘the remaining uncertainty and 
gaping discord’60.  
 
Nancy seems overall to respond to two claims advanced by Heidegger:  
- that philosophy does not in its working produce a world-view and also fights 
against this tendency almost natural in/to philosophizing itself;  
- more importantly that philosophy has to start (and possibly end) right at 
existence, at current existence, at ‘mine’ ‘yours’ ‘hers’ ‘their’ understood 
outside properties and only in their existing. As Heidegger says: ‘philosophy 
remains latent in every human existence and need not be first added to it from 
somewhere else’61. 
 
Reflection is not the act of coming back to itself (therefore of affirming the 
substantiality of the given), but rather that of exploding (circulating) in the midst of 
experience.  
Every singular each time of existence is a reflection. Philosophy neither casts it 
on existence, nor names it; it puts it in a space where its necessity is open to a 
regime of interconnections.  
 
                                                
60 Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984), 18 
61 Ibid., 18 
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Given the definition Nancy offers of existence as ‘being-determined according 
to indetermination’62, one could say that, though existence is given, it is given to be 
existed, therefore not simply. It is given as an offering whose reception is 
undecidable. That the essence is existence therefore always means having to affirm 
existence (and not simply something about it, as Levinas also reproaches 
philosophy fordoing). ‘All thought frees the existing of existence because thought 
proceeds from it’63: this is the command that falls upon thinking when thinking 
aims to be more than a gathering of information or the passion of undoing one 
particular rhetoric to impose a new one in its place or the regaining of a self-
assurance as the right of philosophy to exist always as what it is.  
 
The emergence of incommensurable measures with regard to the body, sense, 
the world, the opening of an incommensurable space or of a measure of 
incommensurability doesn’t respond to an awareness as to the end of philosophical 
action, it rather answers a different call: that of affirming existence. One should 
therefore see a program here – moments of incommensurability could be another 
title for it – perhaps the entire program of Nancy’s philosophy. It is in the nature of 
thinking to open a field of possibilities rather than to close upon them with an 
ultimate decision.  
 
 
                                                
62 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Decision of Existence’ in The Birth to Presence, trans. Brian Holmes (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 104. 
63 Jean Luc Nancy, The Experience of Freedom, trans. Bridget McDonald (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), 18 
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Nancy is quite clear about this: ‘thought has no decision of practical, ethical, or 
political action to dictate. If it claims to do so, it forgets the very essence of the 
decision, and it forgets the essence of its own thinking decision’64. 
 
And yet what proceeds from this is not the great refusal of thinking. Thinking 
does not decline action nor does it remain ‘indifferent’ or ‘disengaged’. Thinking 
cannot be indifference towards action, there is not such a thing as disengaged 
thinking. The exposure of moments of incommensurability responds to a gesture of 
affirmation, rather than to a withdrawal: to expose an immeasurable measure as the 
practice of thinking.  
If this prevents philosophy from enacting the prescription of general rules, at the 
same time it keeps philosophy as the very affirmation of existence and of existence 
alone as its own essence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
64 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Decision of Existence’ in The birth to presence, trans. Brian Holmes (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 108 
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Coda  
Love: a broken heart and the exposed being 
  
The Heideggerian thinking of the with as a moment of sublimation, where the 
stripped juxtaposition of our existences grows into destiny, seems then to indicate 
Being-with as the capping of individual experiences. It is thus the very closure of 
powers of existence.  
On several occasions when confronted with the Heideggerian development of 
Being-with, Nancy seems to elude the impasse of destiny by turning to love65. It is 
in fact in the few notes on a possibility of love that Heidegger – without ever 
systematizing his thinking in this direction – seems to put the notion of Being-with 
back into question.  
One should be extremely cautious in trying to formulate a Heideggerian thinking 
of love simply by reconstructing the sincere, but nonetheless sketchy, remarks one 
finds in the Letters to Hannah Arendt66, given some apparent contradictions67 there 
enclosed. Although the letters date from the period during which Heidegger was 
completing Being and Time, one cannot be too sure as to how far the equation 
between the man in love and the philosopher of Being and Time can be 
meaningfully carried out. The aim here, therefore, will only be to problematize 
                                                
65 Not surprisingly perhaps Giorgio Agamben attempts a similar path: ‘Love, as passion of facticity, may be 
what makes it possible to cast light on the concept of the Ereignis’. Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities: 
collected essays in philosophy, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2002), 202. 
66 Hannah Arendt’s work on St.Augustine and its relation with Heidegger’s thought would deserve a 
separate treatment, which cannot be afforded here. The idea could be to analyze Heidegger’s care and 
St.Augustine’s idea of love as craving as treated in Hannah Arendt, Love and St.Augustine, trans. Joanna 
Vecchiarelli Scott & Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).  
67 Heidegger speaks of love mainly as the affirmation of the Other, although it sometimes also refers to it as 
unity. 
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Nancy’s turn towards ‘Heideggerian love’, while always keeping in mind both 
Being-with and the thinking of existence at large. The letters do contain a few 
interesting considerations. In a surprisingly blithe fashion Heidegger insists that: 
- to pose love ‘as such’ contradicts the very expression of love;  
- in love the otherness of the other bursts forth without ever being reabsorbed 
(according to St.Agustine’s volo ut sis);  
- love is the most explicit undertaking of existence; the moment where taking 
existence upon oneself remains beyond and in excess of every possible theme 
or knowledge. 
 
In the letter from the 9th of July 1925, Heidegger says: ‘love as such does not 
exist’. Love is always only ‘my’ or ‘your’ or ‘our’ love, it can be determined solely 
on the basis of the singular stroke of the ones who share this love. No singular 
expression of love can be adjusted to fit into the horizon of a thinking of absolute 
love. As such, outside its singular eventuality, its singular measure of Being-with, 
love doesn’t take place.  
Also, Heidegger proceeds to say that ‘only such faith – which as faith in the 
other is love – can really accept the ‘other’ completely’68. The other appears here as 
the gift of love: ‘you – just as you are and will remain – that’s how I love you’. The 
possibility to understand the other, as the positive affirmation of an unknown, is the 
way love sustains itself always beyond mimesis and integration: ‘only then love is 
strong for the future’. Only then is love future itself. 
                                                
68 Hannah Arendt / Martin Heidegger, Letters 1925 - 1975, ed. Ursula Ludz, trans. Andrew Shields 
(Orlando: Hartcourt, 2004), 20 
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This delivers the argument to a third declaration: ‘to be in one’s love: to be 
forced into one’s innermost existence’69. Love emerges here as the moment of 
existence that cannot be assimilated: ‘for anything else there are methods, aids, 
limits, and understanding’70. Love is then the fiercest power of existence, it keeps 
itself open, ‘always beyond or short of any apprehension’. Faith for co-existence. 
To confirm this Heidegger adds: ‘being allowed to wait for the beloved – that is 
what is most wonderful – for it is in that waiting that the beloved is present’71.    
The minute space Heidegger makes for love allows one to glimpse for Being-
with a different trajectory from the thematization contained in Being and Time. It is 
perhaps not surprising that the possibility of Being-with to offer a logic of 
separation is maintained right at the point where Heidegger is at the farthest remove 
from a properly philosophical presentation (and the tone at times seems almost to 
resonate with Levinas): ‘here (in love) being close is a matter of being at the 
greatest distance from the other […] the other’s presence suddenly breaks into our 
life – no soul can come to terms with that’72.  
 
This impossibility of love – ‘we want to thank the beloved, but find nothing that 
suffices’73 – perhaps indicates something more. Not being able to think the with 
without transforming it into an essence (fate, generation, community, sacrifice) or 
                                                
69 Hannah Arendt / Martin Heidegger, Letters 1925 - 1975, ed. Ursula Ludz, trans. Andrew Shields 
(Orlando: Hartcourt, 2004), 21  
70 In this same letter one should take into consideration also the final passages where ‘thank you’ is 
repeated three times, until the final ‘thank you for your love’. Here perhaps one could attempt a 
triangulation on thinking as gratitude to the impossibility of love.   
71 Hannah Arendt / Martin Heidegger, Letters 1925 - 1975, trans. Andrew Shields, ed. Ursula Ludz 
(Orlando: Hartcourt, 2004), 18 
72 Ibid., 4-5 
73 Ibid., 5 
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dispersing it in the apparent apathy of existence as routine (they, indifference, idle-
talk, scribbling) – thinking it as what remains in-common in separation, what 
signals a non continuous contact, the play that always puts at stake both actualized 
occasions and indefinable possibilities – is ‘a paradox common to all philosophy’ 
and not only a Heideggerian deficit. Philosophy seems to always fall short of our 
being-together as that which is stretched across a distance (and always an other 
distance, a newly born one) rather than united in a point.  
In ‘Shattered love’ Nancy attempts to articulate the concept of love beyond 
metaphysical and dialectical significations aimed at completion. In Nancy’s view 
love interrupts the law of a subject that always returns identical to itself. Love 
triggers a transcendence that works as the ‘disimplication of an immanence’74. Love 
breaks into the reflective work of the subject. 
To the scheme that wants love as absolute representation running on the 
fulfillment of the subject (reflecting subject – love – fulfillment), Nancy opposes 
the logic of the heart (broken heart – love – promise) where love is a singular 
movement that expresses itself as the arrival of a promise (this arrival, though, 
doesn’t imply that the promise is kept and therefore concluded). If one understands 
love according to the first articulation, one hears in it the work of possession. 
Possession is not of the object possessed – it is not, as it were, simply the grasping 
of the object – instead it is the subject realizing itself as property. Understood as the 
law of the broken heart, love instead constitutes the exposed being, that which ‘is 
not completed by the dialectical process, it incompletes itself to the outside, it is 
                                                
74 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Shattered Love’ in A finite thinking, ed. Simon Sparks, trans. Lisa Garbus and Simona 
Sawhney (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 249 
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presented offered to something that is not itself’75. Here the affirmation and 
negation proper to dialectic are not eliminated, but posed to the outside of a ‘you’. 
What the heart exposes is finitude, the impossibility of appropriation through love, 
impossibility of finding one’s own property ‘either in itself or in a dialectical 
sublimation of the self76. 
Therefore the experience of love is experience of the outside: experience of a 
subject that cannot maintain itself simply on its self-presence, but has to pro-pose 
itself to itself in terms of discontinuity. Love rests on this outside that is not the 
outside of me balanced by the outside of the other. It is not enough to say that the 
other’s identity has traversed me, because it is not the work of another identity that 
exposes me. The other as well comes always as other, already disjoined, never 
itself. What the other approaches when he approaches me is not an integrity called 
‘me’, but a movement towards otherness. As Nancy puts it:” (love’s) coming is 
only a departure for the other, its departure only the coming of the other’77. 
This structure, Nancy says, is nothing else than the ontological determination of 
Dasein. Love is the law of a subjectivity that starts in singular sharing, not in the 
mastery of the ‘I’ nor in its sublimation through the other (in this case one would 
have to assume again the other as closed immanence). If it’s true that this trajectory 
owes its formulation to Heidegger, it is also true that in Being and Time Heidegger 
remains silent about the possibilities of love. According to Nancy, Fürsorge ‘is still 
                                                
75 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Shattered Love’ in A finite thinking, ed. Simon Sparks, trans. Lisa Garbus and Simona 
Sawhney (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 252 
76 Ibid., 262 
77 Ibid., 262 
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thought starting from an ‘I’ or from an ‘identity’ that goes toward the other’78 (but 
even for Levinas love remains nothing more than the moment of a process: love 
expresses the face, but is then surpassed by the absolute distance and novelty of 
filiation, the child. Love remains ambiguous, ‘does not transcend unequivocably’79, 
to love is also to return to oneself. It is only in going beyond its terms – and so in 
the child and in paternity – that love can manifest ‘a unity that is not opposed to 
multiplicity, but, in the precise sense of the term, engenders it’80). 
The space and the logic described by Nancy can be found in Heidegger’s 
thinking only if one pays attention to the letters to Hanna Arendt. There one can 
glimpse Being-with thematized as faith in the possibility of the other, in otherness 
itself as the decision for existence. In this series of love letters something is opened 
that doesn’t find space in Being and Time: a singular sharing names the absolute 
singularity of being, ‘that which remains ‘self’ when nothing comes back to the 
‘self’81. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
78 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Shattered Love’ in A finite thinking, ed. Simon Sparks, trans. Lisa Garbus and Simona 
Sawhney (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 269 
79 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingins (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 2005) 266 
80 Ibid., 273 
81 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Shattered Love’ in A finite thinking, trans. Lisa Garbus and Simona Sawhney, Simon 
Sparks ed. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 262 
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Beginning to think  
 
The existential analytic of Being and Time is the project from which 
all subsequent thinking follows, whether this is Heidegger's own 
thinking or our various ways of thinking against or beyond 
Heidegger himself. […] It does not signify that this analytic is 
definitive, only that it is responsible for registering the seismic 
tremor of a more decisive rupture in the constitution or 
consideration of meaning.  
    Jean-Luc Nancy 82 
 
 
To conclude, the project of Jean-Luc Nancy is largely that of reading the 
unthought in Heidegger’s work, which means responding not only to the call 
coming from Heidegger, to Heidegger’s legacy as it were, but to that which in 
Heidegger’s thinking resists thinking, resists his presentation: existence, an opening 
into Heidegger’s thought, at the very outset of Heideggerian presentation. 
Thinking the unthought thus means something other than thinking according to 
this rule: ‘letting every thinker’s thought come to us as something in each case 
unique, never to be repeated, inexhaustible’83. It means thinking with Heidegger, 
according to a logic of separation, where the distances – although minimal – in the 
                                                
82 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans. Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), 93 
83 Martin Heidegger, What is called thinking, trans. Glenn Gray (London: Harper and Row Publishers, 
1968),. 76 
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Heideggerian praxis of thinking make up resistances. Thinking the unthought in 
Heidegger’s work means thinking that which resists him. The unthought in this 
sense would be the non-presentable under the strategies of Being and Time and the 
action of thinking. Resistance of philosophy to itself.  
That which is un-thought in Heidegger is the beginning of his own thinking.  
The unthought becomes then that which cannot be enclosed by thinking, the 
threshold of its beginning, that which by exhausting thinking right away makes 
thinking take its course. Existence and its powers of exposure to the undecidable-
having-to-be-decided.  
By thinking the unthought in Heidegger’s writing, Nancy thinks the unthought 
anew: affirmation of existence beyond philosophical presentation and, at the same 
time, urgency following which we begin philosophy. 
Obeying or paying attention to powers of existence thus means unleashing the 
with-ness from within the subjectivity of the philosopher and therefore the subject 
of philosophizing; leaving perhaps that place less certain, less individual, less 
grounded. Unachievability here should not simply indicate a failure to achieve a 
program, an identity infinitely deferred: it should be the program itself, the power 
of thinking-with, silently happening and immediately exposed between us. 
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